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Monument of nature? an ethnography of the World Heritage of Mt. Kenya 
examines the World Heritage status of Mt. Kenya, an alpine area located 
in Central Kenya. In 1997 Mt. Kenya joined the World Heritage List due to 
its extraordinary ecological and geological features. Nearly fifteen years later, 
Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site expanded to incorporate a wildlife conservancy bordering the mountain in the north. 
Both Mt. Kenya’s original World Heritage designation and later adjustments were founded on, and exclusively 
formulated in, natural scientific language. This volume argues that this was an effect not only of the innate 
qualities of Mt. Kenya’s landscape, but also of a range of conditions that shaped the World Heritage nomination 
and modification processes. These include the World Heritage Convention’s rigid separation of natural and cultural 
heritages that reverberates in World Heritage’s bureaucratic apparatus; the ongoing competition between two 
government institutes over the management of Mt. Kenya that finds its origins in colonial forest and game laws; 
the particular composition of Kenya’s political arena in respectively the late 1990s and the early 2010s; and the 
precarious position of white inhabitants in post-colonial Kenya that translates into permanent fears for losing 
property rights. 
Marlous van den Akker (1983) obtained a Master’s degree in cultural anthropology from the Institute of Cultural 
Anthropology and Development Sociology at Leiden University in 2009. The year after, she received funding from 
the Leiden Global Interactions Research Profile to write a dissertation on Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage status. For this 
project Marlous spent approximately one year in the vicinity of Mt. Kenya in a town called Nanyuki. She is currently 
a member of staff at the Institute of Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology at Leiden University.
African Studies Collection  63

Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
Monument of nature?
An ethnography of the World Heritage of 
Mt. Kenya
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
African Studies Centre 
African Studies Collection, vol. 63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monument of nature?
An ethnography of the World Heritage of 
Mt. Kenya
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marlous van den Akker
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
The research presented in this dissertation was financially supported by the Leiden 
Global Interactions Research Profile and the Institute of Cultural Anthropology and 
Development Sociology at Leiden University.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published by:
African Studies Centre Leiden
P.O. Box 9555
2300 RB Leiden
The Netherlands
asc@ascleiden.nl
http://www.ascleiden.nl
Cover design: Heike Slingerland
Cover photo: Mt. Kenya from Mukima, a housing estate just outside Nanyuki town
Photo: Marlous van den Akker
Maps: Nel de Vink (DeVink Mapdesign)
Printed by Ipskamp Printing, Enschede
ISSN: 1876-018x
ISBN: 978-90-5448-153-9
© Marlous van den Akker, 2016
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
v
Contents
Acknowledgements     vii
INTRODUCTION: DOING ETHNOGRAPHY ON MT. KENYA’S WORLD 
HERITAGE STATUS 1
‘Following around’ Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site 3
Nanyuki, a hub of sorts     6
Informant engagements 8
1 THE RISE OF HERITAGE CONSERVATION: WORLD HERITAGE IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 12
World Heritage as collective ànd state-owned property 13
World Heritage and the failure to problematize ‘the state’ 17
Natural World Heritage is culture 20
World Heritage’s depoliticizing technical idiom 27
World Heritage as a contemporary fascination for the past     33
2 BECOMING WORLD HERITAGE: THE ‘STATE PARTY’ BEHIND MT.
KENYA’S 1997 WORLD HERITAGE LISTING 37
The 1996 application     38
A Game Department, a Forest Department, and the Royal 
National Parks 41
Former colonial offices turned into state corporations 48
KWS and Forest Department rivalry on Mt. Kenya 56
World Heritage consolidating colonial legacies 62
Mt. Kenya’s tussles over mandate after 1997 67
3 A PLACE OF NATURE: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL HISTORIES 
MARGINALIZED 76
Mt. Kenya, Kikuyu homeland     77
Mau Mau on Mt. Kenya 83
A new nation’s troubled past 90
Nature dominating cultural and political pasts 101
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
vi 
4 WHITE PERILS: RACIAL STRUGGLES OVER LAND IN MT. KENYA’S
SHADOW 106
White Highlands     107
From ranches to wildlife sanctuaries 112
Maasai grievances and legislative changes     123
A spectrum of white     131
Is Laikipia’s colour bar inescapable?     137
5 MT. KENYA WORLD HERITAGE SITE REVISITED: A CONSERVANCY’S
QUEST FOR PERPETUAL SAFEKEEPING 142
The making of a conservation titan     143
A devilish land sale?     152
A first attempt to become World Heritage     158
A former cattle ranch as World Heritage 166
A brand in the hands of elites     171
CONCLUSION: MONUMENT OF NATURE? 176
References 186
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
vii 
Acknowledgements 
A great number of people inspired and contributed to this dissertation. To those 
whom are not listed below I emphasize that I have treasured each conversation, 
each debate, and each shared cup of coffee that came to pass in the course of this 
project.
In the first place, I am indebted to the individuals who made my introduction
to Kenya easier, and whose contacts and connections helped to smooth the first 
phase of this research. Among them have been Rachel Spronk, her Nairobian 
friend Janet and her family, Angela Kronenburg García, Adriaan Tas, Charles 
Nzioka, Eleanor Monbiot, and Paul Benson. I am particularly grateful to those
who helped me gain access to Mt. Kenya’s conservation scene and who, apart 
from sharing with me their own insights and points of view, aided me in building
networks of informants. Thank you Susie Weeks, Humphrey Munene, Anthony 
King †, Jonathan Moss and Robert Obrien.
In alphabetical order, I thank George Abungu, Rashid Butt, Geoffrey Chege, 
Ian Craig, Martin Dyer, Michael Dyer, Flemming Dyhr †, Amos Egal, Shawn 
Evans, Gideon Gathaara, Ramesh Gathogo, Simon Gitau, Max Graham, Tim 
Hobbs, Peter Howard, Danson Kamau, Mercy Kendi, Edwin Kinyanjui, Oliver 
Kinyua, Julius Kipng’etich, Christian Lambrechts, Richard Leakey, Benson 
Lengalen, Dominic Maringa, James Mathenge, Gordon Murray, James Murray, 
Paul Muya, James Mwangi, John Mwangi, Margareth Mwangi, Robert Myall,
Daniel Maina Ndoria, Solomon Maina Ndoria, Leo Niskanen, James Njogu, 
Karanja Njoroge, Maurice Nyaligu, Anthony Ochino, Mordecai Ogada, Charles 
Oluchina, Elizabeth Ouma, Edward Parfet, Deirdre Prins-Solani, John Sikote, 
Mark Simpkin, Malte Sommerlatte, Chris Thouless, Tom Traexler, Richard
Vigne, Peter Viljoen, Ben Wandago, Hoseah Wanderi, Sammy Warigia, Satish 
Wason, Mike Watson, David Western, Charlie Wheeler, and Bongo Woodley. 
You, as well as others I have not mentioned by name, offered me your 
perspectives on Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage status and took the time to share
your knowledge and experiences with me. I am extremely appreciative of this.
I think warmly of Leiden University’s Institute of Cultural Anthropology and 
Development Sociology. Over the years the institute has been a stimulating 
academic environment. In particular, I consider myself fortunate to have received
the guidance of Peter Pels. His expertise, his encouragement, and his inspiring
and meticulous comments on my writings have been of inestimable value to me. 
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
viii 
I also cherish the solidarity and critical eye that fellow PhD candidates and other 
colleagues offered me. Thank you Erik Bähre, Andrea Cerda, Richard Fraser, 
Roos Gerritsen, Jan-Bart Gewald, Wendelmoet Hamelink, Zane Kripe, Sabine 
Luning, Carrie Nakamura, Maarten Onneweer, Khadija Outmany-Kadrouch, 
Christoph Rippe, and Annemarie Samuels. In addition, I am indebted to the 
Bayreuth Academy of Advanced African Studies that invited me for a guest 
fellowship in July 2014, during which I shared this project with a larger 
academic audience and received constructive feedback that enriched this work.
I reserve special gratitude for Silvester Kimeli Choge and Joyce Gathigia. 
Your friendship has been, and continues to be, unprejudiced and unconditional. 
Your kindness and affection instilled this project with a lightness and optimism 
that I have not encountered before. Thank you.
More than anyone, I owe Erik. You are my guest of honour. 
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
Meru
Chogoria
Chuka
Nanyuki
Timau
Naro Moru
Nyeri
Karatina
Embu
Mt. Kenya National Park
Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve
0 10 km
Main road
UNESCO
World Heritage Site
© ASCL/ DeVink Mapdesign 2016
Equator
Mt. Kenya
Forests
KENYA
KENYA
ix 
DeVink Mapdesign Ltd
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
Introduction: Doing ethnography on 
Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage status
In August 2010, a man called Teddy Munyao climbed to Point Lenana, the 
lowest of Mt. Kenya’s three peaks. The act itself was not exceptional. Each year,
thousands of tourists visit Mt. Kenya National Park and many of them come for 
mountaineering. The hike to Point Lenana is not particularly harsh: under the 
instructions of a good guide even inexperienced climbers generally pull it off.
But Teddy Munyao’s trek meant to write history. He carried with him a copy of 
the new Kenyan Constitution, which had just passed parliament, to plant it on top 
of the mountain. He succeeded and his action received national media coverage 
(see for instance Daily Nation, 24 August 2010, 29 August 2010; Standard 
Media, 24 August 2010).
Nearly three years prior to Teddy Munyao’s deed, Kenya had witnessed an
outburst of extreme violence. The brutality had been sparked by the outcome of 
the general elections held in December 2007, after which the supporters of two
opposing political parties had attacked one another. The atrocities lasted until late
February 2008. By that time, more than a thousand people were confirmed dead,
and an estimated three hundred thousand people had left their homes and 
possessions to escape the bloodshed (Anderson & Lochery 2008: 328). Roughly
a month into the conflict, United Nations’ Kofi Annan intervened in an attempt 
to calm the hostilities. Under his mediation, the leaders of the two competing
parties eventually agreed to a comprise and divided the country’s key 
administrative positions amongst their members. In the years that followed, the 
international community pressured Kenya’s politicians into drafting a new 
constitution, so that future elections would not end in such mayhem again. Teddy 
Munyao’s climb marked the end of this process – it meant to symbolize that 
former difficulties in organizing the country’s leadership democratically had
finally been surmounted. 
It was not the first time that Mt. Kenya got caught up in nationalist 
propaganda. In fact, Teddy Munyao’s hike was a reiteration of an earlier event
that had taken place in 1963. In December that year, Kisoi Munyao, Teddy 
Munyao’s father, had climbed Mt. Kenya to mark the end of colonial rule. While 
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the British made preparations for the transfer of governance an assistant of the 
soon-to-be president Jomo Kenyatta had asked Kisoi, who was a trained porter 
boy, to raise the republic’s new flag on Mt. Kenya at the exact moment of 
Kenyatta’s inauguration. The act was part of a larger celebration programme that 
one Kenyan journalist later recounted as follows: 
Midnight December 11-12 found two elderly men standing in the middle of the huge arena 
of the Uhuru Stadium in Nairobi. The band played the British national anthem. Then 
suddenly the lights were dimmed. There was a profound silence among the 250,000 people 
who filled the Stadium that night. Once I heard a boo, but it sounded as stupid as it was 
mannerless. Then the lights went on, and all I could hear was the deafening roar of the crowd 
as they cheered the raising of the black, red and green flag of the new Kenyan nation. Prime 
Minister Jomo Kenyatta, for whom this was the crowning moment of his forty-year political 
life, walked back to the Royal Pavilion waving his white fly whisk. At his side walked the 
grey-haired Malcolm MacDonald, the last but most popular of British Governors in Kenya 
and the country’s first Governor-General. Then fireworks exploded to light the sky and, as it 
were, officially announced the birth of the new nation.
Ng’weno (1964: 36)
While in Nairobi groups dressed in tribal costumes were performing indigenous 
dances, and while men of faith were leading public prayer ceremonies (Ng’weno 
1964: 37), Kisoi Munyao and his crew struggled on Mt. Kenya. The group had 
aimed for the highest of Mt. Kenya’s three summits, called Batian, but bad 
weather conditions had forced them to settle for Mt. Kenya’s second highest peak 
Nelion (Ng’weno 1964: 38). On arrival, Kisoi took the Kenyan flag from one of 
the backpacks and planted it firmly on Nelion’s rocky surface. According to 
popular belief, this happened exactly at midnight and it is said that while Nairobi 
exploded into fireworks and cheers, Kisoi watched the cloth flutter in the wind.
Kisoi Munyao’s expedition was one of symbolic reconquest. As we will see in 
the course of this dissertation, both the country’s Kikuyu population as well as 
British administrators had claimed ownership over Mt. Kenya in the past – the
latter even named the entire colony after it (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya 
1920: 404). Kisoi’s flag hoisting adventure was to supplant these histories and 
turn Mt. Kenya into a national symbol that belonged to all citizens. By 
implication, Kisoi became a national hero. On his way down from Nelion he was 
picked up by helicopter, shipped straight to the capital, and welcomed into the 
independence festivities as a celebrity (Nyamweru 2012: 282).
***
In December 1997, Mt. Kenya obtained World Heritage status. The World 
Heritage listing was vested in the mountain’s natural characteristics and 
celebrated its moorlands, its indigenous forests, its lakes and glaciers, and its 
distinguished flora record. Because Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site focuses
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
3
  
exclusively on ecological processes and geological formations, it might seem a 
far cry from the political events described above. Nevertheless, I began this 
dissertation with father and son Munyao because their hikes epitomize what 
became this work’s core theme – namely, Mt. Kenya’s involvement in struggles 
over power and recognition, as well as its association with nation-building and 
statecraft, in a political climate in which ethnic and racial tensions predominate.
In this dissertation I examine Mt. Kenya’s 1997 World Heritage designation
(chapters two and three) as well as modifications to that designation that 
materialized roughly one and a half decades later (chapters four and five). World 
Heritage is a state affair, yet so far World Heritage case studies have largely 
failed to engage with the notion of ‘state’ critically. In light of this, I set myself 
the task of unpacking the ‘Kenyan state party’ that was responsible for Mt. 
Kenya’s original World Heritage nomination, and unpacking the ‘Kenyan state 
party’ that initiated later site adjustments. This revealed a number of things. For 
instance, both events were brought about by a small group of stakeholders that 
meant to capitalize on World Heritage to secure property rights and management 
authority; both events drew heavily on natural scientific arguments for nature 
conservation and in the process obscured various struggles over decision-making 
power; and, most importantly, both events were a response to the present-day 
legacies of Kenya’s colonial history. 
There are important insights to gain from breaking down World Heritage state
parties into the actual individuals who drive World Heritage initiatives. Such an 
exercise reveals, among other things, the histories and political processes that 
World Heritage’s professional technical idiom obscures, and in doing so it can 
make contributions to the anthropology of heritage and World Heritage studies.
But there are not only academic merits. When we conserve and celebrate heritage 
sites without paying attention to how these sites came about in the first place, we 
might fail to recognize how heritage articulates and reinforces social, cultural and 
political boundaries. This is particularly pertinent in the case of Mt. Kenya,
because, as we will see, its World Heritage status is intimately tied up with the 
country’s colonial history. I develop this thought in the chapters to come. In the 
remainder of this introduction I address how I organized my project 
methodologically. 
‘Following around’ Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site
Since its foundation in 1972 there has been ample critique on the World Heritage
Convention. Among others, scholars have pointed to the top-down 
implementation of Western heritage values and practices in other parts of the 
world (Butler 2007; Byrne 1991; Derrida 2002; Elliot & Schmutz 2012;
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Rowlands & Butler 2007); to the favouring of well-known heritages, particularly 
religious buildings and historic towns, over less well-known places and places 
with a negative connotation (Breen 2007; Meskell 2002; Labadi 2005; Rico 
2008); and to its static understanding of heritage, vested in the idea that heritage 
sites have a permanent value and meaning (Bianchi 2002; Harrison 2004; 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004; Scholze 2008; Smith 2006). These are all legitimate 
points, but I chose to approach World Heritage differently – this dissertation is 
not about how and why the World Heritage Convention is inappropriate, and it is 
not about all the different ways in which World Heritage failed Mt. Kenya.
Instead, it focuses on how World Heritage status affected and complicated the 
mountain, and on how it served as a mobilizer in its own right. As such, it for 
instance considers how Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site engendered negotiations
and the formation of alliances, or how it gave expression to and got entangled in
existing conflicts. In doing so, this dissertation intends to walk the middle ground 
between instrumentalist and critical views of World Heritage. I found inspiration 
for this in David Mosse’s (2005) work on development policy. 
In search of answers to the kind of questions posed above I applied a 
methodology of ‘following around’ (Marcus 1995). This is a method in which 
the issue under study comes to identify chains, paths, threads and conjunctures 
(Ibid.: 105), thus revealing to the researcher relevant social networks. The
method of following around typically results in multi-sited ethnographies that 
examine the relations, translations, and associations between different settings 
(Ibid.: 102). Although I applied Marcus’s method, I am hesitant to call this work 
multi-sited for at least two reasons. First, for Marcus, ‘different settings’ 
translates into physically different places of fieldwork. Following around Mt.
Kenya World Heritage Site brought me to all sorts of research sites, which I
describe below, but all these sites were connected to just one fieldwork locale, 
namely a town located on Mt. Kenya’s west slopes that I introduce below. 
Secondly, I am reluctant to use the term multi-sited given the hype surrounding 
this concept in recent years. Proponents have claimed, and continue to claim, that 
multi-sited research marks a radical break with classical anthropological 
fieldwork traditions. Yet, it is debatable whether this is really the case. Bronislaw 
Malinowski and Edward Evans-Pritchard arguably already did very similar 
things – they were just less explicit about it (Herzfeld 2015: 338; Hannerz 2003: 
202).
In practice, following around Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site took various 
forms. Firstly, it brought me to a large variety of organizations and institutes. 
These included government institutes such as the Kenya Wildlife Service 
(KWS), the Kenya Forest Service (KFS, before called the Forest Department), 
and the former Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife, as well as NGOs such as the 
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International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the Mount Kenya 
Trust, the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), Space for Giants (SFG), the 
Laikipia Wildlife Forum (LWF), the Green Belt Movement, the Kenya Forest 
Working Group (KFWG), Ngare Ndare Forest Trust (NNFT) and The Nature 
Conservancy (TNC). In addition, it brought me to the National Museums of 
Kenya (NMK), to the World Heritage Centre in Paris, to Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy, and to a range of other private conservancies located in the vicinity 
of Mt. Kenya. All these organizations and institutes have been key to my 
understanding of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site, but I did not do in-depth 
ethnographic work on any of them. Rather, my interest in them was largely 
restricted to their link with Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage status, and my contact 
with them typically consisted of conversations with one or two specific staff 
members who had an explicit connection to the mountain. In addition, I
participated in a number of institutional events: I for instance sat in on 
community meetings organized by conservation NGOs and joined NGO staff on 
field patrols or project visits.
Secondly, following around Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site brought me to a 
variety of written sources that included websites, newspapers, policies, 
conventions, maps, agreements, management plans, evaluation reports and World 
Heritage application files. I have approached these written sources as 
authoritative texts deserving ethnographic attention in their own right. I 
examined how they constructed subjects, objects and social realities, and I 
focused explicitly on how they meant to foster administrative control (Hull 2012: 
257-259; see also Shore & Wright 1997). In doing so, I followed in the footsteps 
of scholars such as Anders (2008, 2009), who analysed World Bank and IMF 
reports in relation to the implementation of good governance reforms in Malawi; 
Erikson (2001), who analysed the UNESCO document ‘Our Creative Diversity’ 
in relation to UNESCO’s definition of the concept ‘culture’; and Ferguson 
(1990), who analysed a World Bank Country Report in relation to the formation 
of development projects in Lesotho.
Lastly, following around Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site brought me to a wide 
range of informants who were largely, but not exclusively, associated with one or 
more of the above institutes. Among them were (former) KWS rangers, wardens 
and executives; KFS foresters and forest guards; politicians and ex-politicians 
operating regionally, nationally, or both; trained biologists, geographers and 
ecologists working as professional conservationists or having done so in the past; 
heritage specialists including freelance consultants and museum employees; 
Kenyan and foreign NGO workers; mountain guides; fellow researchers; recent 
settlers and descendants of colonial settler families; and the owners or managers 
of private conservancies. I invited these informants into my study for different 
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reasons – sometimes their names appeared in one of the aforementioned written 
documents, sometimes organizations or institutes directed me to them, and 
sometimes my contact with one informant led to my introduction to another. 
How exactly I dealt with this colourful collective I discuss at the end of this 
introduction.
In sum, following around Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site marked out a 
scattered and fragmented research field that lacked an obvious geographic centre. 
This is something that increasingly complicates anthropological research today. 
In part, this is due to the way in which the discipline has come to conceptualize 
global interconnectedness and has come to organize fieldwork in line with this,
and in part, this is due to how anthropology recently expanded its interest in 
topics such as policy or the functioning of bureaucracy (see for instance Gupta 
2012; Mosse 2005; Müller 2013; Shore & Wright 1997; Wedel et al. 2005). For 
this reason, Gupta & Ferguson suggest conceiving of contemporary ethnographic 
fieldwork not as a commitment to one particular local setting, but as ‘an 
attentiveness to social, cultural, and political location and a willingness to work 
self-consciously at shifting or realigning our own location while building 
epistemological and political links with other locations’ (1997: 5, original 
emphasis). I have aimed to do precisely this. 
Nanyuki, a hub of sorts
I followed around Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site from Nanyuki, a town located 
on Mt. Kenya’s western slope. Nanyuki was founded as a colonial township in
1920 in anticipation of the wave of Europeans that moved to the area in the 
course of the decade (Duder & Youé 1994: 261). Initially, it was fairly remote, 
but this changed when a branch of the larger Mombasa-Uganda railroad 
connected it to Nairobi in 1930. After that, Nanyuki attracted more and more 
Europeans and it became the typical white men’s meeting ground (Ibid.: 260). 
Such developments characterized the region at large, and Nanyuki was part of an
area that became known as the White Highlands, due to the massive number of 
white settlers. To this day, the area’s colonial history complicates the distribution 
of land and struggles over ownership rights, as we will see in the course of this 
dissertation. My stay here had direct consequences for the themes I came to 
discuss in this work, and it inevitably turned my attention to the colour bar.
Nanyuki ceased to be exclusively white long ago, and today it is a colourful 
and multi-ethnic place. Nevertheless, it still has a distinct settler feel to it. This is 
due to, among other things, the presence of the British Army Training Unit 
Kenya (BATUK), which has a camp in town, and the presence of the Nanyuki 
Sports Club, which attracts white landowners and conservationists from all over 
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the region. For a long time, Nanyuki continued to be the somewhat isolated and 
tranquil place that it once was, but this changed in the course of the 2000s. For 
one thing, in the aftermath of the 2007 elections, many residents of the Rift 
Valley, which was one of the epicentres of election violence, fled to Nanyuki for 
safety and stuck around afterwards. Secondly, in 2010, a new highway was 
completed that runs from Nairobi to Isiolo, a town some seventy kilometres 
northeast of Nanyuki that grew out of Somalian military camps established 
during the First World War. This highway greatly improved Nanyuki’s access 
and, as a result, it now attracts a far larger number of tourists and white settlers 
than before. Correspondingly, the town swelled, house prices skyrocketed, and 
coffee corners, restaurants, curiosa shops and tourist camps continue to 
mushroom all over the place.
I first visited Nanyuki in January 2011, when I conducted a short three-week 
pilot study during which I travelled around the mountain in search of a suitable
fieldwork base. I eventually chose Nanyuki, primarily for its proximity to two 
different Mt. Kenya National Park gates as well as for its facilities. I returned to 
Nanyuki from July to December 2011, and again from April to September 2012. 
In these ten months I rented a small cottage just outside town, which had been 
offered to me after I had placed a small notice in a regional newsletter. From here 
I took a car, which I bought for the purpose and sold afterwards, to meet my 
various informants – many of them lived somewhere in the area, but I also made 
frequent excursions to Nairobi. In the capital, I paid regular visits to, among 
others, the Kenya Wildlife Service headquarters, the National Museums of 
Kenya, the offices of organizations such as IUCN and UNESCO, and a range of 
conservation NGOs.
In June 2013, roughly six months after I completed my last stretch of 
fieldwork in Nanyuki, I made one final fieldwork trip to Paris, to visit the World 
Heritage Centre. At the time, the Centre was in the midst of preparing for that 
year’s annual World Heritage meetings. I was not invited to these meetings. But,
due to the event, the Centre turned into a meeting place for different heritage 
experts, several of whom I was able to meet. The meetings themselves, during 
which decisions were made about the modifications to Mt. Kenya’s original 
World Heritage designation, I later watched online1 (see UNESCO n.d.A).
 
                                                        
1 This service is offered since 2012 and, according to Meskell & Brumann, has had some notable 
effects. Live streaming of World Heritage meetings for instance led to home ministries following the 
proceedings closely while instructing their representatives on the spot. Also, aware of the increased 
visibility, some speakers now tailor their speeches to online audiences (2015: 35).
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Informant engagements
The way in which the method of following around came to identify the 
informants of this study demanded a careful reflection on fieldwork possibilities. 
On the one hand, my informants were dispersed over many different locations 
and organizational settings, which meant that I continuously moved from one 
place to another and did not spend a prolonged period of time anywhere. On the 
other hand, many informants had demanding professional lives. Some were even 
considered leading experts in their field of specialization and, as a result,
informants typically only had limited time to spare to contribute to my studies. In 
short, this type of informant did not allow for participant observation. 
Ever since Bronislaw Malinowski, participant observation has been central to 
anthropology and the mystique that surrounds it has had direct consequences for 
the identification of ‘suitable’ ethnographic research topics (Gupta & Ferguson 
1997; Shore 2002). Laura Nader, for instance, exemplified just how strongly the 
discipline’s identity and self-esteem seems to depend on participant observation: 
The degree to which our field choices might be determined by whether or not we can 
observe as participant was made clear to me when two of my students went to Washington to 
study a law firm that did not want to be studied (even though individual members were 
willing to cooperate in a limited way). How could they participant-observe if the firm 
wouldn’t let them in the door, and if they couldn’t participant-observe then how could they 
do anthropology?
Nader (1972: 306, original emphasis)
The method of participant observation fits the study of the marginalized and the 
subaltern best. As a result, these groups have long formed, and arguably continue 
to form, anthropology’s main field of interest. But already in the early 1970s 
Nader pointed out that such a limited vision hampers the discipline’s 
development. She argued that the insights that anthropologists can offer are 
inevitably distorted, and likely play into stereotyping and stigmatization, as long 
as anthropologists fail to study ‘the colonizers rather than the colonized, the 
culture of power rather than the culture of the powerless, the culture of affluence 
rather than the culture of poverty’ (Nader 1972: 289). A study on white collar 
crime amongst middle-class corporate staff and business elites would, for 
instance, put crimes amongst the residents of a shanty town in a different 
perspective, and it would unsettle the idea that criminality is confined to the poor 
(Ibid.: 299). Clearly, participant observation does not lend itself well to the study 
of the rich and the powerful (see also Konrad 2002; Shore 2002), and it has even 
been suggested that ethnographic invisibility is in itself one of their many 
privileges (Gusterson 1997: 115). Yet, this does not mean that anthropologists 
should not, or cannot, study elites. Rather, we must think of ways to engage that 
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can replace participant observation but that do not compromise ethnographic 
authority.2
I have tried to do this in two ways: I have critically analysed various written 
documents that informants composed themselves or used for administrative 
purposes, and I have sought dialogue. Schrijvers (1991) has drawn attention to 
how dialogue is complicated by power differences, and she suggested that 
anthropologists are largely unable to build dialectical relations with elite groups 
on equal terms because the latter are unlikely to ‘climb down’ to the level of the 
researcher (Ibid.: 177). I do not necessarily disagree with this, but I believe that 
her evaluation deserves at least two additional comments. First, I would describe 
my encounters with informants as conversations that I guided towards certain 
topics and themes, but during which I also shared my own ideas and insights (see 
also Hannerz 2003: 209). Especially the latter helped to establish my position as 
an ‘expert’, which, in turn, contributed to levelling power differences. Secondly, 
Schrijvers’s claim raises the question of whether it is always necessary to aspire 
to equality in dialogue, if such a condition is even possible at all. I have 
experienced that sometimes it may work in one’s advantage to be taken as 
unknowing and unthreatening, and being exposed to how informants try to 
establish and maintain power differences during conversations can in itself be a 
useful source of information.
Over time, I came to discuss Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site with roughly one 
hundred informants. Not all of them appear in this dissertation, but even those I 
do not directly refer to are implicitly present, for they helped to ground my 
understanding of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site, as well as of Kenya’s overall 
political conditions. I visited about twenty informants on different occasions and 
I met a handful regularly – they became my key informants. On three or four 
occasions I failed to meet people face-to-face and only spoke to them by phone 
or email. More often, however, first-hand conversations and emails 
complemented one another, with private meetings continued online or vice versa. 
I have a very basic understanding of Kiswahili and always communicated in 
English. To my knowledge, this never caused problems or created 
misunderstandings. 
I did not tape-record my conversations but took extensive notes. Occasionally, 
I asked informants to pause for a moment, so that I could write down their words
verbatim – whenever a block quote appears in this work it was recorded in this 
way. Shortly after each informant consultation I used my notes to write a detailed 
report. This meant that a considerable part of my time in Nanyuki was spent 
                                                        
2 The upcoming body of literature on organizations (see for instance Gellner & Hirsch 2001; Harper 
1998; Hilhorst 2003) and the upcoming body of literature on elites (see for instance Lutz 2005; 
Salverda & Abbink 2013; Shore & Nugent 2002) suggest that anthropologists are increasingly making 
efforts in this direction.
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behind the screen of a laptop. This had advantages and disadvantages: on the one 
hand, it limited the time I could spend ‘out in the field’; on the other hand, it also 
aided me in processing the information I collected analytically. This helped to 
identify themes that needed further attention.
While writing this dissertation I ran into two types of difficulties, both related 
to the nature of this study. First, some of the issues I deal with in this work are 
politically sensitive and often informants only wanted to discuss them off the 
record. One of the more critical problems of elite studies is that the use of 
pseudonyms does not necessarily help to hide an informant’s identity, especially 
not when the person in question is a public figure and his or her steps are 
therefore easily retraceable. For this reason, at times I only mention that I learned 
about something through ‘a landowner’, ‘a conservationist’, or ‘a KWS 
employee’, and on a few occasions I even leave out those comments. As a result,
the reader will not always be informed on how I gathered my data and will be left 
in the dark on how I obtained certain information. I have chosen to do this to 
protect my informants – I hope that when the situation occurs readers will accept 
my judgement and have confidence in my analyses. At the same time, there are 
numerous instances where I do mention people by name. In fact, unpacking the 
Kenyan state party was one of my prime goals, as I mentioned earlier, and this 
specifically requires that identities are made public. Where I link statements and 
remarks to individuals I clarify in a footnote where and when I consulted them. 
Secondly, my dependence on a diverse range of informants raised questions 
on the issue of loyalty. The conventional idea still seems to be that an 
anthropologist’s paramount obligation is to the people he or she studies. I believe 
that such reasoning oversimplifies how researcher and researched produce 
knowledge jointly – besides, it is a principle grounded in an ethnographic focus 
on the subaltern that is untenable for elite studies (Shore 2002: 11). Especially 
when applying a method of following around, a researcher occasionally works 
with – and at other times works against – continuously changing sets of subjects 
(Marcus 1995: 114). To deal with such contradictions, and to prevent 
anthropologists from losing touch with informants altogether, Marcus suggests 
taking a stance: 
In conducting multi-sited research, one finds oneself with all sorts of cross-cutting and 
contradictory personal commitments. These conflicts are resolved, perhaps ambivalently, not 
by refuge in being a detached anthropological scholar, but in being a sort of ethnographer-
activist, renegotiating identities in different sites as one learns more about a slice of the 
world system.
Marcus (1995: 113)
Throughout this work I have tried to follow Marcus’s advice and take a stance in 
relation to the issues discussed. On some occasions, specific informants may feel 
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offended by my interpretations.3 Taking this into account, I want to emphasize 
that I do not mean to make personal allegations. I position myself vis-à-vis
subjects and themes, and I look into the role that informants play in relation to 
particular structural conditions, but without the intention of criticizing anyone 
personally.
Finally, in light of the diversity of informants and sources I have used, I feel 
the need to address one of the more fundamental critiques on Marcus’s method. 
This critique holds that when anthropologists follow too many research paths and 
explore networks too widely, there is a real risk that ethnographic data spreads 
too thin. As a result, the anthropological account dilutes, touching upon surfaces 
rather than examining in depth. I share these concerns and I can see how 
networks can become overwhelming in scale and extent. At the same time, such 
comments need further sophistication. Firstly, when applying the method of 
following around it can be perfectly valid to pay more ethnographic attention to 
some parts of the networks that emerge than to others (see Marcus 1999: 8). I, for 
instance, relied heavily on a handful of key informants and mainly used 
conversations with others to contextualize their comments and actions. Secondly, 
Michael Herzfeld (2015) recently suggested that what matters most in multi-sited 
research, or in research that lacks a specific geographic focus, is not the number 
of sites or the scope of the networks that one studies but the level of social 
intimacy that one manages to cultivate (Ibid.: 339). In my particular case, 
relations with informants were reinforced by the growing awareness that my 
interaction with them was part of a larger scheme that also included co-workers, 
superiors, partners in other organizations, former business associates, and so on –
Hannerz (2003) calls this a form of ethnographic embeddedness that follows 
from mutual acquaintance, rather than from deepening relations with any 
particular individual (Ibid.: 204). I like to believe that this, together with 
informants’ increasing willingness to confide things to me off the record, or to 
share critiques with me that were potentially harmful to them, marked the social 
intimacy that Herzfeld speaks of. After more than ten months of fieldwork in 
Nanyuki I felt I was a ‘local’ in the social networks that I studied, not least 
because my presence and interest in Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage status had itself 
tangible consequences – it mobilized people, as we will see in the course of this 
dissertation, and had repercussions for what Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site 
looks like today.
                                                        
3 Publications may destroy the relationship with one’s informants and anthropological writing may 
alienate the researcher from the researched. Mosse (2006) maintains that, even though this can create 
very uncomfortable situations, it should not be taken as an indicator of the quality of one’s work – he 
suggests that the social does not necessarily have to be analysed socially, and rejects the idea that 
evidence is always a matter of consensus (Ibid.: 947). 
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The rise of heritage conservation: 
World Heritage in historical perspective
A number of themes recur throughout this dissertation. On different occasions,
for instance, I deal with ongoing struggles over management authority, which 
have come to pit different government institutes against one another but which 
also complicate private-public partnerships. At times I emphasize the various 
ways in which Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage listing naturalizes and depoliticizes, 
thus obscuring cultural, political and racist histories and enabling a variety of 
political projects to appear as if they are technical affairs. And, of course, I
deconstruct the Kenyan state party, in an attempt to disentangle the processes and 
actors that initiated Mt. Kenya’s 1997 World Heritage listing as well as the 2013 
modifications to Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site. 
These themes resonate with different key characteristics of World Heritage.
These characteristics include uncertainties over who ‘owns’ and is responsible 
for World Heritage; the relationship between World Heritage, the state, and 
nationalism; World Heritage’s categorical separation of natural and cultural 
heritage sites; World Heritage’s technical idiom; and World Heritage’s present-
day popularity. In this first chapter, I make an effort to historicize these 
characteristics by tracing World Heritage’s genealogy. This will bring me to, 
among other things, the French Revolution’s iconoclasm, to eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century aristocrat endeavours to cultivate obedient national citizens, 
to the emergence of a particular American nature conservation ethos from the 
turn of the twentieth century onwards, and to the campaign to save the Nubian 
temples in Egypt in the 1950s. By discussing these developments, I draw 
attention to how the 1972 World Heritage Convention emerged from a wider set 
of historical developments. Thus, I mean to underscore that while Mt. Kenya’s 
World Heritage designation is the product of a relatively recent set of 
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developments in Kenya, at the same time it articulates longer traditions of 
heritage conservation. 
World Heritage as collective ànd state-owned property
Until the late eighteenth century, European countries showed relatively little 
interest in the preservation of historical sites and objects. In France, for instance, 
old buildings were generally left to deteriorate, or they were dismantled and their 
construction material reused (Sax 1990: 1150). The French Revolution, which 
lasted from 1789 to 1799, brought about major changes in this regard and laid the 
foundations for contemporary conservation practices. 
During the French Revolution, France’s common masses challenged the 
sovereignty of the gentry and clergy. Their protest manifested itself in, among 
other things, the widespread destruction and expropriation of church and 
aristocratic valuables. The taking over of the Louvre and the Tuileries illustrates 
this: in 1791, the French king Louis XVI declared the Louvre’s buildings and 
gardens a national palace, but a year later he was imprisoned and the 
revolutionary government took possession of both the palace as well as of the 
scientific and artistic collections that it contained. 
Revolutionists plundered at a steady rate – revolting masses looted 
monasteries and royal graves, and those noblemen who were not executed fled
abroad, leaving numerous art collections unattended (Grijzenhout 2007: 7). As a 
result, the body of confiscated goods expanded rapidly, but the revolutionary 
government was ambivalent about what to do with all these objects. It meant to 
sell parts of it, and in 1790 it founded a Monuments Commission that was to 
distinguish the saleable from the non-saleable items (Sax 1990: 1152). But the 
broader populace soon protested against the commission: it maintained that the 
artefacts were too reminiscent of former repression, and they demanded their 
wholesale destruction. Initially, the revolutionary government paid heed to such 
calls and in 1792 it even adopted legislation that justified and encouraged 
demolition (Sax 1990: 1153). 
While France struggled to cope with the material relics of the old regime, 
different commentators began to call for conservation. Among them was the 
bishop of Blois, Henri Baptist Grégoire, who was a fierce critic of the 
widespread destruction and even invented a word for it: vandalism (Grijzenhout 
2007: 8). Rather than giving prominence to how church and aristocratic treasures 
had come to represent ecclesiastical and feudal power, Grégoire underscored 
their artistic value – he was an advocate of the fine arts and the sciences, and he 
argued that the revolutionary slogan liberté, égalité et fraternité was merely an
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empty catchphrase as long as the country at large failed to respect talent and
creativity (Sax 1990: 1155).
Henri Baptist Grégoire’s calls resonated with other advocates of conservation 
such as Alexandre Lenoir. Like Grégoire, Lenoir strongly disapproved of the 
public’s cry for demolition, and it has been suggested that he especially deplored 
the looting of the Church of St. Denis as well as the plunder of the Abbey of 
Cluny (Ter Keurs 2011: 10). Yet, unlike Grégoire, Lenoir was far less successful 
in streamlining his arguments with the revolution’s credos – he always struggled 
to ‘get in line with the appropriate revolutionary rhetoric of the day’ (Sax 1990: 
1165). Nevertheless, Lenoir made significant contributions to the preservation of 
the objects that revolutionists targeted. Already in the early 1790s he used his 
political contacts to press for safekeeping. Surprisingly, he received support from 
the revolutionary government, which hired him as well as two assistants to 
collect as much as possible and store it in the Petits-Augustins convent in Paris 
(Ter Keurs 2011: 10). In 1795, Lenoir opened the Musée des Monuments 
Français, after which his collection became accessible to the larger public.
The advocacy of men such as Henri Baptist Grégoire and Alexandre Lenoir 
gave way to a catchall term for the objects under threat of the revolution, for 
which hitherto no collective name had existed. This term was patrimoine,
introduced by the politician Armand-Guy Kersaint in 1791 (Grijzenhout 2007: 
7). Prior to Kersaint’s usage of the word, patrimoine had been a strict juridical 
category that had referred to an individual’s possessions obtained through 
patrilineal inheritance and that were inalienable. Such legal restrictions to what 
one could do with bequeathed goods were not exclusive to France. In the 
Netherlands, for example, the notion erfgoed imposed similar constraints (Van 
den Berg 2007: 24): erfgoed made a juridical distinction between the possessions 
one had inherited from ancestors and the possessions one had acquired oneself, 
called koopgoed. Contrary to koopgoed, erfgoed was subjected to various norms 
and constraints that sought to prevent family capital from breaking up or from 
being handed over to in-laws. Similar juridical regulations were in force in 
Germany (Ibid.).1
Presumably, the kinship values on which patrimoine and erfgoed rested began 
to disintegrate already from the thirteenth century onwards, and possibly even 
earlier (Van den Berg 2007: 30). Gradually, the legislative distinction between 
possessions bought and possessions inherited lost its relevance. Particularly 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, juridical arrangements in 
general took progressive account of individual rights, and the protection of 
                                                        
1 The situation in England was entirely different from the situation on the main land: here, law already 
allowed for the free alienation of all one’s possessions as early as the second half of the twelfth 
century (MacFarlane 1998: 109-111). 
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
15
 
private interests gained the upper hand over the custody of family resources 
(Ibid.: 29-31). The French Revolution further reinforced this process and marked 
the end of the legal separation of bought and inherited goods in France (Ibid.: 
37). However, and partially due to Armand-Guy Kersaint, the word patrimoine 
did not vanish from French vocabulary. 
In the course of the French Revolution, patrimoine came to signify the objects 
that the revolutionary government had seized from the gentry and clergy. 
Armand-Guy Kersaint called these objects le patrimoine de tous (Grijzenhout 
2007: 7) and, as such, he had identified the French people as the legitimate and 
ultimate heirs of the revolutionary loot. When Henri Baptist Grégoire, Alexandre 
Lenoir and likeminded thinkers adopted Kersaint’s application of patrimoine and 
made it central to their conservation jargon, its meaning shifted permanently 
from a juridical arrangement on family inheritances to a conservation philosophy 
that concerned goods that belonged to society at large (see also Sax 1990: 1157). 
This philosophy was vested in a collective commemoration of the past that was 
already seen elsewhere, for instance during the celebration of Bonfire Night in 
seventeenth-century England (Harvey 2001). At the same time, there was 
something truly novel in the French Revolution’s notion of patrimoine: it made 
the safekeeping of the historic relics that belonged to all a task of the state.
The historical development of the term patrimoine may encourage us to 
consider heritage as the expression of a property relation. Yet, the kind of 
property relation that formed during the French Revolution created a 
contradiction in terminis: patrimoine suggested that goods could be collective 
property and state property at the same time, and in doing so it confused different 
types of ownership rights. MacPherson (1978) defines collective property as a 
bundle of individual rights that pertain to the same use or the same benefit, and 
that gives all individual members of a group access to something (Ibid.: 4). State 
property on the other hand, seen from the perspective of the recipients of 
collective rights, is a right of exclusion reserved to the state (Ibid.: 5-6). 
MacPherson’s definitions thus suggest that collective property can never be state 
property, or vice versa, for the former endows members of society with access 
rights that the latter denies them. It follows that state ownership over heritage, 
which is by its very nature the property of a collective (Handler 1985; Strother 
2012), is inevitably contradictory – it communicates that heritage is 
simultaneously of the state, and of all the people who are not the state. 
The 1972 World Heritage Convention echoes patrimoine’s idea of state 
supervision over collectively owned heritages. In the preamble it states:
Considering that parts of the cultural and natural heritage are of outstanding interest and 
therefore need to be preserved as part of the World Heritage of mankind as a whole 
UNESCO (1972: 1)
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And:
Considering that, in view of the magnitude and gravity of the new dangers threatening them, 
it is incumbent on the international community as a whole to participate in the protection of 
its cultural and natural heritage of outstanding value, by the granting of collective assistance 
which, although not taking the place of action by the State concerned, will serve as an 
efficient complement thereto
UNESCO (1972: 1)
The convention grants state parties the exclusive power to select and manage the 
world’s heritages, it dictates that all decision-making should go through state 
parties, and it constantly reiterates state authority over World Heritage
preservation. On a very practical level, this means that stateless territories cannot 
host World Heritage Sites – Antarctica, for instance, has an extraordinary 
landscape but no government to put forward World Heritage nominations 
(Anthamatten & Hazen 2007: 265), and the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem was 
only recently added to the World Heritage List after the United Nations 
recognized Palestine as a state party in November 2012 (UNESCO document 
WHC-12/36.COM/19). At the same time, the convention indicates that World 
Heritage exceeds national interests and serves mankind as a whole. As such, the 
friction between collective property rights and state property rights became one 
of World Heritage’s core features: on the one hand, World Heritage is identified 
as a global common tantamount to a global public domain (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 
2006: 185); on the other hand, World Heritage’s protection is entrusted to the 
state. Among other things, this friction has translated into ongoing discussions 
over who is ultimately responsible for the preservation of World Heritage Sites. 
Elizabeth Ouma, 2 who in 2011 worked for the regional UNESCO office in 
Nairobi, indicated to me that especially poorer countries tend to demand from 
UNESCO that it takes responsibility, for instance by offering financial support. 
She said that these countries ‘misunderstand’ the organization’s role in the World 
Heritage Programme, and underscored that the convention is very explicit about 
state parties’ obligations.
What seems to further complicate the confusion over who precisely should be 
in charge of World Heritage preservation is that neither the principle of state 
ownership, nor the principle of collective ownership identifies where exactly
supervision over the property in question should be located: the first assigns 
control to all and thus to no one in particular, and the latter assigns control to an 
institution of which the representatives change (MacPherson 1978: 5-6). Thus, 
even if one had a clear idea about whether World Heritage is more ‘of the state’ 
or more ‘of the world’, it would still not be obvious exactly which individuals or 
institutions should be entitled to deal with World Heritage. Mt. Kenya World 
                                                        
2 Conversation on 31 October 2011, UNESCO Regional Office for Eastern Africa in Nairobi.
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Heritage Site illustrates how this may manifest itself in daily struggles over 
management authority. What is particularly interesting about the case of Mt. 
Kenya is that different sets of stakeholders have tried to capitalize on the 
confusion that the convergence of collective property rights and state property 
rights create, and have deliberately tried to mobilize a global heritage community 
in the competition over the power to manage. Indeed, as chapter two shows, in 
1997, the idea of World Heritage as a global commons was used in attempts to 
remove the mandate over Mt. Kenya’s forests from one state institution and 
locate it with another, and, as indicated in chapter five, in the late 2010s, it was 
employed in an endeavour to bypass Kenya’s state apparatus altogether.
World Heritage and the failure to problematize ‘the state’ 
This section continues to focus on the central role of the state in the 1972 World 
Heritage Convention. It specifically looks at how the notion of the state is dealt 
with both by the convention itself as well as by the majority of World Heritage
studies. Before I discuss this below, I first briefly turn to how the link between 
heritage and state-making consolidated across Europe in the aftermath of the 
French Revolution.
In the course of the nineteenth century, nationalist sentiments gained 
momentum on the European continent: populist movements, which challenged 
the hegemony of the aristocracy, sprang up roughly from the 1820s onwards 
(Anderson 1983). Europe’s ruling classes typically responded pragmatically to 
the rise in nationalist ideologies – rather than trying to supress or challenge 
emerging nationalist rhetoric, they began to work their way into it (Ibid.: 109-
111). They had multiple strategies for this that included, among other things, the 
implementation of state-controlled education, propaganda that meant to 
naturalize and justify existing power structures (Ibid.), and the glorification of 
heritage (Willems & Comer 2011: 160). 
Europe’s aristocrats understood the political potential of the symbolic 
mediation of a shared national past, and different ruling elites began to employ 
the celebration of official histories for governmental purposes. The institution of 
the Victorian public museum in Britain for instance is a case in point. Victorian 
public museums were to introduce ‘high culture’, which was previously 
restricted to the aristocracy, to Britain’s proletariat. By bringing visitors in direct 
contact with the aristocratic lifestyle, the Victorian public museum intended to 
regulate morale – in essence these museums were highly controlled environments 
that meant to foster specific normative and ethical standards among the broader 
public (Bennett 1995). 
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The nineteenth-century celebration of national heritage, which manifested 
itself in the establishment of museums, but also in the institution of national 
traditions (Hobsbawm 1983B), articulated a wider change in government 
strategies. Roughly until the middle of the eighteenth century, hegemonic rule 
had been vested in law, regulation, and discipline. But, among other things, the
collapse of mercantile theories and practices, as well as rapid population growth, 
had commanded a reorientation of power relations (Foucault 2003 [1978]: 239). 
This had given way to a political frame of mind that aimed at the cultivation of 
self-regulating citizens. This self-regulation depended on an ensemble of 
institutions, procedures and tactics, all designed to manipulate the population’s 
behaviour (Ibid.: 244). Central to this ensemble was a complex of disciplinary 
technologies, or governmental strategies that meant to promote the 
internalization of specific knowledge systems, truths and ethics. Foucault called 
this ‘the governmentalization of the state’ (Ibid.: 245), and the national 
celebration of heritage came to play a key role in this. In the words of Bennett:
Culture was increasingly thought of as a resource to be used in programmes which aimed at 
bringing about changes in acceptable norms and forms of behaviour and consolidation those 
norms as self-acting imperatives by inscribing them within broadly disseminated regimes of 
self-management.
Bennett (1995: 23)
World Heritage articulates the historical link between states and heritage, and 
the convention prescribes that all World Heritage designations require state 
endorsement (UNESCO 1972, article three). In practice, this fuels conflict, for 
instance between states and marginalized groups that feel that their heritage is 
excluded from the official history of their country, or between states when 
different governments lay claim on heritage sites in border areas. Numerous 
scholars have called attention to such conflicts and the case studies abound. For 
instance, citizens of Turkish North Cyprus struggle to have their heritage 
acknowledged on the World Heritage List because Cyprus’s government seeks to 
establish a Greek identity for the island (Scott 2002); in the 2000s, the 
governments of Cambodia and Thailand fought over the right to nominate the 
Temple of Preah Vihear for World Heritage status (Silverman 2011); Tibetans 
continue to lament that the Mountain Resort and its Outlying Temples became 
Chinese World Heritage in 1994, for this placed the Buddhist site firmly within 
the PRC’s multi-ethnic propaganda (Hevia 2001); and the government of Laos 
deliberately downplayed the social and ceremonial functions of the Town of 
Luang Prabang when it nominated the place for World Heritage status on the 
basis of its architecture and aesthetics only (Long & Sweet 2006). All these case 
studies emphasize that the 1972 World Heritage Convention offers state parties a 
tool with which to disseminate national messages, and with which to buttress 
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nationalist schemes. In doing so, these studies make a valid point and they offer 
important insights into how World Heritage fosters conflict, opposition and 
alliances. Yet, at the same time, there is also an important hiatus in these studies 
– they fail to engage with the notion of the state critically.
Already more than seventy-five years ago, the anthropologist Alfred 
Radcliffe-Brown (1940) suggested that ‘the state’ does not exist. He wrote:
In writings on political institutions there is a good deal of discussion about the nature and the 
origin of the State, which is usually represented as being an entity over and above the human 
individuals who make up a society, having as one of its attributes something called 
‘sovereignty’, and sometimes spoken of as having a will (law often being defined as the will 
of the State) or as issuing commands. The State, in this sense, does not exist in the 
phenomenological world; it’s a fiction of the philosophers. What does exist is an 
organization, i.e. a collection of individual human beings connected by a complex system of 
relations. Within that organization different individuals have different roles, and some are in 
possession of special power or authority, as chiefs or elders capable of giving commands 
which will be obeyed, as legislators or judges, and so on. There is no such thing as the power 
of The State; there are only, in reality, powers of individuals – kings, prime ministers, 
magistrates, policemen, party bosses, and voters. 
Radcliffe-Brown (1940: xxiii)
Abrams (1988) suggested that since Radcliffe-Brown did not believe in the state 
he saw no use in examining it – to understand relations of power it sufficed to 
study governance and politics (Ibid.: 75). Abrams himself took a different 
perspective: he accepted Radcliffe-Brown’s comment that the state does not exist 
as a tangible thing in itself, but simultaneously stressed that there are,
nevertheless, powerful ideas of the state that suggest otherwise. These ideas, 
Abrams suggested, mask political practice as it is and serve to convey ideological 
power. For Abrams, ‘the state’ is a governmental technique, or a form of moral 
regulation (Ibid.: 77) that means to legitimize and reinforce the subordination of 
the larger public.
From the 1990s onwards, and in the wake of Abrams’ landmark study, various 
scholars further worked on how the idea of the state aims to foster national 
obedience. Attention has been drawn to, among other things, how an image of 
the state as distinct from the rest of society is socially produced and maintained 
(Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Li 2005; Mitchell 1991); to how the effectiveness of 
the state depends on its mystification and fetishization (Taussig 1993); or to how 
the idea of the state creates effects beyond government and national institutions 
and surfaces throughout society (Li 2005; Trouillot 2001). This literature
underscores the hegemony of the notion of the state and at the same time 
suggests that, in order to understand how this hegemony works, we must look 
into the actual institutions, individuals, policies, power structures, and so on,
where the idea of the state is productive. Many World Heritage case studies fail 
to do precisely that – they buy into the idea of the state without scrutinizing or 
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unpacking it, and in doing so they mistake the state’s symbolic purpose for 
empirical reality. This is furthermore sustained by World Heritage’s depoliticized 
and technical rhetoric, which I discuss later, that presents state parties as simple 
administrative entities that serve a mere bureaucratic purpose. 
Those World Heritage case studies that neglect to address the idea of the state 
critically typically pay little or no attention to the actual individuals and 
institutions that are responsible for specific World Heritage nominations (but see 
Scholze 2008). However, the coming chapters reveal that doing so is vital for
understanding how World Heritage functions: if we do not deconstruct World 
Heritage state parties into their actual agents, then we may fail to recognize the 
social and political processes that propel and complicate World Heritage
designations. One consequence of such a failure seems to be that, at times, World 
Heritage is too easily portrayed as a nationalist tool (see for instance Askew 
2010). Sharma & Gupta (2006) have indicated that the terms state, nation, and 
nation state are often used interchangeably and without much consideration or 
awareness. This has historical reasons, for the conjunction of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ 
normalized from the nineteenth century onwards (Trouillot 2001: 130) – one 
implication is that the two are seldom distinguished from one another 
theoretically:
The concept of the nation-state has so thoroughly conjoined the state with the nation that it is 
almost impossible to think of one without the other […]. Theories of the state always have 
implicit in them theories of nationalism; similarly, theories of nationalism assume some 
theory of the state in that nationalism is often seen as a state project. 
Sharma & Gupta (2006: 7)
In quite a few World Heritage case studies the amalgamation of nation and state 
has come to translate into the logic that because World Heritage Sites depend on 
state approval they inevitably carry a nationalist message in them (see for 
instance Hevia 2001; Long & Sweet 2006; Scott 2002; Silverman 2011). I 
disagree with this and stress that World Heritage status might be pursued for 
reasons other than nation-building. Different parts of this dissertation illustrate 
this. In chapter two, for instance, I show that Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site 
primarily sprang from struggles between government institutes over management 
authority. In chapter five, furthermore, I demonstrate that the 2013 modification 
to Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site rested on an explicit intention to challenge the 
Kenyan state administration.
Natural World Heritage is culture
In the second half of the nineteenth century two prominent figures emerged 
within Britain’s conservation scene: John Ruskin and William Morris. Both were 
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at the forefront of the preservation of historic relics and personified a particular 
British conservation ideology. Roughly a century later this ideology helped to 
shape the World Heritage Programme.
Painter, architect and critic John Ruskin was one of the few early advocates of 
a ‘conserve as found’ conservation ethos (Smith 2006: 19). At the time, Victorian
renovators restored ancient buildings such as medieval churches and cathedrals 
based on an idea of what such buildings had looked like in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries – they aimed to recover a building’s original appearance and 
often made major architectural interventions (Ibid.). Ruskin, however, criticized 
such practices and argued that buildings acquire a soul over time, which was to 
be protected against Victorian renovators’ brutal methods:
Neither by the public, nor by those who have the care of public monuments, is the true 
meaning of the word restoration understood. It means the most total destruction which a 
building can suffer: a destruction out of which no remnants can be gathered; a destruction 
accompanied with false descriptions of the things estroyed. Do not let us deceive ourselves 
in this important matter; it is impossible, as impossible as to raise the dead, to restore 
anything that has ever been great or beautiful in architecture. […] that spirit which is given 
only by the hand and eye of the workman, never can be recalled. Another spirit may be given 
by another time, and it is then a new building; but the spirit of the dead workman cannot be 
summoned up, and commanded to direct other hands, and other thoughts. And as for direct
and simple copying, it is palpably impossible. What copying can there be of surfaces that 
have been worn half an inch down? The whole finish of the work was in the half inch that is 
gone […] There was yet in the old some life, some mysterious suggestion of what it had 
been, and of what it had lost; some sweetness in the gentle lines which rain and sun had 
wrought. There can be none in the brute hardness of the new carving.
Ruskin (1899 [1849]: 161-162 original emphases)
Ruskin called for conservation methods that merely prevented further decay. His 
critical writings on Victorian restoration techniques, and in particular his popular 
essay Seven Lamps of Architecture published in 1849 from which the above is an 
excerpt, inspired William Morris (Burman in Smith 2006: 20). 
William Morris was a textile designer, poet and novelist born some fifteen 
years after John Ruskin in 1834. In 1887, he founded the Society for the 
Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB) in Bloomsbury, a British conservation 
initiative that is still active today. The SPAB’s ideology was firmly grounded in 
Ruskin’s ideas on proper conservation and it advocated a kind of ‘conservation 
repair’ that intervened with the fabric of buildings as little as possible (Smith 
2006: 20). The SPAB’s approach eventually proved decisive for the development 
of a typically British heritage philosophy, not in the least because in the course of 
the twentieth century the organization came to direct official legislation and 
policy setting (Ibid.) – to this day, British heritage regulations echo Ruskin’s 
outlook on acceptable conservation practices and the country’s current legal 
instruments continue to lean on the architect’s ideals (Ibid.). The explicit concern 
with conservation techniques distinguished British heritage customs from 
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heritage practices elsewhere in Europe, for instance in France. But there was also 
another important difference: the notion of patrimoine confined to the 
preservation of cultural objects, yet Ruskin and Morris also pressed for the 
conservation of ornamental landscapes and sceneries (Grijzenhout 2007: 10). 
Both John Ruskin and William Morris were admirers of the British 
countryside. They had a taste for the picturesque and the pastoral (Smith 2006: 
20), which they considered threatened by the country’s advanced state of 
industrialization and urbanization. Above all, Ruskin and Morris advocated 
conserving medieval rural homes and churches and they pressed for the 
safekeeping of the aesthetic landscapes in which these homes and churches were 
found – for both men, the preservation of buildings and sceneries was inevitably 
entwined (see for instance Lowenthal 2005: 84). In the course of the twentieth 
century, Britain’s national imagination increasingly formed around such rural 
panoramas (Soper 1995: 196, see also Williams 1973), and eventually country 
houses became central to Britain’s body of national heritage.3
John Ruskin’s and William Morris’s calls for the conservation of rural 
landscapes resonated with developments taking place elsewhere, namely 
American patriots’ efforts to cultivate a sense of national belonging. In European 
countries, literary and artistic achievements had been central to the formation of a 
unique national identity, but in the United States, which lacked such 
achievements, nationalist rhetoric came to revolve around the splendidness of 
nature (Nash 1967). The continent’s wilderness turned into a collective source of 
pride – as such, the United States became one of the few places where nature 
played an explicit role in summoning national solidarity (Haila 1997: 133). 
The American pride for nature gave way to concerns for nature conservation, 
which were formulated for the first time in George Perkins Marsh’s book Man 
and Nature; or, Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action published in 
1864 (Lowenthal 2005: 83). In this publication, Marsh indicated that, unless the 
United States would learn to manage its natural resources better, the continent’s 
wilderness would eventually succumb to the pressure of urbanization and 
industrialization. Marsh’s work prompted the naturalist and travel writer John 
Muir to take action and, in 1892, the latter cofounded the Sierra Club, an 
environmental movement that included nature lovers, scientists, and activists. 
Muir’s travel writings were widely read and he managed to mobilize broad 
national support (Tsing 2005: 95-97). These writings echoed Muir’s compassion 
                                                        
3 Mandler (1997) notes that the British country house only began to be respected as a source of national 
pride from roughly the 1930s onwards. In the 1850s and 1860s, and encouraged by the advocacy of 
John Ruskin and William Morris, the British country house briefly received the admiration of the 
larger public. But by the 1870s such popular interest dwindled: commoners increasingly took a hostile 
position against British aristocrats and country houses turned into symbols of upper-class seclusion 
and privilege.
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for the United States’ wilderness, and presented American nature as God-like and 
worthy of worship in its own right. It drew heavily on spiritual rhetoric – to 
Muir, nature had an intrinsic value and deserved religious devotion (Ibid.: 96).
The advocacy of John Muir, in turn, paved the way for the emergence of the 
American National Parks model. This model found its origin in the foundation of 
Yellowstone National Park in 1872 (see for instance Neumann 1998). It rested on 
the presumption that nature was best maintained in closed-off sanctuaries where 
wilderness was protected against human destruction and exploitation. The 
national parks model departed from an understanding of nature as pristine, Eden-
like, and ideally unspoilt, which, for instance, also informed the landscape 
portraits of American painters such as Thomas Cole, Asher Brown Durand, 
Frederic Edwin Church, Albert Bierstadt, and Thomas Moran (Nash 1967), or the 
writings of American authors such as Ralph Waldo Emerson or Henry David 
Thoreau (Wolmer 2007: 13). 
Such understandings of nature found their roots in Romanticism, which 
experienced its heyday in the first half of the nineteenth century and which, for 
instance, also came to inspire John Ruskin (Smith 2006: 20). Romanticism was 
partially a response to Europe’s industrial developments and it articulated a 
nostalgic longing for nature not yet affected by the polluting and destructive 
effects of industrial demands. The separation of man and nature that is implicit in 
the Romanticist nostalgia for virgin nature has its own and much longer 
genealogy – it has been suggested that in medieval times the orthodox concept of 
nature still included man (Williams 1980: 74), but that during the Renaissance 
period that followed nature came to stand out as a ‘realm apart from the everyday 
present’ (Lowenthal 2005: 82). With the onset of technological developments in 
the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, nature was increasingly 
perceived in mechanistic terms and a view of nature as animistic made way for a 
view of nature as employable to satisfy human needs (Soper 1995: 43).
Under the influence of Romanticism, the conceptual distinction between 
human-shaped environments and a nature existing in isolation from human 
intervention became increasingly authoritative. It gave way to the modern 
ideology of naturalism (Escobar 1999) 4 that conceived of nature as a place 
devoid of history and culture (see also Schama 1995). Through the popularity of 
the National Parks model, which soon spread beyond the United States, the 
separation of man-made and natural environments became key to 
environmentalist rhetoric worldwide. This had important consequences, 
especially on African territory where pristine understandings of nature came to 
                                                        
4 This modern ideology of naturalism is contradicted by recent technological improvements that have 
enabled human manipulation of nature to unprecedented degrees (see for instance Haraway 1991; 
Rabinow 1996). Taking notice of this Escobar (1999) suggests that the modern ideology of naturalism 
is currently experiencing its decline.
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
24 
 
inform colonial policy and administration. In the next chapter, I deal with this in 
more detail and discuss its effects on Kenya more specifically.
The American celebration of nature as it materialized from the late nineteenth 
century onwards had repercussions for the development of World Heritage.
When the convention was drafted at the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s, the 
United States pressed for the inclusion of natural sites (UNESCO 2008B: 7; see 
also Adams & Hutton 2007: 150) – a handful of international heritage treaties 
and agreements already existed, as the next section points out, but all these
treaties and conventions focused exclusively on cultural historic relics. The 
motivation for the United States’ lobby was evident: without the inclusion of 
natural heritage, the continent could not partake in the exhibition of masterpieces 
that the convention aimed to promote. Besides, to American patriots the United 
States’ wilderness was equivalent to European monuments (Tsing 2005: 96) and 
deserved equal recognition.
The World Heritage Convention indeed came to include natural sites, and 
treated these as fundamentally different from cultural heritage. The first two 
articles of the convention immediately describe their differences and emphasize 
their mutual exclusiveness. Article one reads:
For the purpose of this Convention, the following shall be considered as “cultural heritage”:
monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or 
structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of 
features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or 
science;
groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their 
architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal 
value from the point of view of history, art or science;
sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including 
archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, 
ethnological or anthropological point of view.
(UNESCO 1972, article one)
Article two reads: 
For the purpose of this Convention, the following shall be considered as “natural heritage”: 
natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such 
formations, which are of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of 
view;
geological and physiographical formations and precisely delineated areas which constitute 
the habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding universal value from
the point of view of science or conservation;
natural sites or precisely delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value from the 
point of view of science, conservation or natural beauty.
UNESCO (1972, article two)
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Although these two articles do not explicitly mention it, they allude to the 
Romantic separation between human-shaped and natural environments. This 
division is also visible in the World Heritage guidelines, which subject natural 
heritage and cultural heritage to different standards and principles. Criteria for 
the designation of cultural sites, for instance, focus on human creative genius, 
town planning, architecture, and artistic and literary achievements, while the 
criteria for the designation of natural sites focus on ecological processes, 
geological formations, and ecosystems (UNESCO 2013: article 77). In addition, 
cultural heritage sites and natural heritage sites must stand different tests of 
credibility: cultural sites are assessed on authenticity vested in an idea of 
historical truthfulness, while natural sites are assessed on biological integrity. 
Here, it is not historical depth and accuracy that matters but ecological intactness 
(Ibid.: articles 79-95). In practice, this means that nature does not have to be ‘old’ 
to become World Heritage – chapter five illustrates this and shows how a 
property that only recently converted to nature conservation managed to obtain 
World Heritage status. Finally, World Heritage’s separation of natural and 
cultural heritage also finds expression in their institutional subdivision: the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) is responsible for the 
evaluation of natural heritage sites, while the Council on Monuments and Sites 
(ICOMOS) and the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and 
Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) are responsible for the evaluation of 
cultural heritage sites. In sum, the World Heritage Convention rests on a 
categorical separation of nature and culture – it allows for valuing both a 
property’s cultural and natural features, for instance through the designation of 
cultural landscapes5 or ‘mixed heritage sites’, but it nevertheless treats the two as 
intrinsically different. 
It seems that the separation of natural heritage and cultural heritage also 
echoes in academia: natural and cultural heritage studies have come to occupy 
two distinct fields of academic interest that rarely overlap or engage with one 
another (but see Byrne & Ween 2015). Cultural heritage scholars have typically 
taken on the task of identifying problems associated with heritage’s 
identification, its commodification, its recent popularity, and so on. Among other 
things, they have demonstrated that heritage claims are contemporary social, 
cultural and political constructions (see for instance Handler 2003; Harrison 
2004; Probst 2011; Weiss 2007); they have drawn attention to struggles over 
heritage’s definition, meaning and ownership (see for instance Berliner 2012; 
Creighton 2007; Herzfeld 1991; Rowlands & Butler 2007); and they have 
pointed out the principles on which current dominant understandings of heritage 
                                                        
5 UNESCO introduced the category ‘cultural landscape’ in 1992 (UNESCO 2008B: 8).
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rest (see for instance Byrne 1991; Smith 2006). 6 Scholars dealing with the 
preservation of nature, on the other hand, largely deal with the social 
implications of conservation programmes and primarily focus on issues of 
access, resource use, resettlement, and the like (see for instance Adams & Hutton 
2007; Brockington 2004; Duffy 2000; Igoe 2004; Neumann 1998; Nishizaki 
2004). Such studies are essentially different from studies on cultural heritage 
because they do not explicitly address nature conservation as a form of heritage 
celebration. This split between cultural and natural heritage, both in practice as 
well as in academia, can be partially explained historically – the conservation of 
cultural relics and nature emerged under different historical circumstances and 
commented upon different political contexts, as this and preceding sections 
pointed out. Nevertheless, I suggest that natural and cultural heritages are far 
more alike than is currently acknowledged – the reason for this is that our 
understandings of nature are culturally informed.
That ideas about nature are essentially cultural ideas is a theme that has
received significant scholarly attention over the decades. Anthropologists, for 
instance, underscored the Western-centric character of nature/culture 
dichotomies while pointing out its inapplicability to other cultures (Barth 1975; 
Strathern 1980), and different suggestions have been made to replace dualistic 
models with alternative conceptual frameworks that account for the culturally 
diverse ways in which people interact with their physical environments (cf
Descola 1996; Haila 2000; Latour 1993). Likewise, it has been argued that the 
nature/culture dichotomy is always incapable of capturing man’s relation to his 
surroundings, regardless of one’s whereabouts or one’s cultural background, 
because this relation is perpetually in-the-making, shaped and reshaped, and thus 
unavoidably temporal (Bender 2002; Ingold 1993; Ronayne 2001).
These works, as well as specific historical developments such as Europe’s 
industrialization, the rise of Romanticism, or the emergence of the American 
National Parks model, suggest that when the term ‘nature’ is used one should
consider which cultural model for nature is taken for granted in the act (Beck 
1996: 2). I do not mean to reduce nature to a mere discursive construct, and there 
are natural powers and processes that operate independently of how we talk 
about them. In the words of Kate Soper: ‘it is not the discourse of ‘global 
warming’ or ‘industrial pollution’ that has created the conditions of which it 
                                                        
6 Brumann (2014A) further suggests that cultural heritage scholars are divided into two strands of 
thought: first there are heritage believers who aim to preserve heritage and accept that heritage has an 
intrinsic value, and second there are heritage atheists who take a critical position and seek to 
undermine contemporary conservation practices. Perhaps such a separation is discernable among 
scholars, yet it seems unsustainable in the heritage conservation scene. Chapter two shows that the 
initiator of Mt. Kenya’s 1997 World Heritage designation was neither a heritage believer, nor a 
heritage critic – rather he responded to the call to nominate Mt. Kenya opportunistically, and simply 
let the process take its course.
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speaks’ (1995: 249). But the point here is that the ecological rhetoric that World
Heritage and the environmental movement at large employ, which relies on a 
purely scientific presentation of nature and which presents itself as neutral 
through the recital of ‘hard scientific facts’ such as biodiversity records, is a 
political discourse – it conceals that nature is not only ecological processes, but 
also cultural practice, and it conflates the reality of nature with its ideological 
representation (Ibid.: 251). 
Approaching nature in this way, cultural heritage and natural heritage no 
longer appear radically different. In fact, they look quite similar: both are the 
tangible evidence of specific cultural ideas about how to deal with our material 
surroundings. Mt. Kenya’s 1997 natural World Heritage designation was not an 
inevitable outcome of the mountain’s natural extraordinariness. Rather, it marked 
the victory of one particular cultural idea over a range of others. This entire work 
rests on that assumption, but in chapter three I engage with it directly and discuss 
how Mt. Kenya’s naturalization marginalized cultural and political pasts.
World Heritage’s depoliticizing technical idiom
By the late nineteenth century, the loss of national heritage, especially during 
times of warfare, had become a shared concern between European nations. This 
concern led to the establishment of international treaties in which signatories 
promised to respect each other’s historical sites and objects (Grijzenhout 2007: 
11-12). One of the first such treaties was the Declaration Concerning Laws and 
Customs of War drafted in 1874 (Elliot & Schmutz 2012: 262-263), which was 
followed by the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. The latter specifically stated 
that sacred edifices, historic monuments, buildings used for artistic purposes and 
a number of other places were to be spared in bombardments – it even
encouraged countries to identify such places with clearly visible rectangular 
panels that could be seen from the air (Ibid.).
During the First World War, several countries made additional efforts to 
protect heritage against warfare demolition, and in the aftermath of the war the 
preservation of heritage was further institutionalized within the League of 
Nations (Elliot & Schmutz 2012). Among other things, this resulted in the 
adoption of the Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic Monuments in 
1931, and in the adoption of the Roerich Pact in 1935 (Ibid.: 264). The Second 
World War had a similar effect, and after 1945 renewed attempts were made to 
offer still better protection for monuments and important cultural sites. This led 
to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict in 1954, but it also gave way to different lobbies that called for the 
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preservation of specific sites. Amongst these was the lobby to save the Abu 
Simbel Temples in Egypt.
Shortly after the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, the Republic of Egypt 
announced its plan to erect a dam at a place called Aswan. The revolution had 
brought an end to the British occupation of Egypt as well as to the dynasty of 
Muhammad Ali, and the post-revolution government sought a prestige project to 
demonstrate its newly obtained power and its capacity for modernization. It 
aimed for a massive dam that meant to regulate the floodwaters of the Nile –
Egypt struggled to meet demands for water and energy, and dams in general 
summoned a sense of progress and prosperity:
Dams were unique in the scope and manner in which they altered the distribution of 
resources across space and time, among entire communities and ecosystems. They offered 
more than just a promise of agricultural development or technical progress. For many 
postcolonial governments, this ability to rearrange the natural and social environment 
became a means to demonstrate the strength of the modern state as a techno-economic 
power.
Mitchell (2002: 21)
The project communicated to Egyptians and the international community alike 
that the government was in full control, and the Aswan dam was to be the 
centrepiece of post-independent state building (Mitchell 2002: 43).
The Egyptian government intended to expand an earlier dam that had been 
built by the British in 1902. That dam had already been extended in 1912 and 
again in 1933 (Hassan 2007: 75), but still failed to control the Nile effectively. In 
the 1950s, different experts expressed their worries and indicated that further 
expansion would bring about salinization, a decline in soil fertility, the spread of 
disease, coastal erosion and loss of water due to evaporation and seepage 
(Mitchell 2002: 45). Despite such worries, the Egyptian government pursued its 
plans, even though it lacked the financial resources. Initially, Western countries 
supported the project and offered funding: in 1955 the World Bank agreed to 
lend $200 million and both the United States and Britain made further financial 
contributions (Boyle 2005: 104). These developments took place against the 
background of the Cold War and it has been suggested that Western countries 
primarily subsidized the Aswan dam to prevent Egypt from turning to the Soviet 
Union. When the country nevertheless reinforced its relations with the USSR and 
recognized the communist government of China, Western donors took their 
hands of the project and withdrew funding (Ibid.: 104-105). In response, Egypt’s 
leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal as well as the British-
French Suez Canal Company. This further increased tensions and resulted in the 
1956 Suez crisis, during which Israel, France and Britain attempted to remove 
Nasser from power. 
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In the meantime, international protests against the Aswan project began to 
emerge. These protests were not rooted in the dam’s possible ecological effects,
but rather were concentrated on the cultural harm it would cause. The Aswan 
dam was planned in a region called Nubia, which included a number of valleys 
that harboured old temples such as the Abu Simbel Temples. These valleys 
would be flooded and, as a result, the last remnants of ancient Egypt civilizations 
would disappear under water (Hassan 2007). The lobby against the loss of such 
cultural heritage became mixed up with Cold War politicking (Basu & Modest 
2015: 18), which once again underscores my earlier point that it is vital to 
unpack state parties in order to understand heritage politics, but in 1959 the 
Egyptian and the Sudanese governments themselves requested support in saving 
Nubia’s treasures. This prompted UNESCO to organize a relocation campaign 
and the organization began to collect money for dismantling and rebuilding the 
temples. The operation that followed was unprecedented in scale: it was 
extremely laborious to document everything item for item, and archaeologists as 
well as other specialists from around the world contributed to the task. 
Afterwards, some of the twenty-three temples that were saved were shipped to 
other parts of the world, and today Nubian temples decorate the exhibition halls 
of museums in, among other places, New York, Madrid, Turin, Berlin, and 
Leiden (Hassan 2007: 80). The entire undertaking eventually cost $80 million 
and was funded by roughly fifty countries (Elliot & Schmutz 2012: 265) – the 
United States made the largest contribution and paid $12 million for the rescue of 
the Abu Simbel Temples alone (Berg 1972: 34).
UNESCO’s salvage operation concluded in 1968. The project was considered 
an overall conservation triumph: not only had important temples been saved, the 
scheme had also shown ‘the importance of solidarity and nations’ shared 
responsibility in conserving outstanding cultural sites’ (UNESCO 2008B: 7). Abu 
Simbel became a token for the urgency of international cooperation in heritage 
conservation (Stoczkowski 2009: 9) and triggered a range of other international 
conservation campaigns, among others in Italy, Pakistan and Indonesia. It also 
created momentum for a renewed interest in heritage conventions and existing 
treaties were again revised – this brought about the 1964 Venice Charter for the 
Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites and, finally, it paved the 
way for the World Heritage Convention.
The World Heritage Convention, and to a lesser degree also the Venice 
Charter, differed from earlier treaties in at least one regard. Older arrangements 
had stemmed from national concerns for heritage safeguarding, and they had 
meant to foster mutual respect for heritage assets between countries. But the 
World Heritage Convention did not draw on such rhetoric. Rather than 
underscoring heritage’s national merits, it introduced heritage sites as universal 
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treasures that enrich humanity at large (UNESCO 1972: preamble), and in doing 
so it aimed to cultivate a sense of global communality that would feed into an 
ethic of shared custody (see for instance Elliot & Schmutz 2012). Thus, World 
Heritage came to incorporate two ill-matching principles, as I already indicated 
at the start of this chapter: it granted state parties the exclusive right to identify 
and nominate World Heritage Sites, but at the same time it introduced World 
Heritage as a global good belonging to the world at large (Hitchcock 2004; 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004). 
Six years after the adoption of the convention the World Heritage List was 
founded. The list meant to offer an overview of all the sites that the convention 
acknowledged and intended to record all the world’s most outstanding sites. Yet,
the text of the World Heritage Convention primarily focused on World 
Heritage’s definition and only gave limited clues as to how such sites were to be 
identified. For this reason, UNESCO drafted guidelines that were to aid state 
parties through the World Heritage application procedure. Over the years, these 
guidelines have been adapted and republished many times. The basic outline of 
the application procedure remained the same, although the requirements have 
become stricter – in the past, for instance, hand-drafted World Heritage Site 
maps were accepted, but today GIS maps are the norm.
The World Heritage guidelines describe the nomination procedure as follows. 
First, countries must endorse the convention. At present, nearly all countries 
have, but in the past this provision limited the number of state parties that could 
put forward World Heritage nominations. 7 Second, countries must compile a 
tentative list of potential World Heritage Sites. Only when a property has been on 
this list for a number of years is it eligible for World Heritage nomination. Third, 
state parties must draft a nomination file, which, among other things, should refer 
to a set of pre-defined selection criteria and make a statement on a site’s 
outstanding universal value. This file must then be submitted to the World 
Heritage Centre in Paris, which checks if the document contains all the stipulated 
information. If this is the case, it forwards it to an advisory body, which is IUCN 
for natural heritage nominations and ICOMOS and/or ICCROM for cultural 
heritage nominations. These advisory bodies evaluate the nomination file on its 
content and send an expert for a field visit. After the field visit, the advisory body 
delivers its recommendation on whether or not the site in question merits World 
Heritage status. This recommendation is passed on to the World Heritage
Committee, which consists of twenty-one state representatives who meet 
                                                        
7 In the mid-1970s, only some twenty countries endorsed the convention. In the early 1980s, this 
number increased to sixty, and by the late 1980s more than a hundred countries acknowledged the 
convention.
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annually. Finally, the Committee votes on the nomination – if it receives a 
majority outcome it is added to the World Heritage List.
The World Heritage guidelines present the identification and designation of 
World Heritage Sites as a technical problem that is solvable through the 
intervention of the right kind of expertise. This idea is further reinforced by how 
the notions of authenticity and integrity serve to assess the legitimacy of 
respectively cultural and natural heritage sites – authenticity reduces history to 
something that can be revealed through the recollection of historical facts (see 
also Rowlands & de Jong 2007) while integrity reduces nature to something that 
can be revealed through the recollection of scientific facts (see also Latour 2004). 
This ‘rendering technical’ (Li 2007: 7-10) of World Heritage has at least two 
effects. First, it takes heritage away from the laymen (Smith 2006: 30) and puts it 
under the authority of archaeologists, historians, biologists and ecologists. In 
doing so, it constitutes boundaries between those who are positioned as trustees
and those subjected to expert direction (Li 2007: 7). In the process, it reproduces 
hierarchies of knowledge and it should therefore be understood as a display of 
power (Mitchell 2002). Joyce’s (2005) study on the Maya staircases in Copàn, 
Honduras, illustrates this. It shows how plans to replace the staircases with a 
replica brought about struggles between archaeologists, historians and 
conservationists who fought over decision-making power. Within these struggles 
there was no place for the ‘non-professional’ inhabitants of the area, and they 
were never invited into the debate.
Secondly, in presenting the designation of World Heritage Sites as a technical 
undertaking, World Heritage depoliticize in a way that recalls James Ferguson’s 
(1990) work on an aid project in Lesotho. Ferguson described how the project 
reduced the notion of poverty to a statistically measurable condition and argued 
that this was a highly political undertaking: it pre-empted discussion on the root 
causes of poverty, including the perpetuation of inequality grounded in 
discriminatory land distribution or access to jobs, while at the same time it 
enabled the Lesotho state to expand its power into formerly inaccessible regions 
where it then continued maintaining such inequalities. Ferguson claimed:
By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising technical 
solutions to the sufferings of powerless and oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of 
“development” is the principal means through which the question of poverty is de-politicized 
in the world today. At the same time, by making the intentional blueprints for “development” 
so highly visible, a “development” project can end up performing extremely sensitive 
political operations involving the entrenchment and expansion of institutional state power 
almost invisibly, under cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no one can object.
Ferguson (1990: 256)
Such dynamics also apply to World Heritage. In the coming chapters, I draw 
attention to the various ways in which technical definitions of ‘state party’ and 
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‘nature’ depoliticized Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage designation and catered for a 
number of political operations. In chapter two, for instance, I address how these
definitions came to obscure that Mt. Kenya’s 1997 World Heritage listing was 
partially the result of struggles between two government institutes, which harked 
back to colonial policies; in chapter three, I illustrate that they concealed Kenya’s 
mid-1990s political conditions, which sustained Mt. Kenya’s naturalization; and 
in chapters four and five I reveal that they covered up racial struggles over 
landownership. 
World Heritage’s depoliticization thus resonates with Mt. Kenya’s particular 
conditions, but it also has wider implications that touch upon all World Heritage
designations – World Heritage’s technical idiom obscures the politicking that 
takes place within the World Heritage Committee and it masks how state 
representatives form coalitions. It has been suggested that these coalitions 
resemble alliances between UN member states more generally and attention has 
been raised to the BRICS bloc that consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa (Meskell & Brumann 2015: 33-34). Recently, the representative of 
China, for instance, supported a South African World Heritage application, 
presumably in exchange for South Africa’s support for the expansion of Chinese 
trade and industry ventures (Meskell 2012B: 150). Due to alliances like these, the 
members of the World Heritage Committee have become increasingly indifferent 
to the recommendations that IUCN, ICOMOS and ICCROM put forward. This 
development can be traced to 2010, when the World Heritage Committee 
changed in composition and came to include several countries that have 
experienced difficulty in adding their national heritage to the World Heritage List 
for reasons that I discuss in the next section. Since their appointment, these 
countries have employed their decision-making power to catch up, and many of 
them have come to perceive IUCN, ICOMOS and ICCROM as ‘spoil sports’ 
(Brumann 2014B: 2185). In the past, World Heritage state representatives 
typically had a background in heritage conservation, but today many of them are 
trained career diplomats (Brumann 2014B: 2186) – this hints at the type of skills 
considered most useful, and at present voting sessions are preceded by aggressive 
lobbying (Meskell 2013). 
Finally, World Heritage’s technical idiom is vested in an extensive 
bureaucratic framework. This framework is central to how the convention tries to 
foster heritage management and conservation, for its lacks official sanction and 
fully relies on governments’ goodwill. One IUCN specialist, 8 for instance,
described World Heritage to me as a voluntary club in which the members do 
what they want. A Kenyan cultural heritage expert,9 moreover, stressed that the 
                                                        
8 Conversation on 4 July 2012, Nairobi.
9 Conversation on 12 July 2012, Naro Moru.
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World Heritage Committee can do nothing to impose the convention’s rules and 
regulations – in theory, it could de-list a site, but this is considered highly 
insulting and it has only happened twice throughout World Heritage’s entire 
history.10 Maswood’s (2000) study on how the World Heritage Committee failed 
to prevent uranium mining in Kakadu National Park, Australia, further 
underscores World Heritage’s lack of sanction, as does Burns’s (2009) study on 
how the United States’ refusal to address climate change undermines the 
committee’s credibility.
In light of the World Heritage convention’s lack of power to enforce, 
governing through cultivating desired behaviour has become all the more 
important – I suggest that Foucault’s work on the governmentalization of the 
state, which I discussed earlier, applies to World Heritage as well. The 
circulation of authoritative texts, a practice that has been considered to be at the 
heart of statecraft (Gupta 2012; Hull 2012), is key in this regard. In cooperation 
with IUCN, ICOMOS and ICROM, UNESCO frequently publishes conservation 
manuals and best practice directives. Also, it constantly produces site evaluation 
reports, decision documents, statistics, maps, and so on. Moreover, the World 
Heritage guidelines demand a similar effort from state parties, and every World
Heritage designation leans on heaps of paperwork. Together, all this 
documentation forms the kernel of World Heritage governance and is intended to 
convey World Heritage’s legitimacy. At different moments in this dissertation I 
deal with this issue explicitly: in chapter two, for instance, I examine how the file 
on Mt. Kenya’s 1997 World Heritage designation constructed subjects and social 
realities so as to foster administrative control, and in chapter five I do the same 
for the file on the 2013 extension.
World Heritage as a contemporary fascination for the past
In 1978, the first twelve World Heritage Sites were identified. The year after,
another forty-five followed and by the mid-1980s the list already counted more 
than two hundred designations. In short, there was an instant enthusiasm for 
World Heritage. This enthusiasm echoed the increasing popularity of heritage 
more generally (Lowenthal 1998; Probst 2012), which itself mirrored important 
cultural and political changes: immediately after the Second World War the 
emphasis had been on progress and technological development, but by the 1980s 
                                                        
10 In 2007, the Arabian Oryx Sanctuary in Oman lost World Heritage status, officially because the 
sanctuary hosted no more Oryx (UNESCO n.d.B) and unofficially because the Oman government 
announced it would drill for oil (different people who had been present at the meeting conveyed this 
information to me in person). The Dresden Elbe Valley in Germany lost World Heritage status in 
2009, after the Waldschlössen Bridge was built. The World Heritage Committee considered this 
bridge to spoil the landscape so much that the valley no longer merited World Heritage recognition.
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the focus on the future had made way for a focus on the past. The celebration of 
memory became a key concern in Western societies (Huyssen 2000: 21), and 
over the past decades certain heritage expressions have become ‘imbued with a 
sacrality’ (Meyer & De Witte 2013: 276-277), to the extent that heritage could be 
considered a contemporary religion.
World Heritage marked the beginning of a large, international heritage 
movement (Smith 2006). From its inception, the World Heritage List aspired to 
be balanced and representative (Labadi 2005). But as the number of sites grew 
exponentially throughout the 1980s a pattern nevertheless revealed itself. By the 
late 1980s, World Heritage was concentrated in European countries and largely 
comprised historic towns and religious buildings, particularly Christian ones 
(Ibid.: 90). It advantaged elitist architecture over vernacular buildings (UNESCO 
1994A), and especially the number of African World Heritage Sites lagged 
behind (Breen 2007). The World Heritage convention claimed to watch over the 
world’s most extraordinary places, but slowly it was becoming apparent that its 
particular understanding of extraordinariness only applied to certain parts of the 
world (Anthamatten & Hazen 2007; Byrne 1991; Labadi 2007).
As the uneven distribution of heritage sites became more pronounced, critics 
began to reject World Heritage for its Western-centric disposition (see for 
instance Elliot & Schmutz 2012; Eriksen 2001; Rowlands & De Jong 2007; 
Smith 2006) and its ‘West knows best’ (Kersel & Luke 2015: 71) attitude. In 
response to such criticism, UNESCO took a number of measures. For instance, it 
carried out a study between 1987 and 1993 that meant to identify gaps in the 
World Heritage List and that aimed to encourage the nomination of sites in 
underrepresented categories (Labadi 2005: 90). In 1994, it also organized a 
meeting that brought together a handful of heritage professionals from Canada, 
Brazil, France, Australia and Germany (see UNESCO 1994A) to explicitly 
address the disparities and to develop a new overall vision to tackle the issue. 
This meeting resulted in a document called Global Strategy for a Representative, 
Balanced and Credible World Heritage List that continues to guide World 
Heritage applications to this day. But UNESCO not only actively motivated the 
designation of marginalized heritages – one of World Heritage’s key concepts, 
authenticity, also came under review following controversy over one particular 
nomination.
In 1993, the government of Japan applied for World Heritage status for a
temple complex called Hôryûji, in Ikaruga, Nara Prefecture. Records traced 
Hôryûji’s origins to the seventh or eighth centuries, but the temple consisted of
wooden buildings that had been rebuilt numerous times since. Taking this into
consideration, World Heritage experts maintained that the temple was no longer 
in its ‘original’ condition and rejected the nomination. Japanese stakeholders 
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fiercely protested against the decision: they objected to World Heritage’s 
restricted understanding of authenticity, and claimed that the survival of the skills 
needed to rebuild the temple time and again was of greater value than its actual 
physical shape (Brumann 2014B). Eventually, the experts gave in, and in 1994 
UNESCO published a paper that reconsidered the notion of authenticity (see 
UNESCO 1994B). This paper adopted a cultural relativist definition of the 
concept and stated: ‘the respect due to all cultures requires that heritage 
properties must be considered and judged within the cultural contexts to which 
they belong’ (UNESCO 1994B: article 11).
While UNESCO undertook a number of measures to reduce regional and 
thematic imbalances in the World List, a range of other concerns began to 
emerge. Under UNESCO’s encouragement, the list had continued to grow 
rapidly, and each year dozens of sites had been added to it – by 2000, the total 
number of World Heritage Sites counted nearly seven hundred. In consideration 
of this, heritage experts began to argue that the World Heritage List was 
defeating its purpose: they claimed that UNESCO had been so concerned with a 
fair distribution that it had accepted countless sites that failed to meet World 
Heritage criteria, and they argued that the list had ceased to be a collection of the 
most extraordinary places only (see for instance Anthamatten & Hazen 2007; 
Askew 2010). Such critiques prompted widespread discussion among heritage 
experts about what it meant to be of ‘outstanding universal value’ as well as 
about how such values were to be measured.11 One of the effects of these debates 
was that the World Heritage application procedure became stricter, more time 
consuming, and far more expensive (see also Willems & Comer 2011: 161). 
Poorer countries, which typically were also the underrepresented countries, once 
again found themselves in a marginalized position, although in recent years 
different funds have been established to support them. Among these initiatives is,
for instance, the African World Heritage Fund that was founded in 2006, which 
seeks to offer assistance in the application for World Heritage status and which 
aims to train local heritage experts and site managers. 
More than forty years after its inception, it has been suggested that, today, the 
World Heritage Convention might be considered dead (Meskell 2012B: 147). In 
addition to the increased politicking that I discussed earlier, and in addition to 
what has been considered an inflation of World Heritage status due to the large 
                                                        
11 These debates again fostered the production of authoritative texts, including the IUCN report 
Outstanding Universal Value, Standards for Natural Heritage, a Compendium on Standards for 
Inscription on the World Heritage List published in 2008; the ICOMOS report What is OUV? 
Defining the Outstanding Value of Cultural World Heritage Properties also published in 2008; and 
document WHC.06/30.COM/9 published by the World Heritage Centre in 2006 on the evaluation of 
Outstanding Universal Value.
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number of designations,12 World Heritage is currently suffering serious budget 
cuts that appear to have brought the entire programme to an impasse (Meskell 
2013). World Heritage’s financial troubles were a direct result of the United 
Nation’s decision to accept Palestine as a non-member observer state in 
November 2012, after which the United States, previously World Heritage’s 
largest sponsor, withdrew its funding – this again articulates just how much 
World Heritage is entangled in global politics, and it is reminiscent of how the 
Cold War complicated the rescue of the Nubian temples in Egypt in the 1960s. 
Throughout this chapter I have dealt with different historical episodes, all of 
which have had a bearing on what World Heritage looks like today. The 
argument implicit in this is that World Heritage is the most recent phase in a 
chain of events that goes back more than two centuries. Interestingly, however,
the current phase is one that largely ignores its own genealogy, for it conceives of 
heritage as static and unchanging. Scholars have repeatedly argued that heritage 
is not a quality located in an object or a place, but a mode of cultural production 
(Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998; see also Smith 2006) that has recourse to the past,
but which is also inherently different from that past: 
We use objects to refer to, or think about, the past. But those cultural links to the past can 
exist only in the present and only within present-day semiotic activities. To save or conserve 
the past, tradition, or heritage is to do something new, today.
Handler (2003: 355)
Heritage is a temporal social construction, which reveals more about those who 
make heritage claims than about the sites or objects that are claimed. The World 
Heritage Convention fails to accommodate this and instead departs from a static 
definition of heritage that presumes that objects and places have a constant and 
permanent meaning. Chapter five illustrates this and describes how a 2010 
request to expand Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site was unsuccessful because it 
did not match the description used for the 1997 designation. World Heritage
defines heritage in a way that does not allow for change – cultural, political or 
otherwise. As such, it fixates meaning, and fails to fully understand the 
ramifications of its own historical roots.
                                                        
12 At the time of writing the World Heritage List counted 1031 heritage sites.
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Becoming World Heritage: 
The ‘state party’ behind Mt. 
Kenya’s 1997 World Heritage listing
The World Heritage Committee declared Mt. Kenya a natural World Heritage
Site during its twenty-first session, held at the beginning of December 1997 in 
Naples. The World Heritage Committee welcomed Mt. Kenya, together with 
forty-five other heritage sites, onto the World Heritage List with the following 
official statement:
The Committee inscribed this property under natural criteria (vii) and (ix) as one of the most 
impressive landscapes of Eastern Africa with its rugged glacier-clad summits, Afro-alpine 
moor lands and diverse forests, which illustrate outstanding ecological processes.
UNESCO (1997: 38)
A year earlier, the Kenyan state party had submitted an application to grant Mt. 
Kenya World Heritage status. In this chapter, I unpack this ‘Kenyan state party’: 
among other things, I consider whom it consisted of, how it legitimized itself and 
where it caused friction. In short, I give the Kenyan state party that prompted Mt. 
Kenya’s World Heritage designation a face – or better still, faces. This will 
reveal a range of conflicts and negotiations that the abstract notion of state party 
otherwise conceals. 
In this chapter, I take the position that it is crucial to consider the actual people 
involved in individual World Heritage designations, in order to begin 
formulating an answer to the question of what World Heritage really represents 
and conserves. I reveal that the actors behind Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage listing 
did not have a nationalist agenda, as is often assumed of World Heritage
participants, but that they were primarily interested in securing management 
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authority. This was a result of long-standing conflicts over resource control. 
These conflicts have their roots in how colonial administrators shaped forest and 
wildlife supervision, both legislatively and practically, from roughly the 
beginning of the twentieth century onwards. In light of this, I will argue that Mt. 
Kenya’s World Heritage designation reinforces a set of colonial histories. Thus, 
it is not only a tribute to outstanding ecological processes, as UNESCO’s official 
statement suggests, but also to former colonial rule.
The 1996 application
David Western, who in the mid-1990s served as director for the Kenya Wildlife 
Service (KWS), the national institute for the preservation of Kenya’s wildlife and 
nature (that is introduced in more detail later), told me that the idea to nominate 
Mt. Kenya for World Heritage status had come from someone within IUCN. At a 
certain moment in 1995 or 1996 Jim Thorsell, a Canadian conservationist who 
headed IUCN’s World Heritage Programme between 1984 and 2003, had 
contacted Western and had pointed out Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage potential to 
him. Western1 remembered how Thorsell had said that the 1990s were ‘a good 
time’ to nominate Mt. Kenya for World Heritage status. Western himself 
explained to me that he had interpreted this as a compliment regarding his 
directorship. He stressed that his predecessor had left the KWS in chaos, and 
indicated that only after he had cleaned up did the KWS become an efficient and 
transparent institute. He reckoned that IUCN had witnessed and appreciated his 
efforts, and that by 1996 it was ready to accept the KWS as a credible World 
Heritage partner. 
But there were also other explanations of what ‘a good time’ could have 
referred to. A former IUCN employee who used to be stationed at IUCN’s head 
office in Gland, but who moved back to Kenya a few years ago to take up 
another job, offered a different perspective. To him, the 1990s marked a period in 
which IUCN tried to gain control over the excessive growth in World Heritage
Sites. He indicated to me that the institute foresaw that this growth would inflate 
World Heritage status and, in response, IUCN began to take measures to slow 
down the number of designations. One of these measures was benchmarking, i.e. 
making sure that at least the most extraordinary places were on the World 
Heritage List so that these places could serve as a threshold to prevent the 
designation of less remarkable or less exceptional sites. Together with a range of 
other African alpines, for instance the Ruwenzori mountains in Uganda and 
Kilimanjaro in Tanzania, Mt. Kenya was such a benchmarking site the former 
IUCN employee stressed to me, and he believed that Jim Thorsell’s comment 
                                                        
1 Conversation on 17 July 2012, phone call.
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primarily related to these institutional dynamics. It should be added that Thorsell 
himself did not recall he had said anything about timing at all – in fact, he wrote 
in an email to me that he was unsure whether he had taken the initiative for Mt. 
Kenya’s World Heritage application at all. Nevertheless, in a recent interview,
Thorsell did point out exactly those developments that the former IUCN 
employee had also described to me (IUCN n.d.).
Regardless of precisely whose idea it had been to nominate Mt. Kenya for 
World Heritage status, and regardless of whether it had been developments 
within IUCN, the KWS or both that had paved the way for the application, David 
Western immediately recognized the possible benefits of World Heritage status. 
Although he had not known in advance whether Mt. Kenya’s application would 
be approved, he nevertheless thought of the project as a positive way to inform 
international communities on the conservation progress that Kenya was making 
at the time. In short, he said to me, World Heritage was good advertisement. He 
could use such an advertisement, he stressed, because his predecessor had left 
Kenyan conservation stigmatized by corruption, militarization and violent top-
down fortress conservation. He believed that World Heritage status for Mt. 
Kenya could improve the KWS’s reputation, and could reconcile it with 
international donor organizations that had backed out after previous misdeeds. 
With this in mind, David Western contacted Bongo Woodley2 and asked for 
the latter’s assistance. Woodley was the senior warden of Mt. Kenya National 
Park, and hence the person Western deemed most knowledgeable about the area. 
Woodley agreed to participate, and together with another KWS colleague called 
Joseph Mburugu he drafted Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage application – Mburugu 
delivered a map on which the boundaries of the proposed heritage site were 
drawn, and Woodley wrote a short document of some ten pages that emphasized
the uniqueness of Mt. Kenya’s natural habitat, the content of which is discussed 
in more detail later. 
After Bongo Woodley and Joseph Mburugu completed the document, David 
Western authorized it and signed it on behalf of the Kenyan State Party (The 
Government of the Republic of Kenya 1996: 6). The small bundle of papers was 
subsequently delivered to the World Heritage Centre in Paris, which considered 
it complete and forwarded it to IUCN for specialist evaluation. Next, IUCN sent 
one of its advisors to Mt. Kenya. This happened to be Jim Thorsell. After his 
field visit, Thorsell drafted an evaluation report, in which he raised a few 
concerns in relation to Mt. Kenya’s potential World Heritage listing. Most 
importantly, he noted that parts of Mt. Kenya’s forests were logged extensively 
and had degraded into arid and eroded lands (IUCN 1997: 69-70). Woodley and 
Mburugu had suggested designating all of Mt. Kenya’s forests as a World 
                                                        
2 Conversations on 2 June 2012, Nanyuki Airport; 13 June 2012, Nanyuki Airport.
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Heritage Site, but Thorsell maintained that certain parts were not worthy of 
World Heritage status. He therefore advised the World Heritage Committee that 
Mt. Kenya was qualified for World Heritage listing, yet only on the condition 
that severely logged areas were removed from the application. This demonstrates 
that arguments for World Heritage justification are strongly embedded in 
processes of boundary setting, and it offers some insight into how World 
Heritage cuts out sites piecemeal from wider surroundings in order to satisfy, in 
this case, criteria of ecological integrity. 
In reaction to Jim Thorsell’s evaluation, Bongo Woodley composed a new 
map of what Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site was to look like, and drafted a site 
that excluded the most critically affected areas. Like Joseph Mburugu’s map, this 
one was rudimentary and basic, and the adjusted boundaries were simply drawn 
in by hand. Today, such practices are unthinkable and at present World Heritage
applications must be accompanied by GPS maps, which are time-consuming and 
expensive to produce. But, at the time, IUCN and the World Heritage Committee 
accepted Woodley’s revised nomination. Subsequently, the World Heritage
Committee voted in favour of Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage listing. From 
December 1997 onwards, Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site was a fact.
The above shows that the ‘state party’ that applied for Mt. Kenya’s World 
Heritage listing only comprised two wildlife officers, namely Bongo Woodley 
and David Western. Western, moreover, hardly contributed to the preparation of 
the nomination, and only validated it afterwards. In essence, Woodley was the 
sole creator of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site. With hindsight, Woodley told me 
that he had taken on the task opportunistically: neither him, nor Western, had had 
a clear understanding of what World Heritage would bring them, for Mt. Kenya 
would be the country’s first World Heritage Site. 3 He explained to me that, 
although Western and he had had certain ambitions for Mt. Kenya’s World 
Heritage listing, it had nevertheless been unclear where the project would end up,
if anywhere at all. ‘We just went ahead and thought let’s see where it leads’ he
remarked. Like Western, Woodley had aspirations that Mt. Kenya’s appearance 
on the World Heritage List would improve the KWS’s reputation. But for 
Woodley, the importance of this exceeded the mere purpose of positive PR: since 
his appointment in the late 1980s he had been caught in an unresolvable 
administrative dilemma with regard to Mt. Kenya’s daily management, and he 
had hoped that World Heritage Status would help him to gain international 
support for solving the dilemma to his benefit.
Bongo Woodley’s management problems were rooted in administrative 
structures inherited from the British colonial government. Imperial laws and 
regulations had problematized the supervision of Kenya’s natural resources ever 
                                                        
3 Together with Lake Turkana that was also designated in 1997. 
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since their introduction in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 
next two sections deal with this matter further and lay the basis for a lengthier 
discussion of Woodley’s plight that follows later in this chapter.
A Game Department, a Forest Department, 
and the Royal National Parks
In 1895, the British administration established the East African Protectorate, 
which included the territory that in 1920 became the Colony of Kenya. The 
regulation of the protectorate’s game and forests was one of the administration’s 
immediate concerns, and already before the turn of the century it founded a 
Game Department. This Game Department paid heed to the spirit of the age, for 
in 1891 the British Foreign Office had called for the need to implement stricter 
game regulations on the African continent. This was a reaction to the fierce 
decline in game numbers that was especially apparent in South Africa, where 
large mammal hunting was the order of the day (Prendergast & Adams 2003: 
252).
Hunting had always played an important role in British society and was a key 
social practice for elite classes in Victorian England (see MacKenzie 1988). By 
the end of the nineteenth century, it had largely come to play a symbolic role in 
England, not least because of a decline in hunting possibilities. But when the 
African continent opened up it made available a wilderness that offered ample 
opportunity to revive the sport. The colonies presented the British with 
seemingly limitless opportunities to again exercise the sport, and to confirm 
class, status and pedigree (Ibid.). This took place against a backdrop of white 
settlers’ collective awe for Africa’s wilderness, which was embedded in an 
imperial ideology that separated enlightened and culturally superior colonists 
from savage, wild and uncivilized Africans, who stood in direct contact with 
nature (see for instance Birch 1998; Comaroff & Comaroff 1991; Garland 2008). 
For Kenya, such awe later resonated in the popular writings of authors such as 
Elspeth Huxley and Karen Blixen, who romanticized big game hunting and 
brought glamour to the white hunter myth (Steinhart 1989: 254; Steinhart 2006: 
102). Indeed, under safari hunters such as Blixen’s husband Baron Bror Blixen, 
or her lover Denys Finch Hatton, Kenya’s hunting industry bloomed in the early 
twentieth century (Adams & McShane 1996: 29). 
While hunting experienced a renaissance in the empire, a group of prominent 
Englishmen in the metropole began to protest against it. Among them was 
Edward North Buxton, who cofounded a conservation organization that turns up 
in a later chapter and who argued that colonial hunting was reckless and 
irresponsible. He and likeminded advocates claimed that the sport had been 
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stripped of its former ethics and rules of play, and had turned into mere killing 
that lacked any true sense of sportsmanship (Prendergast & Adams 2003). 
Together, these men succeeded in putting tighter control over colonial hunting on 
the agenda, and in 1900 the ‘Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, 
Birds and Fish in Africa’ was adopted in London. It was within this setting that 
the protectorate’s Game Department came into being in 1899.
During its first ten years, the protectorate’s Game Department was hardly 
operational – between 1901 and 1907 it only knew one ranger (Steinhart 2006: 
149). This ranger was Captain Arthur Blayney Percival, who was born in 
Newcastle and had participated in an ornithological expedition in Arabia before 
coming to East Africa at the turn of the century. Percival was joined by Colonel 
T.H. Patterson in 1907, who directed the game department for roughly a year or 
two (Ibid.: 151). Afterwards, Patterson became somewhat of a celebrity due to 
the publication of his memoir called The Man-Eaters of Tsavo (1907), in which 
he recounted his experiences with an exceptionally aggressive pride of lions that 
he had fought while supervising the construction of a railway bridge near Tsavo4
on the Mombasa-Uganda line. The book became an instant success. 
In 1919, Arthur Blayney Percival officially became the Game Department’s 
managing director, but in practice he already had long been the department’s 
most influential figure (see MacKenzie 1988: 245). Percival was largely 
oblivious to the calls of Edward North Buxton and associates to curtail colonial 
hunting (Steinhart 1989: 255). In fact, he was an ardent hunter himself and he 
maintained that it was the Game Department’s primary task to protect white 
settler estates against the invasion of dangerous and destructive wildlife. 
Contrary to the upcoming conservation lobby in the metropole, Percival regarded 
Africa’s wildlife a notorious pest, as did many other administrators and settlers 
(Steinhart 2006: 150). Besides, Percival understood the economic benefits that 
derived from the sport: he saw how Nairobi was developing into the centre of 
elite hunting, and he observed how the money derived from licence fees and 
duties paid on trophies significantly contributed to the treasury (Mackenzie 1988: 
247).
When Arthur Blayney Percival retired in 1923, Captain Archie Ritchie 
succeeded him. Ritchie further cemented the Game Department’s prioritization 
of settler needs and, like Percival, he paid little attention to England’s rising 
game conservation lobby. Ritchie was a man of military distinction, and he 
reorganized the Game Department into an army-like corps that drilled its black 
workforce. He always insisted on being called by his military rank, and he 
recruited his rangers on the basis of sporting skills and soldierly qualities 
                                                        
4 Nearly a century later, the American journalist and author Keith Caputo set out to retrace the myth 
created by Patterson’s memoir in Ghosts of Tsavo: Stalking the Mystery Lions of East Africa (2002).
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(Steinhart 2006: 158). Percival and Patterson had been military men as well, but 
both had shown more indulgent and lenient methods and neither had been as 
strict as Ritchie was (Ibid.). Yet, Ritchie’s military attitude was not at all 
uncommon in the protectorate. The enforcement of law was a constant concern, 
and settlers continuously called upon the administration to tighten control over 
African subjects in order to protect them and their possessions (Anderson 1991; 
Killingray 1986). Immediately after annexation, the British administration had 
employed martial law, which it soon replaced with locally recruited police forces 
that were considered less confrontational, and less costly (Waller 2010: 525). 
These police forces continued to employ aggressive and coercive methods, and 
most of the Europeans hired to direct them had gone through some sort of 
military training. They were often brought in from other colonies, most notably 
South Africa, where they had learned the ropes (Anderson 1991: 184). Overall, 
the protectorate established a thoroughly militarized society that incorporated all 
branches of administration – Ritchie’s Game Department was no exception in 
this regard.
A few years after the foundation of the Game Department the colonial 
administration also established a Forest Department, which was meant to oversee 
the protectorate’s commercial logging. The Forest Department was founded on 
the ambition to make the protectorate’s forests as profitable as possible, for the 
protectorate’s annexation had been much more expensive than calculated. This 
was largely due to the high costs of the construction of the Mombasa-Uganda 
railroad, which started in 1896 and lasted until 1901. Through commercial 
forestry the metropole hoped to earn some of its investments back (Kantai 2007) 
– it was eager, as Lonsdale put it, to ‘capitalize on the politics of conquest’ 
(1992A: 19). 
C.F. Elliot was the Forest Department’s first leading man, recruited in 1902. 
Elliot had studied forestry in France and before coming to the protectorate had 
served as a forester in India. He strongly believed in European scientific forest 
management, as did many of his contemporaries, and he considered African 
forest usage a threat to forest survival (Ofcansky 1984). During the eighteenth 
century, African communities had been romanticized into noble savages who 
lived in harmony with nature. In fact, as Grove (1989) notes for South Africa, 
eighteenth-century state interventions in natural resource control were mainly 
directed at curtailing settler agriculture rather than at restricting the activities of 
Africans. But, in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
presumption that African primitives lacked the knowledge to understand nature’s 
working replaced the earlier image of the noble savage (see also Brantlinger 
1988: 38-39). As a result, it became widely accepted that Africans needed close 
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supervision, in order to prevent them from destroying their surroundings (Ranger 
1989; see also Beinart 2003).
C.F. Elliot at once drew up a set of regulations and restrictions concerning the 
use of the protectorate’s forests. But since the Forest Department only hosted 
three forest rangers he lacked the manpower to enforce his ordinances (Ofcansky 
1984: 138-139). Elliot retired from the department in 1905, after which the 
institute lapsed into administrative paralysis. Elliot’s successor, called D.E. 
Hutchins, came in in 1907 but his appointment did not immediately solve the 
impasse. Hutchins advocated forest conservation rather than exploitation, and he 
actively went against the administration’s ambition to make forestry profitable. 
For instance, he objected to private enterprise and thus angered the entrepreneurs
who had come to the protectorate for the purpose of setting up wood firms 
(Castro 1995: 46). In general, Hutchins paid little attention to commercial 
interests (Ofcansky 1984: 140), but instead launched forest stations and tree 
nurseries, and expanded the department’s staff.
Hutchins’s directorship over the Forest Department lasted until 1911. As the 
protectorate’s leading forester, he had called into question the administration’s 
stance on forest exploitation, but with the onset of the First World War such
debates largely ebbed away. After the war, and in the course of the 1920s, the 
colonial administration established more tree nurseries and plantations. These 
plantations were modelled on the Southeast Asian example (see Rajan 1997; 
Vandergeest & Peluso 2006), and operated on the basis of agro-forestry labour 
arrangements. The model came to be referred to as the shamba (cultivated field 
or garden) system. Within the shamba system individual farmers were allotted 
forest plots for cultivation, on the condition that they planted trees amongst their 
crops and moved on to other plots once these trees had matured. The system was 
justified on the grounds that it offered benefits to all parties involved: it provided 
Africans access to land under conditions of rapid population growth and food 
scarcity, and it guaranteed the Forest Department a source of inexpensive 
manpower in an institutional context of continuous cutbacks (Castro 1995: 70). 
Some fifteen to twenty years after its foundation the Forest Department had 
developed into an authoritative institute that upheld a comprehensive system of 
penalties and licences. It strictly supervised and curtailed African use of forest 
products and it was suggested that, in doing so, it became one of the most 
unpopular colonial bureaus among colonial subjects (Castro 1995: 77). At the 
same time, the Forest Department had its own adversary: the Game Department. 
Initially, the Forest Department and the Game Department had had little to do 
with one another, as each focused on its own tasks. But as the number of tree 
nurseries and forest plantations grew steadily after the First World War a 
problem emerged. Seeds and saplings attracted foraging game, and due to 
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financial constraints the Forest Department was mostly unable to defend its 
nurseries and plantations against invading wildlife. It considered this a 
responsibility of the Game Department, but the latter, also on a constrained 
budget, gave priority to settler needs. It dedicated its scarce resources to the 
protection of European farms, and it hardly responded to the Forest Department’s 
complaints (Ofcansky 1984: 141). Over time, the relationship between the two 
institutes toughened and grew more vexatious, as we will see. 
There was yet a third administrative development that interfered with how the 
supervision over forest and wildlife gained shape in colonial Kenya. The 
previous chapter showed how thanks to, among others, John Muir, a typically 
American mentality towards nature and nature conservation emerged in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These American circumstances 
resonated with the African continent in different ways. For example, colonial 
Africa offered new outlets for the macho confrontations with wilderness and 
savagery that characterized American chauvinism, and different key American 
political figures participated in African travels. Theodore Roosevelt was one of 
them: He undertook a collecting and hunting trip to East Africa under the 
auspices of the Smithsonian Institution between 1909 and 1910 (Steinhart 2006: 
115). Roosevelt’s travels contributed to the rising popularity of East African 
safaris. In fact, Steinhart claims, it was only with the particular event of 
Roosevelt’s expedition that the word safari entered the English vocabulary as 
game hunting. Prior to that, the term safari, a derivative of the Kiswahili verb 
kusafiri, had referred to travel more generally and had long since been associated 
with Arab mercantile, trading caravans and slave trades (Ibid.: 113). 
A few years before Theodore Roosevelt’s expedition, the British politician 
Winston Churchill had also gone on a trip to East Africa. Yet, Churchill had had 
different intentions than Roosevelt: Churchill was not so much interested in big 
game hunting and natural history, as in promoting the empire before the British 
populace. At the time, the British public was sceptical about the expenses that 
had been made to annex the territory, and Churchill set out to show that East 
Africa was a justifiable investment that would soon pay off (Neumann 2013). 
Neumann suggests that the different orientation of the two men was illustrated in 
the memoirs that they later published: in Roosevelt’s African Game Trails: An
Account of the African Wanderings of an American Hunter-Naturalist (1910) the 
African landscape was presented as a vast expanse heaped with game, but in 
Churchill’s My African Journey (1908) the African landscape was dotted with 
cotton, rubber and fibre plantations, and showed a railway line that brought 
modernity and development (Neumann 2013: 1379-1380). 
Especially after the Second World War, conservation advocates in the 
metropole and in North America began to object to African trophy hunting more 
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strongly (Steinhart 2006: 174). These advocates argued that game stocks had 
dwindled in the course of only a few decades due to excessive wildlife killing, 
and they asserted that Africa’s large mammals found themselves on the verge of 
extinction. On the one hand, such protests resulted in increasing numbers of 
former white hunters who began to employ the skills and knowledge they had 
obtained through safari hunting for the benefit of conservation work. On the 
other hand, such protests and calls to ‘manage scarcity’ (Shiva 1992: 229) paved 
the way for the introduction of the American national parks model on African 
territory. This model found its ways to the continent in various ways: 
administrators and hunters, for instance, became acquainted with it following 
participation in international fora such as the British East and Central Africa 
Conferences (Matheka 2008: 121; see also Mackenzie 19885), or they brought 
home ideas after visiting the United States themselves. 
Colonel Mervyn Cowie specifically played a key role in relation to the 
introduction of the national parks model in Kenya (Steinhart 2006). Cowie was a 
Kenyan-born descendent of Scottish farmers, who had briefly left the colony for 
an education at Oxford University in the 1920s. When he returned from Britain 
in the early 1930s he observed that Kenya’s wildlife stock had greatly diminished 
in the years that he had been abroad. He witnessed how this trend continued in 
the years that followed, and he soon fully committed himself to conservation. 
Cowie obtained a position on Kenya’s Game Policy Committee, which was 
founded in 1937 in response to his calls to consider the future of wildlife more 
seriously (Ibid.: 190), and he began to advocate the need for wildlife sanctuaries. 
The Second World War briefly interrupted his petitions, but in 1944 he finally 
managed to get his plans off the ground: a new institute, called the Kenya 
National Parks, was founded and Cowie himself became its first director (Ibid.:
182). By that time, there was a ready audience in Europe and North America for 
adventure stories like Cowie’s and in 1951 a film recounting his struggles was 
released, called ‘Where No Vultures Fly’ (see also Paris 2003). 
In the years that Mervyn Cowie ran the Kenya National Parks, renamed the 
Royal National Parks of Kenya in 1950, he maintained that it was essential to 
establish closed-off areas to protect the colony’s last strongholds of wild nature 
(see for instance Cowie 1955: 9). He envisaged these areas as conservation 
islands to balance the processes of modernization that swept over the colony. ‘It 
would be illogical to seek the protection of all wildlife since there must be 
development’ he wrote, addressing the Fauna Preservation Society in 1955. ‘It is, 
however, reasonable that, before it is too late, Africa should be divided into 
zones so that each claimant for the use of land can have a fair share. And in this 
                                                        
5 In particular, chapter eight ‘From Preservation to Conservation: Legislation and the International 
Dimension’.
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division there must be a place for wildlife’ (Ibid.: 10). Cowie’s campaign 
illustrated how the American national parks model, once it gained ground on 
colonial territory, translated to fit African circumstances: in the United States 
national parks had primarily been established to protect extraordinary landscapes, 
but on the African continent the emphasis was on the survival of large mammals 
(Adams & McShane 1996: xvi). Both interpretations, however, seemed to carry 
the ability to arouse nationalist sentiments. In South Africa, for instance, the 
popularity of game viewing partially ameliorated tensions between former 
sportsmen, elite white classes, and poor white classes (Carruthers 1989: 188-189, 
but see Brooks (2005) for the political and material limits to conservation’s 
contribution to South African nation-building).
Mervyn Cowie’s National Parks added yet another layer of policing to an 
already stringent and repressive colonial regime. As mentioned, he carried 
military stripes, and he recruited men with a similar background. In 1949, for 
instance, he hired David Sheldrick, who had commanded the Fifth Battalion of 
the King’s African Rifles, and appointed him warden of Tsavo National Park. 
Tsavo National Park had been founded a year earlier, and Sheldrick was to bring 
down the high levels of poaching. Bill Woodley (father of the aforementioned 
Bongo Woodley), then a nineteen-year-old junior, soon joined him as assistant 
warden and together the two men came to master the art of military conservation 
in unprecedented ways (Steinhart 2006: 192-193). They optimized wildlife 
patrolling based on army principles, and they caught poachers through 
intelligence gathering as well as by conspiring with former poachers who worked 
for them as local spies (Ibid.: 198). 
David Sheldrick’s and Bill Woodley’s military conservation methods gained 
shape alongside growing African opposition to the colonial regime. In the 1950s,
the administration announced the Mau Mau Emergency, which I discuss in more 
detail in the next chapter, and Woodley joined the troops that aimed to combat 
native resistance. One journalist later suggested that Woodley was extremely 
dedicated to the task, going as far as dressing like Mau Mau, wearing the scalps 
of his victims on his head to resemble Mau Mau, and eating only forest fare so 
that his excrement smelled the same as those of the people he chased (Brown 
2008). Woodley’s contributions to fighting the Mau Mau have been 
mythologized, but his efforts nevertheless earned him a Military Cross and on his 
return to Tsavo he brought with him the war techniques he had picked up and 
employed them in Sheldrick’s anti-poaching campaigns (Steinhart 2006: 197). 
This further reinforced the military character of Tsavo’s management, and of the 
National Parks more generally, and virtually all the officers who later served 
alongside Sheldrick and Woodley were experienced counter-insurgency warriors 
or veterans of the Mau Mau war (Ibid.).
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The Game Department watched the successes of men like Mervyn Cowie, 
David Sheldrick and Bongo Woodley with unease. Prior to the 1940s, the 
department had been the sole caretaker of the colony’s game, and since the 
beginning of the century it had been in full control of regulating and policing. 
But from the mid-1940s onwards, the National Parks began to interfere with its 
monopoly (Steinhart 1994: 61). In addition, the Game Department and the 
National Parks had diametrically opposed goals: the first set out to protect settler 
interests and routinely killed wildlife, while the second combined forces to 
prevent ‘the disastrous destruction of God’s great beasts’ (Cowie 1955: 11). 
Needless to say, the National Parks and the Game Department found themselves 
in opposite positions, and while the National Parks steadily gained the reputation 
of a professional and efficient institute, the Game Department increasingly 
appeared as a demoralized lot that failed to understand the importance of wildlife 
conservation. A long-lasting rivalry over prestige and influence ensued (Steinhart 
2006: 192). 
On the whole, the aggressive enforcement of colonial game and forest 
legislation articulated and, at least initially, consolidated imperial authority 
(Neumann 1996). All over the continent, colonial policies criminalized African 
subsistence hunting and forest use, and after the National Parks ideology had 
gained a foothold entire populations were relocated and displaced so as to create 
safe havens for African wildlife (Beinart 1989; Carruthers 1989; Duffy 2000; 
Grove 1989). By the time the end of the Colony of Kenya began to appear 
inevitable and the prospect of independence was ushered in, European and 
American conservationists feared that a transfer in governance would mark the 
abolishment of nature conservation – they assumed that Kenya’s new leaders 
would be hostile towards it, because it had become such a vivid symbol of
repressive governance and discriminatory laws (Matheka 2008: 122). But their 
fears proved unwarranted and the political elite that emerged after independence 
largely continued colonial conservation practices (see also Gibson 1999), as the 
next section discusses.
Former colonial offices turned into state corporations
When the Colony of Kenya was declared an independent nation in 1963 both the 
Game Department and the Forest Department were incorporated in the new 
administrative system. They were put under the supervision of different 
ministries, and an African workforce largely replaced their former white staff. 
The situation differed for the National Parks: it had been a corporate body 
directed by a board rather than a colonial office all along (see the Colony and 
Protectorate of Kenya 1944) and, as such, it had never been part of the imperial 
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bureaucracy. After independence, the National Parks retained its autonomous 
status and continued to fall outside Kenya’s state apparatus (Leakey & Morell 
2001: 31). Mervyn Cowie nevertheless retired. A man called Perez Olindo 
succeeded him, and a new board was appointed.
Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, the Game Department and the Forest 
Department were hardly operational. Both had been financially constrained for a 
long time, but during the last stretch of colonialism serious budget cutbacks had 
immobilized them entirely (Poole & Leakey 1996). This inertia continued after 
1963 since both remained dependent on government funds, which they were 
mostly denied. The National Parks, on the other hand, managed to designate 
more and more land as protected area, and collected revenues through the 
entrance fees that it raised. While the National Parks supervised all wildlife 
inside officially gazetted conservation areas, the Game Department was supposed 
to control wildlife outside such sanctuaries (Ibid.: 55-56) – in practice, however, 
the latter for the most part lacked the resources to do anything at all.
In 1976, and due to further financial constrains within both institutes, the 
Game Department and the National Parks merged. The organization that thereby 
came into existence was called the Wildlife Conservation Management 
Department (WCMD). The union took place under pressure from the World 
Bank, which had promised a loan for $26 million on the condition that Kenya 
organized its conservation bureaucracies more efficiently (Leakey & Morell 
2001: 31). Shortly after the transformation, Perez Olindo resigned and Daniel 
Sindiyo, from the Game Department, assumed directorship of the WCMD. 
A range of conservationists inside and outside of Kenya favoured the fusion of 
the Game Department and the National Parks, but there were also sceptics. They 
pointed out that park wardens, trained as conservationists, would have to kill 
wildlife to secure farmlands and other white properties. At the same time, Game 
Department rangers, whose job it had been to hunt down problem animals, were 
relocated to national parks where they were likely to continue their habits (see for 
instance Leakey & Morell 2001: 31). Moreover, with the fusion the National 
Parks lost its former independent corporate status and was absorbed into the state 
administration. As a result, the revenue collected through park fees, which used 
to fund the maintenance of parks, disappeared into the treasury of the centralized 
government. The Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, which hosted the WCMD, 
subsequently refused to deliver adequate funding, just as it had withheld 
resources from the Game Department. From its foundation, the WCMD was 
hampered by a lack of decent equipment and by ill-paid salaries. The institute 
was generally perceived as highly corrupt (Poole & Leakey 1996: 56) and the 
acronym WCMD was soon translated into ‘Wildlife Poaching and 
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Mismanagement Department’ (see for instance The David Sheldrick Wildlife 
Trust n.d.). 
By the late 1980s, a little more than a decade after the establishment of the 
WCMD, the Kenyan government was again pressed to reorganize the nationwide 
administration of wildlife conservation. Due to the lack of government funds, the 
WCMD had become highly dependent on money provided by NGOs, which were 
eager to sponsor the institute directly because this saved them the trouble of 
going through state bureaucracies, where statesmen were likely to cream off their 
funds (see also Poole & Leakey 1996: 57). But when reports of increased
poaching began to mushroom in the 1980s, and because WCMD wardens and 
rangers were widely implicated in the killings (Martin 2012: 30), these NGOs 
eventually delivered an ultimatum: either the Kenyan government would clean 
up the WCMD and discharge its corrupt staff, or organizations would simply cut 
off the money supply. This ultimatum was made in the context of alarmist 
prognoses that marked the 1980s more generally, and that were fed by a number 
of ecological disasters as well as by a rising concern for global warming. 
Environmental lobbies gained in influence, and the basis was laid for what Bindé 
came to call a ‘tyranny of emergency’ (2000) that legitimizes radical and far-
reaching conservation interventions on the basis of the argument that time is 
running out – it was against this background that NGOs began to exert pressure 
on the Kenyan government.
In response to the demands by international aid organizations, the president of 
Kenya appointed a new WCMD director in 1989, called Richard Leakey. Leakey 
replaced Perez Olindo, who had been reappointed two years earlier. Initially,
Olindo had refused to work for the WCMD (Leakey & Morell 2001: 31), but 
after Daniel Sindiyo had been removed for nepotism and corruption Olindo had 
nevertheless taken on the job (Ibid.: 9). According to his own recollection of 
events, Leakey was never consulted, or even asked whether he wanted the 
position – instead, he learned about his promotion through a newsflash on the 
radio (Leakey & Morell 2001: 9). At the time, Leakey was the director of the 
National Museums of Kenya in Nairobi, and he was already somewhat of a 
national celebrity. His grandfather, reverend Harry Leakey, had come to the 
protectorate as a missionary at the beginning of the twentieth century. Ever since, 
different members of the Leakey family stood in the academic and political 
limelight. Both of Richard Leakey’s parents, Mary Leakey and Louis Seymour 
Bazett Leakey, had been central to the development of palaeoanthropology in 
Kenya and the latter had furthermore been a noted advisor to the colonial 
administration during the Mau Mau Emergency. Richard Leakey himself,
moreover, gained academic acclaim when, following in the footsteps of his 
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parents,6 an archaeological team under his supervision stumbled upon a near-
complete hominid skeleton near the Nariokotome sand river around Lake 
Turkana in 1984 (Walker & Leakey 1993).
After he became WCMD’s new director, Richard Leakey dismissed most of 
the institute’s workforce and hired experts from the private sector, mostly 
expatriates. He believed that, in general, well-trained people were reluctant to 
work for the Kenyan government due to bad working conditions. He believed 
that, as a result, the country’s state apparatus largely lacked competence (Poole 
& Leakey 1996: 60). In consideration of this, he offered his newly hired staff 
terms of employment that were considerably better than in any other government 
office. In addition, Leakey managed to revive the National Parks’ former 
independent corporate status and, with presidential approval, moved the WCMD 
out of the state bureaucracy. To this end, the Kenyan government adopted a new 
Wildlife Act that officially dissolved the WCMD and established the Kenya 
Wildlife Service (KWS). Like the National Parks in earlier times, the KWS was 
allowed to keep the revenue it earned so that it could sponsor its own operations. 
Leakey had also demanded that the KWS be responsible to the office of the 
president only, so that the institute was spared the clientelistic politics that played 
out on a ministerial level – yet, this was never fully achieved and different 
ministers and politicians continued to interfere with the KWS’s mode of 
operation, Leakey later admitted (Poole & Leakey 1996: 56). To enable the entire 
reorganization, the World Bank promised a loan for $60 million, and Leakey 
managed to guarantee further funding from different donors in the United 
Kingdom, Japan, the United States and the Netherlands (Leakey & Morell 2001: 
134).
After the KWS had been established and new staff had been recruited, Richard 
Leakey began to train his ground troops. Without adequate skills and decent 
equipment, the KWS would never be able to fight Kenya’s well-organized 
poaching syndicates, he argued (see for instance Leakey & Morell 2001). He 
convinced the president of the need to arm his rangers, and began to organize 
training camps where newly recruited staff were disciplined in military manners. 
At the time, different photos circulated that showed Leakey as an army general 
presiding over his forces. For instance, there was one that showed him marching 
between two lines of uniformed ranger-soldiers, all facing forward and gazing 
into the distance with chins up, weapons down and boots clasped. Leakey passes 
them sideways in a lighter uniform with shoulder chain, in a military tread with 
clenched fists and arms stiff to the body (see Leakey & Morell 2001: photo 
appendices at the centre of the book). 
                                                        
6 In Born in Africa: the Quest for the Origins of Human Life (2011) Meredith discusses the professional 
rivalry and competition between father and son.
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Through the KWS, Richard Leakey reinvigorated the military nature of former 
colonial policies, and his conservation approach was reminiscent of Mervyn 
Cowie and other one-time National Park figureheads such as David Sheldrick 
and Bill Woodley. Thus, the KWS became part of a wider post-colonial tradition 
in which African states continue to replicate repressive imperial conservation 
regimes (see for instance Duffy 1999; Ellis 1994; Igoe 2004). Like his colonial 
predecessors, Leakey was a strong proponent of fortress conservation based on 
principles of human exclusion, and he considered strict control key to effective 
wildlife management. Some fanatical nature lovers admired Leakey’s hands-on
techniques, but his methods also raised eyebrows. Especially the KWS’s shoot-
to-kill regulations, which made it possible for Leakey’s rangers to use lethal 
force against suspected poachers without being prosecuted, shocked critical 
observers and academics alike (see for instance Gibson 1999; Haynes 1999; 
Neumann 2004) and it has been suggested that within two years of Leakey’s 
directorship more than a hundred alleged poachers were killed without a chance 
for defence or trial (Peluso 1993: 205-206). 
In the first years of his appointment Richard Leakey managed to free the KWS 
of the stigma of corruption and ineffectiveness that had clung to the WCMD. In 
1991, he even managed to secure another loan worth $150 million from the 
World Bank, of which $60 million was paid immediately and the remaining $90
million spread out over the next five years (Leakey & Morell 2001: 192) –
apparently, the World Bank had no objections to Leakey’s martial methods. But 
from roughly 1993 onwards, the authority he had built began to splinter. In early 
July his private aircraft crashed, in what many believed was an assassination 
attempt organized by one of his political adversaries involved in a poaching 
cartel. Leakey lost both legs in the accident and his recovery was slow. Early the 
next year he was forced to resign after what he himself called a ‘nearly month-
long vilification campaign’ (Ibid.: 272): national newspapers painted him as a
racist imposter, and suggested that he was as corrupt as his predecessors (Martin 
2012: 150).
In March 1994, the president appointed a new KWS director, called David 
Western, who was, in many respects, the complete opposite of Richard Leakey. 
Since the late 1960s, Western had worked in Amboseli, a conservation area in 
southern Kenya close to the border with Tanzania. Here, he had studied the 
symbiotic relationship between pastoralists and the Amboseli ecosystem, and 
while doing so he had become convinced of the need to involve communities in 
conservation programmes (see for instance Western 1989). Western’s 
community-based approach contrasted sharply with Leakey’s fortress 
conservation methods, which had banned communities from conservation areas 
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and which had been firmly grounded in an idealized image of unspoilt African 
nature untouched by human interference.7
The opposition between David Western’s community-based philosophy and 
Richard Leakey’s fortress conservation doctrines resonated with a broader shift
in global conservation rhetoric taking place at the time. Throughout the 1980s, 
and even more so in the 1990s, NGOs and multilateral lending agencies had 
begun to link nature conservation to the aims of economic growth and social 
justice. This connection illustrated the upcoming trend of participatory 
development programmes more generally, which claimed to offer a more just 
alternative to state-orchestrated development programmes (Brosius et al. 1998; 
Gibson & Marks 1995; Jones 2006). Such intentions notwithstanding, it did not 
take critical observers long to point out that community-based tenets came with a 
set of problems of their own. Critics found fault with, among other things, how 
both development and conservation agencies tended to take communities as
homogeneous and harmonious entities, thus disregarding the dynamics of 
internal power inequalities (see for instance Brosius et al. 1998; Dzingirai 2003; 
Li 1996), and some pointed out how the jargon of community empowerment 
concealed that many programmes in practice continued to be top-down or state-
controlled (see for instance Cooke & Kothari 2001; Hill 1996; Marks 2001). 
Nevertheless, the shift from one ideology to another was nearly absolute, and 
with the introduction of community-based conservation principles fortress 
conservation was no longer politically defendable (Brockington 2004).
As the second KWS director, David Western openly criticized Richard Leakey 
for what the latter had made of the institute, and neither of the two men made a 
secret of their mutual rancour. Western had intended to gear the KWS towards a 
more people-friendly approach, but renewed budget constraints made this 
difficult. Among other things, the World Bank became less forthcoming with the 
loan that it had promised Leakey since Western meant to turn the entire 
organization on its head again, and the ongoing rumours of corruption troubled 
Western in making international donors enthusiastic for his plans. After serving a 
four-year term Western was written off, both by the public as well as by Kenya’s 
political establishment. The latter fired him twice: the first time he was rehired 
because of demands made by a number of embassies and funding organizations. 
By 1998, the KWS hit bottom. The larger public considered it thoroughly 
fraudulent and demoralized, and on the verge of bankruptcy (see for instance The 
David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust 1998). In a somewhat unforeseen twist of events 
Richard Leakey was brought back in and reinstated as KWS director in 
September that year. A clear message went out from this decision: David 
Western’s community-based approach had spared the rod and spoiled the child, 
                                                        
7 This idea is also challenged in the landmark study of Fairhead & Leach (1996).
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
54 
 
and a firm hand was needed again. This time, Leakey stayed in office only for a 
short period, and roughly a year later he retired from the KWS for the second 
time to become the country’s Head of Civil Service. It was the highest 
administrative position after the president, and Leakey’s political upgrade caused 
considerable commotion. African newspapers reported that the IMF and other 
donor organizations had commanded the promotion (see for instance Africa 
Confidential, 6 August 1999), and the larger public maintained that it marked a 
neo-colonial mindset in which former imperial powers tried to resume control 
over Kenya’s administrative system.
After Richard Leakey’s second term with the KWS the institute became 
characterized by a high turnover in leadership. Numerous directors followed in 
his and David Western’s footsteps, among whom Nehemiah Rotich, Joseph 
Kioko, Michael Wamithi, Joseph Mutia, Evans Arthur Mukolwe, Julius 
Kipng’etich and William Kibet Koprono. This, as well as ongoing financial 
setbacks, hampered the KWS’s performance and not long ago Leakey was 
quoted as saying that he had come to think of the institute as a complete failure 
(Martin 2012: 155).
Whereas after independence the Game Department and the National Parks 
went through a number of institutional reorganizations the Forest Department 
was largely left intact. In 1963, the colony’s forest plantations had been 
nationalized, and legal ownership shifted from the British administration to the 
government of Kenya. Like the WCMD later, the Forest Department was not 
granted the revenue that it generated with commercial forestry and returns went 
straight into the public treasury. Similar to the Game Department’s fate, the 
ministry that hosted the Forest Department subsequently withheld funding and,
like other government agencies after independence, the Forest Department 
became fully reliant on international donors. It lapsed into excessive illegal 
logging in which it cut far more than its plantations could sustain – and while the 
government abused its mandate to allocate timber concessions, Forest 
Department executives and politicians shared the profits (see for instance Kariuki 
2006; VanLeeuwe 2004).
Illegal logging manifested itself in various ways. For instance, when the Forest 
Department was brought under the Ministry of Environmental and Natural 
Resources in the 1990s a bureaucratic infrastructure emerged that consolidated 
and institutionalized illegal logging: the Forest Act allocated the right to adjust 
forest boundaries to the minister in charge, but the Minister of Environment and 
Natural Resources was a political appointee of the president who continuously 
excised forestland and gave out concessions to foster patronage (Klopp 2012: 
356). The reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1991, which is discussed in the 
next chapter, further intensified illegal logging, since politicians suddenly gave 
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out plots of forestland to their constituencies in exchange for votes (Ibid.: 354). 
Besides, Klopp (2012) suggests, multiparty politics in general encouraged 
politicians to get their hands on as much forestland as possible in the shortest 
possible time, because they were always unsure how long their term would last. 
She quotes an informant who confided to her: ‘if there were an election every 
year, there would be no forests left’ (Ibid.).
In addition to these developments, modifications to the shamba system 
accelerated logging practices. Initially, the colonial government had introduced 
the shamba programme to foster commercial tree growing and to improve food 
security among African peasants. Before and immediately after independence the 
shamba programme at least partially contributed to such goals, some maintain 
(see for instance Standing & Gachanja 2014). But after Kenya’s rising 
intelligentsia had begun to argue that the system relied on the exploitation of 
cheap African labour the programme was adjusted: after 1975 shamba farmers 
received levies for the trees they grew, and were under the obligation to pay rent 
for the plots they cultivated. The motivation for these changes had arguably been 
noble, but the new regulations turned agro-forestry into a lucrative business 
opportunity (Ibid.). People began to cut Kenya’s forests merely for the purpose 
of replanting for payment, and Forest Department officials hired and sold plots to 
landless farmers while putting the money in their own pockets (Kariuki 2006: 7).
The Forest Department’s overall reputation worsened, both nationally and 
internationally, up to the point that it was widely and routinely distrusted. This 
led to the withdrawal of most of the department’s international funding, 
especially during the wave of structural adjustment programmes that hit Kenya in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Among other things, this caused the dismissal of about six 
thousand officers between 1994 and 1998 (Standing & Gachanja 2014). 
Meanwhile, the Forest Department’s malpractices gave way to a national forest 
conservation lobby, marked by platforms such as the Green Belt Movement 
founded in 1977 by Wangari Maathai, at the time a university lecturer who had 
studied in the United States. Initially, the Green Belt Movement merely meant to 
criticize the revised shamba programme, but the more Maathai depicted the 
shamba system as just one example of how Kenya’s corrupted political regime 
operated, the more she gained the reputation of a political activist, rather than a 
conservationist (see for instance Klopp 2000). 
It did not take the Green Belt Movement long to gain the support of 
international watchdogs such as UNEP and the World Bank. In 1987, this 
impelled a number of policy changes, including the total banning of the shamba 
system. But the ban, in turn, created new problems: from one day to another 
former shamba peasants had lost their rights to land and their income. Those who 
refused to leave shamba plantations became illegal squatters on state land, and in 
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different locations this subsequently led to large-scale evictions (Standing & 
Gachanja 2014: 6). 
Notwithstanding the efforts made by national and international pressure 
groups, the Forest Department refused to change its habits or tackle its 
widespread corruption. Instead, it continues to practice excessive tree felling. 
This is a thorn in the flesh of the KWS, which claims that Kenya’s forests are 
indispensible wildlife habitat that must be preserved at all costs. Forestry and 
wildlife officers have never been on good foot (for the former felt the latter failed 
to protect nurseries and plantations, as I indicated in the previous section), but 
due to the Forest Department’s ongoing logging the already tense relation was
exacerbated from the 1990s onwards. Today, the KWS is hardly free from 
corruption itself, but at least it has managed to raise its public profile to some 
degree. With the reorganization of the WCMD into the KWS, the Forest 
Department’s corrupted nature began to stand out even more and at present a 
sense of inferiority plagues foresters. ‘When [KWS] rangers are armed and we 
are armed,’ one of them told me when discussing the problems that he faced in 
running his forest station, ‘we still feel that they are more armed’.8 He added that 
the KWS receives the most conservation donor money, which was later 
confirmed by a zoologist working for one of the larger international conservation 
NGOs. This zoologist indicated to me that forestry in Kenya continues to be 
disadvantaged in terms of budget, and that forest executives and wildlife 
executives are continuously in direct competition over funds and authority. How 
this competition affects Mt. Kenya, and how it complicated the mountain’s 1997 
World Heritage nomination, is the topic of the remainder of this chapter.
KWS and Forest Department rivalry on Mt. Kenya
From the moment that Bongo Woodley became Mt. Kenya’s senior warden in 
1989, his task to police and to conserve the mountain was complicated by the 
Forest Department’s sway over Mt. Kenya’s lower forest ring, which dated back 
to the 1910s. In 1912, the colonial administration issued the first large logging 
concession for Mt. Kenya’s forests (Castro 1995). Prior to that, D.E. Hutchins, 
the colonial Forest Department’s second director after C.F. Elliot, had largely 
managed to prevent the release of such permits. When the concession was 
eventually given out, it was never practiced: the Forest Department failed to 
attract a suitable candidate for the job, and a few years later it abandoned the idea 
of one large concession altogether. Alternatively, it began to hand out small-scale 
and short-term licences (Ibid.).
                                                        
8 Conversation 31 May 2012, Nanyuki town.
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The First World War brought most of Mt. Kenya’s small-scale and short-term 
logging to a halt, because the involved businessmen entered the military en 
masse. After the war, Mt. Kenya’s timber industry revived a little: this was 
mostly due to an extension of the Mombasa-Uganda railroad that headed for 
Nanyuki. These developments notwithstanding, Mt. Kenya’s timber commerce 
remained largely local. Transporting logs out of the highlands was simply too 
laborious and expensive, and Mt. Kenya’s timber entrepreneurs did not 
participate in world markets (Castro 1995: 72-73). Nevertheless, in 1932, all of 
Mt. Kenya’s forests below an altitude of 11,000 feet were designated as a forest 
reserve (Emerton 1998: 6). The colonial administration had already drawn 
boundaries in 1913 that had formally ended the right of Africans to enter Mt. 
Kenya’s forests without permission (Castro 1995: 49), but with the official 
designation the colonial administration assumed yet tighter control and access 
began to be regulated more strictly. 
Mt. Kenya’s timber industry expanded with the onset of the Second World 
War. At the time, demands for fuelwood and timber increased quickly because of 
nearby dehydration factories, which produced dried food rations for British 
armed forces (Castro 1995: 174). Initially, such increased demands caused the 
Forest Department to give out more temporary logging permits, and the number 
of pit sawyer licences issued to Africans increased steadily. But when European-
and Asian-owned sawmills began to protest against these pit sawyer licences, 
which affected their own income, the Forest Department stopped renewing 
African permits (Ibid.: 75-79). This decision frustrated African pit sawyers, who 
by the early 1940s were embittered over their exclusion from the profits made in 
Mt. Kenya’s timber industry. This bitterness later found resonance during the 
Mau Mau upheavals: while the colonial administration tried to suppress the Mau 
Mau rebellion, former pit sawyers aided the movement’s fighters in finding 
groves and caves for shelter, and shared their intimate knowledge of Mt. Kenya’s 
forests with them (Castro 1995: 83). In fact, some Mau Mau figureheads, such as 
Dedan Kimathi and Waruhiu Itote, both introduced in more detail in the next 
chapter, had a background in forestry: Kimathi used to collect seeds for the 
Forest Department, and Itote had been a fuelwood merchant offended by racial 
and unfair forest regulations (Ibid.: 82).
Commercial and large-scale logging on Mt. Kenya continued throughout the 
1940s and 1950s. By the mid 1960s it became evident that ever-increasing 
demands for timber began to outstrip supply, and local wood shortages began to 
emerge (Castro 1995: 98). These shortages increased in the decade that followed 
and eventually a number of measures were taken. Amongst these measures was 
the establishment of the Nyayo Tea Zone on Mt. Kenya’s southern slopes in 
1986, in the vicinity of a town called Embu. Essentially, the Nyayo Tea Zone 
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was a state corporation designed to function as a development scheme, and that 
was sponsored by the World Bank. It had been founded in light of the high prices 
for tea at the time, which reached record levels worldwide in 1983 and 1984 (see 
Castro 1995: 99).
The Nyayo Tea Zone corporation mainly aimed to serve two goals. Firstly, it 
meant to provide villagers, who were encouraged to cultivate tea in exchange for 
a percentage of the sale, with an income. In practice, however, this arrangement 
fed into forms of labour exploitation that recalled the shamba system (see for 
instance Klopp 2012). Secondly, the Nyayo Tea Zone plantations were to halt 
forest encroachment, which had intensified ever since the abolition of the shamba 
system in 1975, by forming a buffer zone between village settlements and forest
land (see for instance Castro 1991; VanLeeuwe 2004). Yet, for Mt. Kenya the 
scheme primarily engendered a different set of consequences: the land around 
Embu was already densely populated, and in order to make room for tea 
plantations large tracks of forests were cut down. Moreover, after the Nyayo Tea 
Zone plantations became productive a number of nearby tea factories were 
established. These factories required large amounts of fuel wood to dry tea
leaves, and as such placed a further burden on Mt. Kenya’s already over-stressed 
forests. 
In order to cope with the ever-increasing demand for timber the government 
expanded Mt. Kenya’s tree plantations throughout the 1980s. This again resulted 
in more logging because forest patches were cleared to make room for such 
plantations. As the Forest Department failed to supervise these clearings landless 
pit sawyers moved in and settled in the emptied forestlands (Castro 1995: 102). 
In 1989, many of these forest dwellers, identified by the Forest Act as illegal 
squatters, were evicted on government order. According to one source, more than 
17,000 people were removed (VanLeeuwe 2004: 188) and the evictions were 
carried out with much violence. The people who were expelled mostly took up 
residence just outside Mt. Kenya’s forests, on narrow strips of infertile land next 
to roadsides – little else was available to them because the area was already 
densely populated. They remained dependent on Mt. Kenya’s resources and 
continued to collect firewood, graze cattle or burn charcoal in Mt. Kenya’s 
forests (Kariuki 2006).
In the years that followed, and related to Kenya’s upcoming lobby for forest 
protection as well as to increased global concerns for environmental conservation 
more generally, large-scale logging on Mt. Kenya became a matter of public 
concern. Politicians blamed forest destruction entirely on villagers, whom they 
said continued to exploit the forest illegally. Yet, as critical observers such as 
Bussmann (1996) and Castro (1991) have pointed out, villagers’ small-scale 
offtake arguably had little effect on the mountain’s overall grave condition. What 
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really threatened Mt. Kenya, they maintained, was commercial logging carried 
out with high-tech logging equipment. Politicians turned a blind eye to such 
practices in exchange for a share in the profits, but in an attempt to save face they 
deployed what Apter has called the ‘formula of blaming the victim’ (2005: 33). 
The Forest Department steadily increased its influence over Mt. Kenya from 
the 1930s onwards, but it was not the only institute that claimed authority over 
the region. In 1949, the National Parks called into existence Mt. Kenya National 
Park. This Park covered the entire surface above the 11,000 feet boundary of the 
forest reserve.9 As such, the National Park was essentially founded as an island 
in the midst of forests that were under supervision of the Forest Department. The 
map below shows the situation:
DeVink Mapdesign Ltd                                                        
9 In 1965, the boundaries of Mt. Kenya National Park were slightly lowered to 10,500 feet, and in 1968,
two tourist tracks leading to the Sirimon Gate and the Naro Moru Gate were added (VanLeeuwe 2004: 
175).
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The foundation of Mt. Kenya National Park gave way to an administrative 
division that eventually proved highly problematic. 
In the first decades after 1949, the arrangements did not cause many problems. 
In 1959, Mt. Kenya National Park came under the auspices of Bill Woodley –
after he had served under David Sheldrick throughout the 1940s and 1950s he 
was promoted to chief warden of both Mt. Kenya and the neighbouring 
Aberdares mountain range. Woodley was familiar with the Mt. Kenya area, 
which he had come to know well during his contribution to the fight against the
Mau Mau (Herne 1999). In fact, after Woodley became warden for Mt. Kenya 
and the Aberdares, he scouted some of his one-time Mau Mau enemies for his 
ranger team. It has even been suggested that one of the Mau Mau’s former 
commanders, called Muhangia, eventually became Woodley’s right-hand man 
and closest confidante (Ibid.: 279).
Due to its rocky surface, and due to the low temperatures typical for Mt. 
Kenya’s higher altitudes, Mt. Kenya National Park never hosted much wildlife 
apart from some rodent and bird species. For Bill Woodley this was not 
necessarily a problem: he considered it his main task to fight poaching (see 
Steinhart 2006: 200-201) and, although Woodley only had an official mandate 
over the national park, there was no rule or piece of legislation that prohibited 
him from pursuing poachers in Mt. Kenya’s lower forests. 
In 1978, Bill Woodley left his post on Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares mountain 
range and returned to Tsavo National Park. In the years that followed the 
management of Mt. Kenya National Park largely stagnated, not least due to the 
integration of the National Parks and the Game Department that I discussed 
earlier. The situation changed when Richard Leakey took over the WCMD in 
1989. Among the new staff recruited by Leakey was Bongo Woodley, one of Bill 
Woodley’s sons, whom Leakey appointed as the new warden of Mt. Kenya 
National Park. Leakey demanded that Bongo Woodley follow the KWS’s 
military training camps – it was an experience, Leakey later wrote in his 
memoirs, that made quite an impression on the young Woodley. He quoted 
Bongo Woodley saying: 
I had been born and raised in Kenya, but like most white kids I mingled more with white 
than with black. So there I was in the barracks – all black Kenyans and two whites, me and 
my brother, Danny.10 Initially, it was tough: who was I going to talk to besides Danny? But I 
found out that all of us shared basic issues: worries about our homes and families, those who 
were sick or who had died. And we shared common goals: protecting the parks, building up 
KWS, surviving the training. So it gave me a very different feel for what Kenya is about.
Leakey & Morell (2001: 195)
                                                        
10 Bongo Woodley’s brother Danny later became warden of Tsavo National Park.
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As a son to Bill Woodley, Bongo Woodley had been brought up to care for 
Kenya’s wildlife, and father and son formed a couple that inspired different 
adventure and travel books (see for instance Caputo 2002; Holman 1978; 
Ridgeway 1999). More importantly, Bongo Woodley inherited his father’s 
military outlook on wildlife control. In an interview with a South African 
newspaper Bongo Woodley said that he had always thought of his father as a 
hero, who had ‘an amazing job’ (Mail & Guardian, 11 June 2003) that ‘involved 
everything’ (Ibid.) that he himself later did on Mt. Kenya. A local mountain 
guide called John Mwangi, 11 who had already been climbing Mt. Kenya for 
decades by the time we met in the course of 2012 and who had observed how 
Bongo Woodley had directed Mt. Kenya over the years, said that Bongo had 
been a strong leader who successfully scared off criminals. ‘Bongo used to be 
very strict so you had to be very good’ he stated, and added that Bongo Woodley 
was very effective in scaring and killing poachers. 
After Bongo Woodley had taken the post on Mt. Kenya, relations between the 
Forest Department and the KWS became more problematic. In the course of the 
1990s, emerging global conservation lobbies began to underscore the need to
safeguard key wildlife habitats, and slowly old colonial ideas that the protection 
of wildlife primarily consisted of preventing and tracing poaching began to be 
complimented with wider ecological concerns. Accordingly, the problems 
inherent to Mt. Kenya’s administrative division began to show: wildlife rangers 
argued in favour of protecting Mt. Kenya’s forests for these were, amongst 
others, vital habitat for elephants and different antelope species, yet rangers had 
no power to actually intervene in forest management. In the meantime, the Forest 
Department was rapidly depleting Mt. Kenya’s forests. There was little that 
wildlife officers could do – the Forest Department had a mandate to carry out its 
activities while the authority of wildlife rangers was limited to the National Park 
where, ironically, there was hardly any wildlife due to its rugged terrain and the 
low temperatures. 
In the context of globally changing perceptions about what ‘good wildlife 
conservation’ looked like, the ongoing depletion of Mt. Kenya’s forests was an 
eyesore to Bongo Woodley. He could not guard Mt. Kenya’s wildlife as long as 
forests were being felled, and he held Forest Department executives responsible. 
During one of our conversations in which he recounted his time on Mt. Kenya he 
indicated that the higher he got in the Forest Department hierarchy, the more 
difficult it had been for him to seek cooperation. He explained that all managerial 
issues were forwarded to higher offices, where decision-making was typically 
delayed or put off entirely. Field officers were simply told to obey orders from 
                                                        
11 Conversations on 13 September 2011, Nanyuki Town; 7 November 2011, Nanyuki Town; 23 May 
2012, Nanyuki Town; 20 August 2012, Nanyuki Town.
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above – they generally followed instructions, for their jobs and income depended 
on the goodwill of their superiors. He added that, in general, he had had a good 
understanding with the foresters located on Mt. Kenya but stressed that these 
lower-ranking employees were in no position to challenge the ways in which 
logging on Mt. Kenya, or in the country at large, had been institutionalized over 
the decades. From the provincial level up, Bongo Woodley had found that Forest 
Department staff showed little interest in forest conservation. ‘There was a strong 
cover-up mentality’ he concluded. Mt. Kenya’s forests were being plundered, he 
said, but higher officials publicly maintained that logging was not taking place. 
Bongo Woodley’s hands were tied. As long as the Forest Department was in 
charge of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve there was little that he could do to change 
the situation. In 1992, the KWS and the Forest Department had signed a 
memorandum of understanding that was supposed to improve the cooperation 
between the two institutions in areas where, like Mt. Kenya, both were active. 
But the memorandum was mainly the result of donor pressure, and the agreement 
never became much more than an official statement. In the meantime, the 
struggles between Bongo Woodley and the Forest Department continued. It was 
against the background of this conflict that Bongo Woodley drafted Mt. Kenya’s 
World Heritage application in 1996.
World Heritage consolidating colonial legacies
Bongo Woodley’s frustration over the Forest Department’s commercial logging 
set the contours for the World Heritage application. Woodley indicated to me that 
he was convinced that it was necessary to withdraw the Forest Department’s 
mandate and to give the KWS full authority to oversee both the national park and 
the forest reserve. With this in mind, different aspects of the World Heritage
application document deserve closer attention.
First, the World Heritage Site that Woodley proposed covered a large area, 
and far exceeded the national park. Initially, Woodley had suggested including 
all of Mt. Kenya’s forests in the designation, but following Thorsell’s field 
evaluation he had adjusted the boundaries so as to leave out the most severely 
logged areas. Still, after this revision the World Heritage Site that Woodley 
proposed continued to include much forest land. In fact, the bigger part of it 
consisted of land designated as forest reserve (see the full page map at the 
beginning of this dissertation). Since Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site came to 
include large parts of a reserve under the supervision of the Forest Department, 
one might expect that the latter played a vital role in the application. This was not 
the case. On the contrary, according to Woodley, the Forest Department was 
never consulted or even informed about the proceedings.
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A short factsheet accompanied Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage application, 
which, among other things, made inquiries about the ownership status of the 
proposed site. It was suggested in this factsheet that the KWS owned the entire 
area under application (The Government of the Republic of Kenya 1996: 1). Here 
and there the Forest Department was referred to as the KWS’s co-supervisor but 
no mention was made of the fact that, in practice, the KWS had no mandate 
whatsoever over the bigger part of the area addressed by the application. Since 
the application was kept completely within the KWS, with David Western finally 
authorizing it and sending it off, the Forest Department was never offered an 
opportunity to object. These conditions illustrate the process of ‘rendering
technical’ – a matter I introduced in the previous chapter. The formal inquiries 
about Mt. Kenya’s ownership status imply that sites have an unmistakable 
proprietor, which can unproblematically be identified and listed. But this 
conceals that heritage is a disputed property relation that, by its very nature, 
forestalls the presence of a self-evident or absolute owner. In the case of World 
Heritage, disputes are likely to materialize between different government 
institutes, for the World Heritage Convention endows states with exclusive 
management rights. By extension, the factsheet thus conceals that states are not 
unanimous administrative blocks, and that debates over heritage ownership can 
pitch different state actors against each another. 
Secondly, the application document that Bongo Woodley drafted only spoke 
of Mt. Kenya’s natural features, and focused solely on the mountain’s 
geographical and ecological qualities. Among other things, it stated that the 
region was extraordinary because Mt. Kenya is a tropical mountain with snow-
capped peaks; it mentioned that Mt. Kenya is a vital water catchment area with 
notable geological formations; and it asserted that Mt. Kenya gives shelter to 
unique flora and fauna (The Government of the Republic of Kenya 1996: 5). It 
extolled the mountain’s glaciers and tarns, and its richness in alpine and sub-
alpine indigenous forests. But not once did the application document mention the 
human activities carried out on Mt. Kenya: it did not note Mt. Kenya’s 
commercial logging or the presence of shamba system plantations and human 
settlements, nor did it discuss how people continued to collect firewood and 
graze cattle. On the contrary – in the document’s final section, Bongo Woodley 
suggested that Mt. Kenya was a pristine wilderness area that ‘never has or ever 
would be used for settlement, agriculture or industry’ (Ibid.).
Of course, Bongo Woodley knew that a depiction of Mt. Kenya as pristine 
wilderness was not realistic. In fact, on different occasions he recounted to me 
how he had spent most of his days actively fighting all of the aforementioned
activities. I think that Bongo Woodley nevertheless staged Mt. Kenya as a 
wilderness area to buttress his own command. After Richard Leakey had founded 
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the KWS in 1990, the organization’s wardens and rangers soon emerged as the 
ultimate and exclusive caretakers of Kenya’s nature. This ‘nature’, in turn, drew 
heavily on colonial images of Africa as a wild and untamed place where human 
influences were largely absent. So for Bongo Woodley to appear as Mt. Kenya’s 
only true, legitimate caretaker he only had to make sure that the area, at least on 
paper, appeared ‘natural’ enough. 
The application document described Mt. Kenya’s environment exclusively in 
the language of the natural sciences. This is another way in which Mt. Kenya’s 
World Heritage nomination ‘rendered the mountain technical’. This had various 
consequences. Among other things, the restricted use of a natural scientific 
discourse obscured alternative descriptions of Mt. Kenya, such as those that 
articulate the mountain’s political, religious or ethnic histories – these histories 
form the basis for the next chapter, where I point out that Mt. Kenya’s 
representation as a site of nature silenced other legacies that were politically 
delicate in the late 1990s. At the same time, the language of the natural sciences 
offered Bongo Woodley a chance to cover up how political his venture actually 
was: he was not merely interested in conserving Mt. Kenya’s lakes and tarns and 
animal species, but he aimed to nullify the management mandate of the Forest 
Department and wanted to assume control over the entire region. And thirdly, the 
document’s use of natural scientific jargon concealed that what the application 
proposed to conserve was not ‘real nature’, understood as actually identifiable 
ecological processes (Soper 1995), but ideals of nature reminiscent of colonial 
domination. Let me clarify this last point.
Bongo Woodley was one of the implementing agents of KWS policy. Under 
supervision of KWS director Richard Leakey this policy came to reinforce the
colonial stereotypes of an African nature devoid of people and of military 
fortress conservation that I demonstrated earlier. Bongo Woodley personified 
these stereotypes. He made no secret of his warlike operations (one of which I 
describe in more detail in the next section), and he paraded his disciplinary 
methods and as well as his sternness. Tellingly, after Bongo Woodley retired 
from the KWS he did not pursue a career in nature conservation. Instead, he 
worked for security and aviation companies such as the ArmorGroup and Everett 
Aviation, where he put the military and intelligence skills that he had cultivated 
on Mt. Kenya to further use. Since Bongo Woodley was responsible for the 
entire application I argue that Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage listing reproduced the 
colonial conservation ideals that Woodley represented. These ideals were based 
on colour bar distinctions, and poised white conservationists against black 
offenders (see among others Adams & Hutton 2007; Brockington & Igoe 2006; 
Carruthers 2006; Duffy 2000).
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
65
 
Although I find it necessary to problematize Bongo Woodley’s position and 
his background, as otherwise we might fail to see how colonial principles of 
nature and nature conservation became a part of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site, 
I do not mean to put the burden of this on Bongo Woodley personally. Rather, 
different structural conditions underpinned his actions. Woodley indeed 
embodied a militaristic conservation style that characterized colonial 
conservation efforts, but his practices were sustained by Richard Leakey’s 
reorganization of the KWS. This reorganization was supported by the World 
Bank, which, in turn, was an effect of the global environmental pessimism that 
characterized the 1980s and 1990s that itself stemmed from culturally specific 
ideals of unspoiled nature. I have no intention of defending Woodley’s fortress-
style conservation, and I disapprove of his military tactics, but I also see how he 
was part of a larger system kept in place by a set of dynamics far beyond his 
control or his personal intentions.
This notwithstanding, we should not forget that Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage
application was the private project of one white officer only. I want to stress this 
point, for it seems that Mt. Kenya is not unique in this regard. Peter Howard,12 a 
conservationist who worked for different large organizations including IUCN, 
and who established an online database of all of Africa’s World Heritage Sites 
(African World Heritage Sites n.d.), told me that especially during World 
Heritage’s first decades white communities largely controlled the designation of 
African World Heritage Sites. He clarified that it had mostly been expats and 
white residents who had nominated African sites for World Heritage listing. 
They had had little trust in African state administrations, he said, and they had 
taken World Heritage to be a venue for protecting what they considered valuable 
African properties against failing state bureaucracies. I believe that this indicates 
that World Heritage is even more Western-centric than scholars like Byrne 
(1991) and Smith (2006) have already suggested.
Before moving on, I also want to emphasize that, even though I believe there 
are good reasons to claim that Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site perpetuates 
colonial ideals and assumptions, I still maintain that we must be careful in 
conceiving of African nature conservation in general as a mere neo-colonial 
venture. Political ecologists and post-colonial scholars have rightly pointed out 
how contemporary nature conservation efforts have come to incorporate older 
North-South inequalities (see for instance Adams & Hutton 2007; Brockington & 
Scholfied 2010C; West et al. 2006), how they expose Africans to top-down 
Western-centric conservation ideals (see for instance Duffy 2000; Peluso 1993; 
Strickland 2001), or how they reinforce black-white boundaries (see for instance 
Garland 2008; McDermott Hughes 2005). Yet, merely understanding African 
                                                        
12 Conversation on 4 July 2012, Nairobi.
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conservation as a colonial relic does not account for the enthusiasm with which 
many African stakeholders subscribe to conservation stereotypes and welcome 
conservation NGOs (Drinkwater 1989; Garland 2008; Gibson 1999). So rather 
than readily accepting that international organizations impose nature 
conservation programmes on African subjects, I find it more productive to 
conceive of nature conservation as a form of negotiation. This necessitates that 
we study the physical settings where conservation ‘takes place’ (understood as 
both emerging from and seizing a particular locale), and also that we keep an eye 
on zones of contestation and constantly shifting positionalities (Brosius 1999: 
283). If we refrain from doing so we are likely to perceive of African subjects as 
mere conservation victims, thereby depriving them of any form of agency (see 
also Carruthers 2006). 
In closing, I want to say a few words on how Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage
listing affected the way in which international observers came to judge Mt. 
Kenya’s plight. In the aftermath of the World Heritage nomination process 
different global onlookers criticized the Forest Department, not in the least due to 
Jim Thorsell’s evaluation report. In this report, Thorsell, in keeping with Bongo 
Woodley, spoke fondly of the KWS but demonized the Forest Department’s 
behaviour:
Current management of Mt. Kenya National Park is judged to be of a high standard. The 
park has a practical management plan which is being implemented with support from the 
European Union and others. New staff quarters and entrance gates have been completed with 
a loan from the World Bank. There is an active research programme and tourism is well-
managed. Special plans for a fenced rhino reserve are being carried out and wildlife 
populations, though reduced from previous years, are still healthy.
The situation in the surrounding Forest Reserve is in sharp contrast to the high level of 
management existing in the National Park. During the field inspection IUCN observed the 
serious levels of encroachment that is [sic.] taking place in the Forest Reserve. The 
inadequacies of management of the forest reserve have been geographically presented in the 
recent study by Bussmann (1996) and the problems are widely known within Kenya. 
Primarily the threats come from overharvesting of forest products and illegal removal of 
Camphor and Cedar. Some areas have been taken over by settlement and exotic plantations 
have replaced much indigenous forests. Marijuana plantations have destroyed much natural 
forest in the south-east of the Reserve and no attempts are being made to control their 
spread.
(IUCN 1997: 69)
Thorsell presented the KWS as Mt. Kenya’s rightful and responsible custodian, 
and insisted that the Forest Department neglected its conservation 
responsibilities. 
Later, World Heritage-related reports on Mt. Kenya echoed Jim Thorsell’s. 
For instance, a 2003 IUCN report expressed worries over the Forest 
Department’s capacities and mentioned being ‘concerned about the lack of 
resources that hinder the Forest Department to make an effective contribution to 
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the protection of the Site’ (ICUN 2003: 3). A 2001 UNESCO decision document 
gave further voice to IUCN’s concern over ongoing illegal logging and 
reprimanded the Kenyan Minister for Environment and Natural Resources, who 
was the Forest Department’s direct supervisor and executive, for his intention to 
deforest 68,000 hectares for settlement purposes (UNESCO 2001: 25).
Ultimately, Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage designation had mixed consequences 
for Bongo Woodley and his crusade against the Forest Department. Most 
importantly, the World Heritage listing had no juridical force. IUCN supported 
the KWS’s position that the Forest Department exploited Mt. Kenya, but World 
Heritage status in itself changed nothing in terms of the KWS’s authority. As 
such, the inscription on the World Heritage List did not have the effect that 
Bongo Woodley had hoped for. Perhaps this was inevitable, as the inscription 
itself was a derivative of the situation that it meant to solve – consequently, Mt. 
Kenya’s World Heritage designation did not offer a solution to existing 
management problems, but rather recreated the power structures that sustained 
these problems. At the same time, Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage listing introduced
an additional layer of inspection, and it brought the mountain under closer 
surveillance of large organizations. As such, World Heritage offered Bongo 
Woodley a discursive sphere in which the Forest Department’s corruption 
became a global concern, rather than a merely Kenyan affair. How this had an 
impact on the mountain’s administration is the topic of the last section.
Mt. Kenya’s tussles over mandate after 1997
In 2000, a revision of Mt. Kenya’s administrative boundaries took place, 
aggravating the opposition between the KWS and the Forest Department. This 
revision was partially reinforced by Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage designation, 
which had given the KWS more international acclaim, but it found its real origins 
in a set of developments that had started some five years earlier. 
In 1995, national and international stakeholders who feared for the future of 
Kenya’s forests founded the Kenya Forest Working Group (KFWG). Among 
these stakeholders were the East African Wildlife Society, IUCN and UNEP, and 
soon after foundation the KFWG was funded by Dutch and Swedish NGOs as 
well as by different UN programmes. The KFWG was essentially a lobby 
platform founded as a civil society organization and designed to expose the 
government’s share in the country’s corrupt timber industry. As such, the KFWG 
largely targeted an international audience – within Kenya, the general public was 
already widely aware of these practices. The KFWG used Mt. Kenya for its first 
shame-and-blame offensive. The choice was deliberate, one of the KFWG’s 
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earliest associates13 told me during a meeting at the ministerial office where he 
worked in 2013. Mt. Kenya had given name to the country, he stressed, and 
therefore it carried an unmistakable iconic value. Besides, by the time that the 
KFWG came round to planning its first campaign Mt. Kenya had just acquired 
World Heritage status. As such, international conservation audiences had been 
freshly reminded of the mountain’s merits and importance, and of what would be 
lost if the mountain was not protected properly.
Although there was widespread talk about Mt. Kenya’s grave condition at the 
time, the KFWG faced a problem: there was no official report with hard data. 
There were eyewitness accounts as well as a few files on the most severely 
affected areas, like Imenti on the mountain’s northern slopes, but a diagnosis of 
Mt. Kenya’s overall condition did not exist as yet – this was primarily a result of 
the inaccessibility of the mountain’s thick forests, of the vastness of its terrain 
and of a number of other practical constraints, such as the dangers involved in 
aerial assessments due to the area’s complicated aerodynamics. To fill this gap,
the KFWG decided to carry out its own survey. To this end, a Belgian expat 
called Christian Lambrechts, who at the time worked for UNEP, visited Mt. 
Kenya in early 1999. During this visit, Lambrechts14 contacted Bongo Woodley.
Lambrechts recounted to me in June 2012 how he informed Mt. Kenya’s senior 
warden of the KFWG’s intentions, and managed to implicate Woodley in the 
KFWG’s operation.
Two men subsequently began to make plans for an aerial inspection: Woodley 
would pilot the two-seater Aviat Huskey that he used for his air patrols, and 
Lambrechts would assess Mt. Kenya’s forests from the passenger’s seat. They 
soon faced the problem of funding, for the KFWG only had a limited budget. 
Bongo Woodley told me that they had therefore turned to Richard Leakey, who 
at the time was serving his second term as KWS director. He said that Leakey 
had agreed to subsidize the survey, and let the two men use the KWS’s Aviat 
Huskey for free. In addition, Leakey promised that the KWS would cover the 
fuel costs, and that the organization would fund the publication of the survey’s 
final results. Once the cooperation between the KFWG and the KWS had been 
established, Richard Leakey introduced another KWS officer, Gideon Gathaara,
to the project. Gathaara was not meant to contribute to the survey’s fieldwork, 
which was done entirely by Bongo Woodley and Christian Lambrechts. Rather,
he was brought in to give the study a black face, one informant who opted to 
remain anonymous told me. This person explained to me that Gathaara’s 
participation was intended to disguise the fact that, in practice, the survey was a 
white men’s undertaking, and added how Leakey had indicated that the project 
                                                        
13 Conversation on 15 August 2012.
14 Conversations on 26 May 2012, Nanyuki Town; 20 August 2012, Nanyuki Town.
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was likely to be rejected as a neo-colonial conservation initiative if it was carried 
out entirely by white practitioners. Just before Leakey resigned from the KWS 
for the first time in 1994 he had personally experienced how Kenyan nature 
conservation continued to arouse racial critiques, and my informant believed that
he had wanted to shield the survey from similar attacks. In the final report,
Bongo Woodley and Christian Lambrechts were mentioned by name only once, 
in the introduction – after that they were anonymized into ‘the survey’s pilot’ and 
‘the survey’s rear seat observer’ (Gathaara 1999: 6-7).
The report that resulted from the survey spread an alarmist message: it 
presented Mt. Kenya’s condition as very grave and very urgent. For instance, it
stressed the negative effects of charcoal production, overgrazing, marihuana 
cultivation and extensive illegal logging, and it supported such claims with 
impressive photographs. Christian Lambrechts told me that he and Bongo 
Woodley had deliberately made use of a specific survey method, called ‘total 
survey count’ (designed in the late 1970s for counting animals), knowing full 
well that this method would generate dramatic results. Total count surveys rest 
on data collected in a few relatively small geographic zones, which is used to 
make calculations for a larger area. Because total count surveys rely entirely on 
the findings gathered through the aerial inspection of a fairly limited number of
demarcated blocks, biases become proportionally much more important (Norton-
Griffiths 1978: 87). With respect to Mt. Kenya’s survey, these biases were 
generated on purpose: Woodley and Lambrechts intentionally flew over the most 
severely affected forest patches, and generalized their findings for the mountain 
at large. The founder of the total survey count, a man called Mike Norton-
Griffiths, later reviewed Bongo Woodley’s and Christian Lambrecht’s survey. 
Norton-Griffiths wrote a report on the biases and errors that had occurred (see 
Norton-Griffiths 2004), and told me in an email about the overall conclusion that 
he had drawn: Woodley’s and Lambrechts’s basic interpretation that Mt. Kenya’s 
condition differed substantially from earlier decades was sound, but they had 
sensationalized their findings. 
Bongo Woodley’s and Christian Lambrechts’s manipulation of survey data 
should warn us against uncritically receiving the ‘evidence’ of environmental 
threats. This is not to suggest that there are no real ecological processes taking 
place that should concern us, but in the political language that the conservation 
industry draws on such real ecological processes are easily confused with cultural 
models of what cannot be lost and should be preserved (Soper 1995: 196). This 
political language largely derives its authority from scientific material gathered 
for the purpose (see also Beck 1996: 3), through which it makes claims to 
objective truths (Feindt & Oels 2005; Hajer 1995; Mühlhäusler & Peace 2006). 
The problem is that when such ‘objective truths’ are dramatized in the public 
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sphere, they tend to enable and justify immediate and drastic interventions (see 
also Bindé 2000; Büscher & Dressler 2007; Mehta 2001) – this is precisely what 
happened with regards to Mt. Kenya.
The survey report managed to elicit the international attention that the KFWG 
had aimed for, and it was widely received as an eye-opener. To this day,
conservation organizations such as the World Wide Fund, 15 IUCN, 16 and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity17 refer to it uncritically, as do scholars from 
various disciplinary backgrounds (see for instance Kariuki 2006; Kleinschroth et 
al. 2013; Teklehaimanot et al. 2004). But most importantly in terms of the 
developments that followed, Richard Leakey ratified the survey. As KWS 
director he wrote a short introduction to the survey report, in which he stated: 
Kenya is best known as a land of arid and semi-arid habitats with little forest. Sadly, the little 
there is has been the focus of unplanned, usually illegal utilisation with disastrous 
consequences for bio-diversity, catchment and loss of soil. As a country, Kenya cannot 
afford to watch the remaining natural forests being destroyed. The forests are a critical and 
invaluable national asset that must be protected.
This report is clear and provides unequivocal data on the current situation. I hope that with 
such evidence, actions will follow to put an end to the wanton degradation of our nation’s 
natural forests.
Gathaara (1999: iii)
Action was indeed taken – by Richard Leakey himself.
In the time between Bongo Woodley’s and Christian Lambrecht’s fieldwork 
and the publication of the final results, Richard Leakey had left the KWS again 
and had become Kenya’s Head of Civil Service. In that capacity, and following 
the shocking outcome of the survey, Leakey announced in July 2000 that Mt. 
Kenya Forest Reserve was to be reclassified as a national reserve. This 
reclassification implied important changes: it took the management authority 
over Mt. Kenya’s forests from the Forest Department and located it with the 
KWS, as the Wildlife Act identifies the KWS as the only lawful supervisor of 
national reserves. The Forest Act situated control over forest reserves within the
Forest Department, but Leakey’s intervention meant that Mt. Kenya was no 
longer a forest reserve. The Kenya Gazette, which publishes all government 
decisions, announced the administrative change in clear language and stated that,
from July 2000 onwards, ‘the Mt. Kenya National Reserve shall fall under and be 
managed by Kenya Wildlife Service’ (The Government of the Republic of Kenya
2000).
On the very day that Mt. Kenya’s forests were re-designated as a national 
reserve, Bongo Woodley carried out a large operation during which, he told me, 
                                                        
15 See WWF (n.d.).
16 See for instance Mogake et al. (2001).
17 See Convention on Biological Diversity (n.d.).
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about twelve hundred people were arrested on charges of using Mt. Kenya’s 
resources illegally. I got the feeling from Bongo Woodley’s account that he had 
primarily done this to demonstrate to the country that things had changed, and 
that, in the future, strict rules would be enforced to halt the degradation of Mt. 
Kenya. I understand the arrest campaign as a way of showing-off newly gained 
power. However, it soon became evident that the Forest Department had no 
intention of leaving Mt. Kenya’s forests, even though its mandate had been 
suspended. Senior Forest Department officers took little notice of the legislative 
change. Instead, they asserted that, since the 1932 decree that had called into 
existence Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve had not been revoked, Leakey’s decision 
was unlawful – even twelve years later, a regional forest officer18 based in Nyeri 
insisted to me that there had never been any administrative change. One of his 
colleagues, a zonal forest officer19 stationed at a nearby office, informed me that 
he continued to tell his staff to ignore the KWS’s claim. He said that the re-
designation was ‘a misinterpretation by the government’.
Christian Lambrechts told me that he and Bongo Woodley quickly came to 
realize that, as long as the Forest Department refused to accept the judicial 
changes, the KWS’s new mandate was of little value. Once the initial commotion 
created by the 1999 survey report began to ebb away, they feared that little would 
change after all. This encouraged the two men to once more take action. 
Lambrechts explained to me that he and Bongo Woodley had primarily been 
concerned that the regazettement of the forest reserve into a national reserve 
would be swept under the carpet, and that it would end up as a useless document 
in the drawer of one or other minister. With this in mind, Lambrechts and 
Woodley decided to carry out another survey. 
The second survey of Mt. Kenya took place in 2002. Bongo Woodley and 
Christian Lambrechts were again the two main instigators, but this time they 
were supported by a British doctoral candidate called Hilde VanLeeuwe who was 
affiliated to the Durrell Institute of Conservation and Ecology, and by KFWG 
coordinator Michael Gachanja. The latter replaced Gideon Gathaara and, as a 
black Kenyan, assumed the mantle of lending the survey political credibility. 
This second survey used different methods than the 1999 survey, and it 
employed a sample collection count rather than a total survey count (VanLeeuwe 
et al. 2003: 9). As a result, the final output of the second survey was far less 
dramatic than the results of the 1999 survey, although Mt. Kenya’s actual 
condition had hardly changed – Christian Lambrechts told me that a three-year 
timespan was far too short to measure the impact of forest regeneration measures. 
Nevertheless, the second survey was presented as evidence that Mt. Kenya’s state 
                                                        
18 Conversation on 6 August 2012, Forest Station Nyeri.
19 Conversation on 6 August 2012, DC Compound Nyeri.
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of conservation had improved significantly after it had been put under the 
supervision of the KWS in 2000 (VanLeeuwe et al. 2003: 21-22). 
The 2002 survey clearly meant to buttress the KWS’s reputation but, 
according to Christian Lambrechts, this had not been its main purpose. He told 
me that he and Bongo Woodley had primarily taken the 2002 survey as an 
opportunity to spread the information that the forest reserve had been re-
designated. The survey report’s appendix therefore actually carried its main 
message: it showed a copy of Richard Leakey’s decision as it had been 
announced in the Kenya Gazette, and it displayed a letter signed by the then 
Minister of Wildlife Francis Nyenze that confirmed that, from July 2000 
onwards, the KWS had the sole legal mandate to act. Woodley and Lambrechts 
had anticipated that the 2002 survey report would reach a global audience, just as 
the 1999 report had done, and they reasoned that the more parties knew about the 
re-designation, the more difficult it would be for the Forest Department to 
pretend that it had not taken place.
Despite Bongo Woodley’s and Christian Lambrecht’s efforts, the Forest 
Department’s executives never bowed to the re-designation. The situation was 
further complicated when the government adopted a new Forest Act in 2005. 
This act dissolved the Forest Department and called into existence the Kenya 
Forest Service (KFS), which mimicked the corporate structure of the KWS. The 
act gave the KFS a mandate over all Kenyan forests, regardless of their exact 
classification, and I have heard many foresters explain that it therefore overrules 
Richard Leakey’s 2000 order. I never found anyone willing to admit that this 
legislative revision was motivated by the struggles taking place on Mt. Kenya. 
But it is not hard to imagine that those involved in Kenya’s illegal commercial 
logging sector did not want to see Mt. Kenya’s developments repeated elsewhere, 
and tightened their judicial hold on the country’s forests out of precaution. 
In 2006, after nearly seventeen years of duty and fighting the Forest 
Department’s mandate, Bongo Woodley retired from the KWS. Different senior 
wardens followed in his footsteps. One of them, who asked to remain 
anonymous, having been reprimanded by his superiors shortly before our first 
meeting for sharing too much information with the public, complained 
extensively about the serious conflicts between foresters and wildlife rangers. 
Bongo Woodley had said that during his time the relationship between Mt. 
Kenya’s Forest Department staff and KWS staff had been relatively peaceful, but 
this warden sketched an entirely different picture. He spoke of violent clashes, 
and recounted to me how a group of foresters had blocked one of Mt. Kenya’s 
forest roads to prevent a KWS truck from entering. He also told me about arson 
that had recently destroyed a newly built KWS housing complex, and he was 
convinced that certain foresters played a key role in the poaching that his teams 
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tried to fight. ‘Otherwise, you explain to me why I find elephant carcasses next to 
their plantations’ he noted. Overall, he expected that, sooner or later, foresters 
and rangers would fight out their disputes by taking up arms against one another.
When I asked foresters and forest guards for their views, they typically 
underscored their subordinate position vis-à-vis the KWS. For instance, they told 
me that the KWS has good and strong vehicles while the KFS lacks any mode of 
transport; they said that the KWS has first-rate arms while the KFS is given 
police force cast-offs; they complained that the KWS has fancy park gates and 
ranger quarters, while KFS foresters are confined to forest stations in a 
deplorable state; and they generally stressed that, while the KWS attracts 
considerable donor funding because it merchandizes its charismatic wildlife, the 
KFS’s budget is so constrained that many forest stations do not even have a 
wheelbarrow for planting trees. Thus, both foresters and wildlife rangers uphold 
the rhetoric that the KWS is superior to the KFS, and that the latter is a mere 
shadow of the first. This rhetoric is saturated with suspicion, distrust and envy. 
Only occasionally did a wildlife officer speak fondly of a forester in my 
presence, or vice versa. Most of the time, both camps provided me with plenty of
reasons why they were not on good terms, and illustrated this with examples of 
when and how they had fallen out. 
Contrary to the above statements, which portray Mt. Kenya’s KWS and KFS 
staff as fierce enemies that actively and continuously fight one another, foresters 
and wildlife rangers are not in a constant state of warfare. In fact, individual 
rangers and foresters from time to time admitted to me that they patrol together 
sometimes, or share other work. Still, their decades-old antagonism has 
established a script of unresolvable hostility that all parties concerned have 
learned well. One of the effects of this script is that it covers up rivalries with 
colleagues from the same institute: the enemy is the sister department, not one’s 
colleagues or superiors. But discontent about the functioning of one’s own 
institute is felt nevertheless. For instance, the warden mentioned above, who did 
not want his identity revealed, complained about how his superiors had made it a 
habit to play down management problems. He found this troublesome because, in 
doing so, they deprived him of the opportunity to make his grievances heard. 
Different foresters and forest guards also told me that they felt cheated by their 
superiors. The 2005 Forest Act had promised the entire KFS staff better working 
conditions and better payment, but by 2012 many had not seen such promises 
come true. Shortly after the adoption of the act senior officials began to receive 
higher payment, but employees lower in rank were told to wait because the KFS 
did not have the means to raise all salaries at once. A number of underpaid 
employees told me that this had created a severe rift in the organization, and that 
it had put juniors in an uncomfortable position: they did not want to complain too
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
74 
 
loudly about how they were discriminated, out of fear of losing their job 
altogether.
Finally, the ongoing conflict between the KFS and the KWS makes the 
conservation efforts of numerous organizations and projects in the region 
difficult, and most initiatives die a slow death due to the administrative chasm –
indeed, some organizations downright refuse to collaborate with the KFS such as 
the Green Belt Movement, which strongly disapproves of how the 2005 Forest 
Act reintroduced the shamba system, and other organizations simply witness how 
their projects stall because the KFS and the KWS fail to come to an agreement. 
One of these organizations is Rhino Ark, which in 2010 announced that it 
planned to fund the construction of a ring-fence around Mt. Kenya. Rhino Ark 
knew in advance that the project would be difficult because it had already carried 
out a similar project on the nearby Aberdares mountain range. And that had taken 
twenty-one years to finish. 
Prior to Rhino Ark’s intervention on Mt. Kenya there had been a range of 
smaller fencing projects on the mountain. These projects had mostly been carried 
out with funding from either the Bill Woodley Mt. Kenya Trust (BWMKT), 
founded by Bongo Woodley in remembrance of his father, 20 or from UNDP 
Compact, a small grants programme sponsored by UNDP and the Global 
Environment Facility. The building of these fences had not been coordinated, one 
of BWMKT’s employees explained to me, and this had resulted in a number of 
problems. In some regions, the patchy distribution of fences had, for instance,
funnelled wildlife into inhabited areas that were not yet fenced, where human-
wildlife conflicts then rapidly increased. Also, the fences were generally of a low 
quality and therefore had failed to stop larger mammals such as elephants. 
Because of this, the inhabitants of some villages had come to perceive of the 
fences not as an intervention that meant to protect them, but as an intervention 
that meant to demarcate where they were allowed and not allowed to go. Out of 
protest these people had begun to cut wires, and they continue to do so whenever 
the fences are repaired. 
Rhino Ark’s approach differs notably from these small-scale and isolated 
fencing schemes: the organization plans to build a top-quality ring-fence that 
goes all the way round the mountain. Rhino Ark claims in different flyers and on 
its website that the fence will eventually be 400 kilometres long, and that the 
total operation will cost approximately $12 million. 
Not long after Rhino Ark had announced its plans the first problems emerged, 
one of the project’s partners told me in confidence. Most importantly, the KWS 
                                                        
20 In 2012 the trust’s CEO expressed to me her dissatisfaction about the colonial and military 
associations that the name Bill Woodley invoked. By the end of 2014 Bill Woodley’s name was 
removed from the trust’s website and logo, and today the organization continues under the name Mt. 
Kenya Trust.
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and the KFS failed to agree on the fence’s location: the KWS wanted it built at a 
low altitude so that the fence would encompass most of the mountain’s forests, 
but the KFS wanted it built at a high altitude, approximately on the boundaries of 
the National Park, because it feared that it would otherwise lose access to forest 
plantations. Moreover, the KWS and the KFS disagreed over the number of gates 
that the ring-fence was to have. The first wanted only a few entrance points so as 
to effectively control access to the area, but the KFS protested. The 2005 Forest 
Act granted the organization the right to sell permits to villagers for a range of 
forest activities, such as grazing cattle, collecting firewood, or shamba system 
cultivation. These were the KFS’s only income-generating activities, but limiting 
villagers’ access to the area would make it difficult to pursue them.
In sum, Rhino Ark’s fencing project soon got caught in arguments over 
whether the KWS or the KFS had the power to decide. The project’s partner told 
me that Rhino Ark had found a temporary solution to this: it had decided to start 
building in an area where it knew that there would be few disputes. This area was 
Embu, where Rhino Ark could follow the already-fixed boundary of the Nyayo 
Tea Zone, which was set up between forests and villages decades ago. But the 
project’s partner also indicated to me that he did not know how to continue 
afterwards and he foresaw that, by the time that the fence passed Embu and 
headed further north and west, disputes between the KWS and KFS would 
escalate again. What the outcome of these disputes would be, no one could tell.
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A place of nature: Cultural and 
political histories marginalized
In this chapter I again look into Mt. Kenya’s 1997 World Heritage listing, but I 
shift my focus from the individuals that initiated the designation to the wider 
political conditions in which it materialized. I have demonstrated that Bongo 
Woodley played a key role in Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage nomination process, 
but in this chapter I depart from the position that his personal efforts only 
partially account for the mountain’s World Heritage designation. The reason for 
this is simple: Kenya’s ruling political elite could have undermined Bongo 
Woodley’s World Heritage project at the time, but did not do so. This is a rather 
basal observation, but it deserves close attention.
Due to a number of historical events, which I describe in the first part of this 
chapter, Mt. Kenya came to epitomize the culture, religion and politics of 
Kenya’s Kikuyu population. The mountain came to articulate tribal competition 
over power, most importantly due to the role it played in the 1950s Mau Mau 
war, and to this day Mt. Kenya symbolizes the wealth and political sway of the 
Kikuyu elite that formed under Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta. 
Interestingly, by the time that Mt. Kenya was nominated for World Heritage
status in 1996 this Kikuyu elite was no longer in place. It had been marginalized 
by Jomo Kenyatta’s successor, Daniel Arap Moi, who had taken over the 
presidency in 1978. By the late 1990s, Moi’s regime was openly challenged by a 
large Kikuyu opposition, which expressed profound dissatisfaction about how it 
had been marginalized. Given that Mt. Kenya symbolizes the unity and solidarity 
of what, at the time, was the government’s strongest political rival, one may 
wonder why the Moi regime did not prevent Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage
designation. 
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I will argue that Daniel Arap Moi’s government endorsed Bongo Woodley’s 
World Heritage project because Woodley’s nomination did not address Mt. 
Kenya’s cultural and political potential. On the contrary, it presented the 
mountain exclusively as a place of nature. As such, Woodley’s World Heritage
nomination fitted with the censorship of Kikuyu cultural and political histories 
practiced by the regime, to a greater or lesser degree, ever since it had come to 
power in 1978. Mt. Kenya’s naturalization illustrates just how much the 
commemoration of Mt. Kenya has been, and continues to be, a source of 
struggle, and it articulates a post-colonial government’s general uncertainty about
how to deal with colonial legacies.
Mt. Kenya, Kikuyu homeland
Different explorers and scientists travelled to Mt. Kenya in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century to study the area’s geological formations and its flora 
and fauna. In this period, knowledge of Mt. Kenya was largely confined to 
academics with a professional interest in the region, but in 1938 Mt. Kenya was 
finally introduced to a larger Western audience. This was due to the publication 
of Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu written by Jomo 
Kenyatta, who, as other parts of this chapter discuss, became Kenya’s first 
president.
Jomo Kenyatta spent most of his childhood with Scottish missionaries because 
his parents had passed away when he was young. In 1924, then in his early 
thirties, Kenyatta joined the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA). The KCA was a 
political organization that aimed to make British administrators in Kenya 
understand colonialism’s destructive impact on Kikuyu people (Shaw 1995). In 
particular, the KCA raised attention for the grievances caused by land alienation 
(Berman 1996: 316) – as long as white people came and grabbed Kikuyu land, 
the KCA argued, Kikuyu would be unable to develop into self-governing modern 
subjects. At the time, the KCA did not have much impact within the colony 
itself. For that reason, and in an attempt to make its voice heard in the metropole, 
it sent Kenyatta oversees in 1929 (Shaw 1995).
During his journeys abroad, Jomo Kenyatta initially had trouble finding a 
suitable partner willing to help him advance the KCA’s cause. Initially, he sought 
shelter with missionaries, a community familiar to him. But he soon distanced 
himself from his Christian upbringing, for mission societies in Kenya had begun 
to take a firm stance against Kikuyu female circumcision (Berman 1996: 318-
319). In addition, the missionaries withdrew their support once they learned 
about Kenyatta’s relations with European women and his communist sentiments 
(Ibid.). Kenyatta subsequently sought rapprochement with liberal imperialists, 
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who introduced him to the British education system in order to improve his 
language skills. Yet, these liberal imperialists were primarily concerned with 
extending British colonial power, and Kenyatta soon realized that his agenda and 
their agenda were irreconcilable (Ibid.: 320). Subsequently, Kenyatta visited 
Russia, where he received further education. At first, he had been encouraged by 
his communist friends, but he fell out with them as well once he saw that their 
desire to forge a trans-ethnic movement to overthrow colonialism was at odds 
with his own intentions to promote Kikuyu traditions and values (Ibid.: 322-325).
In sum, during those first years abroad Kenyatta had primarily been seeking 
sympathy and recognition. Consequently, he had largely failed to carry out the 
advocacy work that the KCA had sent him to do. Moreover, the British 
authorities continuously undermined his authority and refused to acknowledge 
him, or the KCA, as true Kikuyu representatives. As a result, Kenyatta faced a 
profound ‘dilemma of representation’ (Ibid.: 330), which seriously complicated 
his mission.
Jomo Kenyatta’s luck changed for the better when he met Bronislaw 
Malinowksi in London in December 1934. It was a meeting that was to be 
beneficial for both men. On the one hand, Kenya’s Kikuyu population had long 
fascinated Malinowski. The anthropologist showed a strong interest in how the 
Kikuyu rejected conversion to Christianity, as that would mean they had to give 
up their initiation rituals (Frederiksen 2008), as well as in their outspoken 
bitterness over land loss. In the years before he met Kenyatta, Malinowski had 
tried to organize a fieldwork programme in Kenya, but he had never managed to 
pull it off. Now that Kenyatta was in London, Malinowski finally saw an 
opportunity to increase his knowledge of the people that intrigued him. Kenyatta, 
on the other hand, found in Malinowski the mentor that he had been looking for 
since 1929. In light of his previous disappointment in missionaries, liberal 
imperialists and communists, Malinowski’s scientific approach appealed to 
Kenyatta, and the latter enrolled himself in the department of social anthropology 
at the London School of Economics where Malinowski taught. This enabled 
Kenyatta to further advance his education which, or so he hoped, could gain him 
credence in the eyes of colonial administrators (Berman 1996: 330). More
importantly, anthropology offered Kenyatta a scientific and expert idiom through 
which he could address colonial injustices and that British authorities could not 
simply brush aside as anti-colonial African activism (Ibid.).
An intimate pupil-instructor relation formed between Jomo Kenyatta and 
Bronislaw Malinowski. The latter was not only enthusiastic about Kenyatta’s 
knowledge on Kikuyu life, but also appreciated Kenyatta’s anthropological 
education for the methodological argument that it made (Berman 1996: 328). 
Malinowski advocated the practice of participant observation, which was based 
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on the presumption that anthropologists could grasp the native’s point of view 
through extensive fieldwork that included learning the native’s language and 
observing his customs and social organization. The method assumed that 
scientifically trained experts could become knowledgeable insiders of other 
cultures and Malinowski claimed that the method produced objective scientific 
knowledge (see for instance Pels 2011). If Kenyatta, after his training, proved 
capable of writing an unbiased ethnography about his own people then this 
would further validate the soundness of participant observation, Malinowski 
reckoned (Berman 1996: 328). In short, Kenyatta and Malinowski both had a 
stake in having Kenyatta’s work accepted as academically ‘pure’ and ‘value-
neutral’ (see Pels 1999: 109).
At the end of his studies at the London School of Economics, Jomo Kenyatta 
wrote a thesis in which he described Kikuyu customs and traditions. Facing 
Mount Kenya was an edited version of this thesis, and it became one of the first 
modern ethnographies written by an African. Malinowski praised Kenyatta’s 
work for its lack of political purpose and its scientificity, and in Facing Mount 
Kenya’s introduction he wrote:
[Bantus and negroes] have been organised into a hatred of European encroachment and into 
a contempt for the debility of those powers and movements which ranged themselves on the 
side of Africa, and then, through weakness and incompetence, abandoned the cause of 
Africa and let it go by default. […] Mr. Kenyatta has wisely refrained from using any such 
language as appears in my last sentences. He presents the facts objectively, and to a large 
extent without any passion or feeling. 
Malinowski in Kenyatta (1938: x, original emphasis)
Contrary to what Malinowski suggested, Facing Mount Kenya was not at all 
written ‘without any passion or feeling’ and it certainly did not present the facts 
objectively – it was a political manifesto against British imperialism,
masqueraded as cultural historical analysis.
Facing Mount Kenya positioned Mt. Kenya and its surrounding lands at the 
heart of Kikuyu culture. Firstly, it depicted the mountain as a Kikuyu spiritual 
place that served as the residence of the Kikuyu God Ngai, or Mogai, who 
founded the Kikuyu tribes. Long ago, Kenyatta wrote, Ngai summoned a male 
figure called Gikuyu upon Mt. Kenya to behold the beauty and the fertility of the 
area. Ngai then ordered Gikuyu to descend and to establish his homestead in the 
vicinity of Mt. Kenya. He provided Gikuyu with a wife, Moombi, and told them 
to have many children. Gikuyu and Moombi thereupon had nine daughters who 
founded nine Kikuyu clans. Ngai gave all these clans their share of land on the 
foot of Mt. Kenya (Kenyatta 1938: 5-9).
Following this foundation story, Facing Mount Kenya emphasized Mt. 
Kenya’s role in Kikuyu sacrifices and prayers. Jomo Kenyatta explained that Mt. 
Kenya’s Kikuyu name Kere-Nyaga meant ‘mountain of brightness’ (Kenyatta 
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1938: 225), and he portrayed it as a divine place that fulfilled important functions 
during rituals. For instance, he described how initiates to be circumcised were 
marked with symbols on the forehead, cheeks, around the eyes, the nose, the 
throat and the navel that were painted with a particular kind of white chalk called 
ira that was collected on Mt. Kenya (Ibid.: 132); he specified how the blood and 
the content of the stomach of a sheep killed during an engagement ceremony was 
sprinkled along the gateway of a girl’s homestead and towards Mt. Kenya to 
purify and protect an upcoming marriage against evil, and to cement the bond 
between the boy’s and girl’s clan (Ibid.: 162); and he described how elders 
carrying drinking horns filled with beer performed blessing ceremonies towards 
Mt. Kenya each time a Kikuyu man moved from a first to a second grade of 
eldership (Ibid.: 195). Kenyatta further stressed that, in addition to such 
exceptional circumstances, Mt. Kenya played a central role in daily life for 
Kikuyu always faced the mountain whenever they performed their everyday 
rituals and prayers (Ibid.: 225). All in all, Facing Mount Kenya presented Mt. 
Kenya as the supreme mark of Kikuyu solidarity and alliance. 
Jomo Kenyatta used the Kikuyu foundation story and the Kikuyu rituals to 
argue that his tribe held the exclusive historical, cultural and religious right to 
populate and cultivate the area around Mt. Kenya (see for instance Kenyatta 
1938: xv). Taking into account that by the late 1930s much of the land around
Mt. Kenya had come into the possession of European settlers, Facing Mount 
Kenya was essentially a critique on British invasion, as the monograph’s 
conclusion shows:
[a] culture has no meaning apart from the social organisation of life on which it is built. 
When the European comes to the Gikuyu country and robs the people of their land, he is 
taking away not only their livelihood, but the material symbol that holds family and tribe 
together. In doing this he gives one blow which cuts away the foundations from the whole of 
Gikuyu life, social, moral, and economic. When he explains, to his own satisfaction and after 
the most superficial glance at the issues involved, that he is doing this for the sake of the 
Africans, to “civilise” them, “teach them the disciplinary value of regular work”, and “give 
them the benefit of European progressive ideas”, he is adding insult to injury, and need 
expect to convince no one but himself.
Kenyatta (1938: 305)
Jomo Kenyatta was not unique in making land claims through a narrative of 
historical affiliation. From roughly the late 1920s onwards the British colonial 
administration was continuously confronted with tribal groups asserting land 
rights on the basis of cultural histories (Lonsdale 2008: 307). This played into a 
colonial logic that divided African subjects into solid and exclusive tribal 
sections and which concealed the actual negotiations and manipulations of tribal 
identities by colonial administrators and Africans alike (see for instance 
Hamilton 1998; Pels 1996). This logic rested on what administrators, 
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missionaries and anthropologists took as cultural markers, and it paved the way 
for a distinct colonial geography of native reserves that assumed a connection 
between culture and territory (see also Gupta & Ferguson 1997; for Kenya in 
particular see Parsons 2012). As we will come to see later, in Kenya such logic 
laid the basis for an ongoing tribalization of the post-colonial state.
Facing Mount Kenya conveyed one straightforward message: by occupying 
Kikuyu land white settlers had disrupted previously peaceful and integrated 
Kikuyu societies, and the monograph has been depicted as an ‘angry 
denunciation of the West’ (Shaw 1995: 131). At the same time, Jomo Kenyatta 
did not reject all that was associated with the advent of colonialism. For instance,
he had been keen to gain knowledge and he celebrated the introduction of 
education. He also welcomed the arrival of sanitation and medicine (Kenyatta 
1938: 305). But Kenyatta’s point was that Africans themselves should have the 
freedom to decide what they were, and were not, willing to adopt.
While Jomo Kenyatta tried to establish himself as the expert on Kikuyu 
culture in the late 1930s he faced competition from Louis Leakey, the father of 
Richard Leakey. Louis Leakey was a white Kenyan who had been raised at the 
missionary station of his father, reverend Harry Leakey, and who had lived 
amongst Kikuyu for the first sixteen years of his life. He knew their customs and 
spoke their language fluently, and later in life he claimed he was a Kikuyu 
himself (Clark 1989: 383).
Louis Leakey was educated at Cambridge after his parents had returned to 
England in the aftermath of the First World War. Here, he took classes in 
archaeology and anthropology and soon gained a reputation for being a
promising young scholar, especially after he made some important 
archaeological findings in Kenya early in his career. But in the mid-1930s,
Leakey’s work and methods began to be disputed: a professor of geology called 
Percy Boswell pointed out Leakey’s sloppy procedures and his careless dating of 
hominids, and as a result Leakey’s British career in archaeology was shattered 
(Berman & Lonsdale 1991). 
In an attempt to recover his academic reputation, Louis Leakey decided to 
write an ethnography on the Kikuyu, whom he had known all his life. In order to 
fund further fieldwork, he applied for a grant from the International African 
Institute. His request ended up with Bronislaw Malinowksi, who dismissed 
Leakey’s application on the grounds that Leakey lacked thorough 
anthropological training (Berman & Lonsdale 1991: 160). Besides, Malinowski 
was already Jomo Kenyatta’s instructor at the time, and he thought that the latter 
was in a far better position to analyse Kikuyu culture. This event marked an 
enduring rivalry between Malinowksi and Kenyatta on the one hand, and Louis 
Leakey on the other (Ibid.: 162). This rivalry had its effect on how Leakey came 
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to interpret the Mau Mau rebellion in the 1950s, which in turn had important 
implications for how the colonial government responded to the upheavals that is
described in the next section. 
Louis Leakey nevertheless returned to Kenya in early 1937 to carry out his 
ethnographic studies, albeit without funding. Yet, before he managed to make his 
findings public, Jomo Kenyatta’s Facing Mount Kenya was published. Worse
still, Kenyatta’s monograph included parts of a paper that Leakey had written 
earlier, but which Kenyatta failed to mention as a source (Berman & Lonsdale 
1991: 162). In early 1939 Leakey nevertheless tried to have his own manuscript 
printed. However, the document was rejected because it ran to 700,000 words, 
and Leakey refused to reduce its length (Ibid.).1 Seeing that his plans were again 
in ruins Leakey offered his services to the colonial state, and in mid-1939 he 
became an officer of the special branch of the Kenya Police (Ibid.: 174). This 
arguably lost him further respect with Malinowski, who depicted colonial 
administrators in general as practical men without scientific training, who could 
‘not be trusted to come up with reliable knowledge about the people they 
administered’ (Pels 2011: 788). 
Although Louis Leakey failed to earn respect from the academic establishment 
he did manage to gain the confidence of key colonial administrators, whom 
regarded Leakey as an expert on all Kikuyu matters. Like Jomo Kenyatta, 
Leakey portrayed the Kikuyu as a tribe that, prior to colonial rule, had been 
harmonious and organic (Clark 1989: 384), and that had been governed by strict 
rules (Ibid.: 387). Yet, Leakey drew different conclusions than Kenyatta: he did 
not support Kenyatta’s calls for Kikuyu self-governance but claimed that, before 
Kikuyu culture and traditions died out due to the devastating impact of 
colonialism, the British administration had to facilitate their recovery (Ibid.:
395). Leakey based his understandings of Kikuyu culture on data that he had 
collected during conversations with male elders, which was a standard practice 
for colonial administrative ethnology at the time (Pels 2011: 796). These elders 
had offered Leakey an image of pre-colonial Kikuyu society as democratic and 
orderly but, as Shaw points out, in doing so had tried to consolidate their own 
power in a changing political and economic landscape. Rather than describing to 
Louis Leakey the actual state of affairs, these elders had ‘collaborated in the 
construction of a Kikuyu past which put them at the apex of political and 
juridical power and at the centre of the system of redistribution’ (1995: 111). 
Essentially, Louis Leakey’s and Jomo Kenyatta’s accounts on Kikuyu culture 
both drew on notions of pre-colonial integration and tribal solidarity that had 
never existed, and throughout the 1930s different Kikuyu factions increasingly 
quarrelled over the interpretation of their shared history as well as over the 
                                                        
1 The manuscript was published posthumously under the title The Southern Kikuyu Before 1903 (1977).
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severity of the colonial injustices done to them (Berman 1996: 316). In spite of 
such frictions, Jomo Kenyatta cultivated an image of himself as the spokesman 
of an undivided tribe (Ibid.: 315). To further this cause, he was careful not to 
reveal too much of his cosmopolitan experiences or his Christian upbringing: he 
changed his name from Johnstone, which was given to him by the Scottish 
missionaries, to Jomo and he was photographed in a borrowed monkey-fur cloak 
with spear in hand for the cover of Facing Mt. Kenya (Ibid.: 332-333). In 
Nairobi, Kenyatta had primarily been a detribalized native who had moved to the 
city, but in London he emphasized his exoticism to advance his political cause 
(Shaw 1995: 128). 
In the end, Facing Mount Kenya was not at all successful in summoning 
together a united Kikuyu people. Instead, by the late 1940s the Kikuyu were 
fighting amongst themselves as much as they were fighting the colonial regime 
(c.f. Berman 1991; Branch 2007; Lonsdale 1992C). But both Jomo Kenyatta’s 
and Louis Leakey’s commentaries had nevertheless installed a narrative that 
suggested that the Kikuyu were at least supposed to act as one coherent force. 
This narrative gained dramatic momentum during the Mau Mau emergency of 
the 1950s.
Mau Mau on Mt. Kenya
In October 1952, the colonial government declared a state of emergency over the 
Colony of Kenya. This was a response to a sudden upswing of African revolt that 
largely took the colonial administration by surprise. Between 1952 and 1960 it 
fought a brutal war to suppress these revolts, which were carried out in name of 
the Kenya Land and Freedom Army, better known as the Mau Mau. Both Jomo 
Kenyatta and Louis Leakey were key figures during this period of upheaval.
After Louis Leakey joined the Kenya Police in 1939, he made the 
investigation of the KCA one of his prime concerns. By December of that year,
Leakey presented his superiors with a comprehensive report that argued that the 
KCA had tried to prevent the colonial administration from carrying out its duties, 
and that the organization aimed to arouse anti-government sentiments amongst 
its Kikuyu followers (Berman & Lonsdale 1991: 174). In the months that 
followed, Leakey directed searches of KCA’s headquarters, of KCA branch 
offices, and of the homes of KCA leaders. In the aftermath of these searches the 
colonial administration banned the KCA and two affiliated associations in May 
1940. The frontmen of these organizations were arrested and summoned to court 
in July and August (Ibid.: 176). They protested against their imprisonment but 
Leakey testified against them, claiming that the KCA meant to overthrow the 
colonial administration (Ibid.: 177). He stated that he had evidence that the KCA 
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was collaborating with the Italian enemy, and insisted on the organization’s 
secretive and subversive character by emphasizing its oath practices (Ibid.). The 
colonial court consented to Leakey’s evidence and kept the KCA leaders in 
custody (Ibid.: 178).
Louis Leakey claimed that the KCA played a leading role in the coordination 
of large-scale Kikuyu resistance against the colonial regime. In practice, 
however, the Kikuyu population that Leakey spoke of as a more or less 
homogenous lot was divided on a range of topics. In the late 1930s, the colony 
had gone through economically grim times, and it could hardly pay the 
metropole the interests on its debts. To increase revenue, the colony had 
encouraged African agricultural production. This, in turn, had disturbed the 
relationship between different generations of Kikuyu men, who had previously 
been joined in patron-client networks (Clark 1989: 388). In the past, senior 
Kikuyu men had provided young Kikuyu men with the means to marry and to 
establish a household of their own. But under pressure of raising African 
production the first had begun to cut such arrangements, and wealthier 
landowning classes bought out poorer families (Clark 1989: 388) so as to 
maximize the returns from increasingly scarce and valuable land (Branch 2007: 
295). This amplified the contradictions between Kikuyu haves and have-nots, 
and as impoverished youngsters could no longer count on the support of their 
elders they had begun to challenge these elders’ authority (Lonsdale 2003: 56).
After the Second World War, the colonial government released the KCA 
leaders, who by then had spent five years in jail, and in 1946 Jomo Kenyatta 
returned to Kenya. Local KCA figureheads, who generally consisted of older 
land-owning and affluent Kikuyu men, tried to revitalize their former influential 
position. In light of this, they administered oaths of loyalty to men they 
considered responsible household heads, in order to strengthen their overall grip 
on the Kikuyu constituency (Berman & Lonsdale 1991: 181). But soon Kenyatta 
and the KCA lost control over this tactic, and by the late 1940s impoverished and 
dissatisfied young Kikuyu men had begun to copy the KCA’s mass oathing 
campaigns – not to further improve the solidarity among KCA members but to 
consolidate their own alliance versus elder generations, by whom they felt 
exploited (Ibid.: 182).
All these developments escaped the attention of the colonial government. So 
when it was confronted with public oathing ceremonies in 1950, which were 
organized by landless Kikuyu who defied the power of Kikuyu elders and who 
had begun to call themselves Mau Mau, the government mistook this for a sign 
of collective Kikuyu revolt against the regime that Louis Leakey had warned 
against a decade earlier. It should be noted that, by that time, Leakey’s reputation 
as a Kikuyu expert was far less disputed than it had been in the late 1930s, and he 
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had become the honorary director of the Coryndon Museum2 in Nairobi – even
academic anthropologists, who one and a half decades earlier and under 
leadership of Bronislaw Malinowski had condemned the kind of administrative 
ethnography that Leakey practiced (see Pels 2011), had largely come to accept 
Leakey’s expertise (Berman & Londsdale 1991: 180).
The colonial administration took the Mau Mau to be an anti-white and anti-
Christian Kikuyu revolt that was grounded in a revival of tribal customs and 
religion, and banned the organization (see for instance Anderson 2005A; Berman 
2007). The ban could not suppress the Mau Mau: by 1952 more oathing 
ceremonies were taking place and some Mau Mau men had begun to raid white 
settler farms, especially in the highlands around Mt. Kenya that Facing Mount 
Kenya identified as the religious and cultural heartland of the Kikuyu tribe 
(Berman & Lonsdale 1991: 183). Eventually, the colonial government declared a 
state of emergency, and moved military troops into the colony in October that 
year (Anderson 2005A: 4).
Immediately after the emergency was announced, Jomo Kenyatta was 
arrested. The latter had successfully cultivated an image of himself as the 
leadsmen of all Kikuyu, but in the context of the revolts this image had turned 
against him and the colonial administration had little doubt about his 
participation in the Mau Mau uprising. Also, the popularity of Facing Mount 
Kenya made Kenyatta a suspicious character. In 1938, the monograph had sold a 
mere five hundred copies, but by the 1950s it had become a desirable item and in 
1953 it was reprinted to meet the high demand for the book (Shaw 1995: 136). In 
the context of the Cold War and the rise of Pan-Africanism, British 
administrators were certain that all Mau Mau followers were ‘under the hypnotic 
control of the demonic Communist and anthropologist Jomo Kenyatta’ (Berman 
2007: 529). 
After his arrest, Jomo Kenyatta was put before a colonial court in Kapenguria,
western Kenya, in late November 1952. He was heard together with five other 
suspected Mau Mau leaders, who together came to be known as the Kapenguria 
Six (Coombes 2011). Initially, Louis Leakey was called in to serve as a Kikuyu 
interpreter during the trials, but Kenyatta managed to have him removed from the 
case (Clark 1989: 385)3 – he understood that his rivalry with Leakey would not 
work to his advantage, and it has been suggested that the irony of Leakey 
performing as middleman between him and the colonial government was too 
much to bear for Kenyatta (Ibid.). Although Kenyatta openly disapproved of the
Mau Mau, and already before his imprisonment had called Mau Mau followers 
                                                        
2 The Coryndon Museum was the forerunner of the National Museums of Kenya that, as the previous 
chapter pointed out, Louis Leakey’s son Richard Leakey directed until 1989. 
3 But see Berman & Lonsdale (1991: 184) who suggest that Leakey walked out of the trial himself after 
the defendants’ leading counsel, called Dennis Pritt, had complained about his impartiality. 
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irresponsible criminals (Berman 1991: 201), colonial officers thought he 
masterminded the movement and was the ‘manager of Mayhem’ (Lonsdale 1990: 
394). The Kapenguria Six were found guilty and sentenced to jail. 
In the meantime, Louis Leakey wrote two books on the Mau Mau: one called 
Mau Mau and the Kikuyu published in 1952, and one called Defeating Mau Mau
published in 1954. In these two books Leakey portrayed the Mau Mau as 
delinquents who spoiled the reputation of an otherwise peaceful and reasonable 
tribal people. His writings revealed an imperialist nostalgia4 (Rosaldo 1989) for 
the loss of what he reckoned had been a ‘traditional’ Kikuyu culture, and he 
argued that the Mau Mau deliberately abused Kikuyu traditions and customs in 
their fight for self-governance. He reduced Mau Mau followers to semi-educated 
gangster politicians who distorted traditional customs, who undermined colonial 
improvement schemes, and who manipulated the beliefs of religious peoples to 
advance their own political cause (Clark 1998: 385). In Leakey’s eyes, the Mau 
Mau was orchestrated by former KCA people, who had begun operating under a 
new name but who were still under the command of Jomo Kenyatta (Berman & 
Lonsdale 1991: 146).
Throughout the emergency Louis Leakey had frequent and direct personal 
contact with senior officials, both in Kenya and in London, whom he advised on 
the matter (Berman & Lonsdale 1991: 186). As such, he played a pivotal role in 
how the colonial administration shaped its official narrative on the Mau Mau 
(Berman 1991). This official narrative depicted the Mau Mau as a savage, 
violent, depraved and bloodthirsty tribal cult (Ibid.: 182). It posited the Mau Mau 
as agitating against enlightened British rule, and it reduced Kikuyu subjects to a 
backward people who were ignorant of the advantages that modern civilization 
offered them.5 This rhetoric gave way to different positions: while conservatives,
for instance, focused on the Mau Mau’s terror-laden primitivism, Christian 
fundamentalists emphasized that the solution was in Kikuyu conversion to 
Christian values (Lonsdale 1990: 412). Nevertheless, all agreed on the Mau 
Mau’s atavistic, primitive and anti-modern disposition.6
                                                        
4 A nostalgia among colonial agents for colonized cultures as they ‘traditionally’ were, which is 
paradoxical for the colonial encounter itself affected these cultures (Rosaldo 1989: 107). Rosaldo 
deliberately uses the term nostalgia because it comes with strong emotions of longing and has an 
innocent touch to it, which effectively draws attention away from the fundamental inequality that set 
the conditions for the emergence of such emotions in the first place (Ibid.:120).
5 The psychiatrist J.C. Carothers as well as the sensational writings of authors such as Robert Ruark 
further cemented this official narrative (Clough 2003: 254), as did political scientists who clung to the 
modernization theory of political evolution (Lonsdale 1992C: 270-272).
6 Already in 1954 the anthropologist Max Gluckman rejected this official narrative. Newspapers
habitually reported on the Mau Mau as back-to-the-bush, but Gluckman suggested that the Mau Mau
rebellion was the product of a clash between cultures rather than a revitalization of pre-colonial 
religious and cultural practices (Gluckman 1963). 
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The colonial government approached the Mau Mau as a united front, which it 
fought by force from October 1952 onwards. Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares 
mountain range were the two main stages where the war against the Mau Mau 
took place. This further cemented the Mau Mau’s depiction as an exclusively 
Kikuyu revolt, because Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares demarcated an area where 
the bulk of the colony’s Kikuyu population lived, either in native reserves or on 
the fringes of the white-owned farms that employed them. In reality, the Mau 
Mau was not limited to Kikuyu and the movement did get support from people 
with a different tribal affiliation (Lonsdale 1992C), such as Jaramogi Oginga 
Odinga who is introduced later. But the colonial script of Africans organized in 
tribes largely prevented colonial administrators from noticing this.
Already in August 1952 some Mau Mau leaders had begun to retreat to Mt. 
Kenya and the Aberdares, to hide in the thick forests and caves to escape the 
watchful eye of the colonial regime (Anderson 2005A: 231). The number of men 
taking cover on Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares further increased when the 
emergency was announced, and slowly different Mau Mau forest bands began to 
take shape. These bands were not immediately the militant troops that they later 
became. Initially, they largely consisted of men that had simply fled their villages 
because they had feared prosecution by the colonial administration – they were 
fugitives rather than soldiers, and they were not used to the forests’ wet and cold 
conditions (Anderson 2005A: 237). In fact, most of these men had turned to the 
Mau Mau only to escape the recruitment campaigns of the Home Guard (Ibid.:
253). The Home Guard was an African brigade that the colonial regime had 
called into existence to fight Mau Mau rebels (Ibid.). It gained supporters 
quickly, although many early Home Guard adherents had little against the Mau 
Mau: rather, they had been seduced by Home Guard privileges such as 
exemption from tax payments or forced labour, they had been intimidated by the 
threat of punishment such as the confiscation of livestock, or they had simply 
wanted to avoid suspicion of being Mau Mau (Ibid.: 253-254). At least until late 
1954 many African Home Guard followers actually sympathized with the Mau 
Mau, and it has been suggested that about half of them had taken Mau Mau oaths 
(Ibid.: 256).
From early 1953 onwards a draconian war was fought, involving battalions of 
the King’s African Rifles, the Kenya Police, the Home Guard, and different Mau 
Mau armies that largely operated independently of one another (Anderson 2005A:
243-244). All parties involved committed cruel atrocities including torture, 
mutilation, beheading, cutting of hands and ears, and public hangings. Between 
twelve thousand and eighteen thousand Mau Mau rebels were killed, and at the 
peak of the emergency more than seventy thousand alleged Mau Mau supporters
were held in detention camps. The Mau Mau in turn killed about eighteen 
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hundred African civilians whom it took as British loyalists, not counting the 
hundreds of people that went missing and never returned. Relatively few victims 
fell on the side of white settlers and British troops: records mention 250 killings 
and casualties (Ibid.: 4-5).
The methods employed by the colonial administration, such as the invention 
of the Home Guard, divided African subjects into British loyalists and Mau Mau 
followers, and civil war broke out. Most of the fighting took place in villages 
located on the slopes of Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares – between April 1953 and 
March 1954 Murang’a, a town south of Mt. Kenya, was one of the worst 
battlegrounds (Anderson 2005A: 263), and at the end of March 1953 a town 
called Lari, located in Kiambo region, became the scene of a massacre. One night 
Lari’s Home Guard was called out to investigate the murder of a loyalist. 
Arriving at the scene, the brigade realized it had been fooled – when it returned 
to Lari it found the entire village in ruins. More than one hundred villagers were 
killed or gravely injured, and the incident became known as the ‘greatest 
bloodletting of the entire Mau Mau war’ (Ibid.: 119-139).
During the first two years of the emergency, the Mau Mau armies proved 
strong forces that were difficult to fight. It was hard to trace their whereabouts 
due to Mt. Kenya’s and the Aberdares’ harsh terrain and thick forest cover, and 
they had developed successful intelligence-gathering techniques. But from mid-
1954 onwards these circumstances gradually changed after Waruhiu Itote, better 
known as General China and the leader of all Mau Mau generals on Mt. Kenya, 
was captured. Itote became trapped in an ambush organized by the King’s 
African Rifles and the Home Guard in January 1954. He was shot, and 
surrendered himself. A few weeks later he was called to court and sentenced to 
death, but he was offered a pardon if he agreed to cooperate in the colonial 
government’s efforts to finish off the Mau Mau (Anderson 2005A: 234).
Waruhiu Itote offered his assistance to the regime, and he became pivotal in a 
large surrender campaign. He wrote more than twenty letters to all Mau Mau 
leaders on Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares, asking them to meet with the colonial 
administration to discuss their capitulation (Anderson 2005A: 273). The plan 
seemed to have potential: more and more Africans had begun to reject the Mau 
Mau due to its use of extreme violence (see for instance Berman 1991; Branch 
2007) and the Mau Mau increasingly received less support from outside, making,
for instance, the supply of their forest encampments more difficult. In addition,
the Mau Mau had suffered a great number of casualties since October 1952, 
which further weakened their position. 
A handful of Mau Mau leaders responded to Itote’s call, and in the first week 
of April 1954 the first troops came down to announce their surrender. Contrary to 
what had been agreed, a brigadier of the King’s African Rifles called John 
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Reginald Orr opened fire (Anderson 2005A: 276). This threw a spanner in the 
works, and with this event the surrender campaign fell to pieces. Mau Mau 
leaders no longer trusted Waruhiu Itote, and eventually the latter was sent to a 
detention camp for he was of no further use. Nevertheless, Itote’s intermingling 
divided the Mau Mau leaders: whereas some openly scolded him, others 
continued to believe in his innocence (Ibid.). 
By late 1954, the Mau Mau had largely been defeated. There were only about 
two thousand fighters left, and the movement no longer posed a real military 
threat. The colonial government dismissed British troops and installed ‘pseudo-
gangs’ from September 1955 onwards (Anderson 2005A: 284-285). These 
pseudo-gangs largely consisted of former Mau Mau rebels who had changed 
side, but they also included white highlanders and administrators such as Bill 
Woodley who painted their faces and disguised themselves as Mau Mau fighters 
by wearing ragged clothes and dreadlock wigs. By early 1956, these pseudo-
gangs had cleared most of Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares of Mau Mau militants 
(Ibid.).
The war officially came to an end in October 1956, when the last standing and 
most important Mau Mau general on the Aberdares, Dedan Kimathi, was finally 
arrested. With Kimathi’s capture the resistance of the forest armies had been 
broken and all the Mau Mau figureheads had either been hanged or imprisoned, 
or were presumed death (Anderson 2005A: 328). The civil war came to an end, 
but Mau Mau detention camps initially continued to exist. However, the horrible 
conditions within these camps embarrassed the colonial government on different 
occasions and, fearing more scandals, it finally called off the state of emergency 
in January 1960. It released all former Mau Mau suspects and began to 
rehabilitate the region (Ibid.: 328-330).
The rehabilitation process had a bearing on Jomo Kenyatta’s predicament. 
After the Kapenguria trial, Kenyatta had been imprisoned for six years, but in 
1959 he had been transferred to Lodwar where he continued to live under house 
arrest. Once the state of emergency was lifted, Kenya’s emerging political elite 
began to lobby for Kenyatta’s liberation and his detention was finally cancelled 
in August 1961. Subsequently, Kenyatta resumed his political career and became 
the chairman of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), a political party 
founded the year before. 
In anticipation of Kenya’s decolonization Jomo Kenyatta launched a charm 
offensive. He deliberately kept the Kikuyu populism that the Mau Mau 
represented at bay so as not to offend loyalists, non-Kikuyu, the colonial 
government or European settlers (Clough 2003: 255). In a press statement that he 
gave shortly after his return from Lodwar he echoed Louis Leakey judgement
that Mau Mau followers were gangsters, and he declared:
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We are determined to have independence in peace, and we shall not allow hooligans to rule 
Kenya. We must have no hatred toward one another. Mau Mau was a disease which had 
been eradicated, and must never be remembered again.
Taken from Clough (2003: 255)
Kenyatta tried to shake off his reputation as the ‘demonized leader to darkness 
and death’ (Berman 2007: 536) and he positioned himself as the pillar for 
reconciliation (Ibid.). In the process, he further hardened the division between 
ex-Mau Mau and Kikuyu loyalists (see for instance Branch 2007), and managed 
to enhance his reputation in the eyes of colonial officials and white settlers alike 
– by 1963 they regarded him as the most desirable president of an independent 
Kenya, who could be trusted to protect Western interests (Berman 2007: 536).
A new nation’s troubled past
On 12 December 1963 Kenya was proclaimed independent. Jomo Kenyatta’s 
KANU had won the pre-independence elections, and Kenyatta was inaugurated 
as the country’s first president. On the eve of independence, the British 
government foresaw an exodus of British settlers who were likely to demand 
compensation from the public treasury to cover the costs of investments that they 
had made (Leo 1978: 621). In anticipation of this, the British government funded 
Kenyatta to buy off some European properties. These land sales were to 
demonstrate that Europeans would not be chased out, and that their properties 
would retain their value under the new administrative system (Ibid.; see also 
Branch & Cheeseman 2006). In essence, Jomo Kenyatta meant to communicate 
that there would be a place for everyone in independent Kenya.
But the Mau Mau history problematized Kenya’s cultivation into a multi-
cultural and multi-ethnic state (Lonsdale 1992B: 267). Not long after Jomo 
Kenyatta’s presidential appointment, different memoirs appeared written by 
former Mau Mau activists. For instance, there was one by a man called Josiah 
Mwangi Kariuki that was published in 1963, and one by Waruhiu Itote published
in 1967. These memoirs did not depict the Mau Mau as a tribalist movement, like 
the colonial regime had done, but claimed that the Mau Mau had been a 
nationalist movement that had stood up against British domination (see for 
instance Berman 1991: 184). Such a depiction tied in with the publication of 
different academic works that argued that the Mau Mau had been a rational and 
instrumental response to grievances caused by the colonial regime. These works 
described Mau Mau followers as conscious political actors rather than as 
primitive and uncivilized savages. Especially Nottingham & Rosberg’s The Myth 
of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya published in 1966 was influential in this 
regard (Berman 1991). 
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Mau Mau’s characterization as a nationalist liberation movement undermined 
Jomo Kenyatta’s ideology of national unity: to acknowledge former Mau Mau 
fighters as political activists who had advanced and achieved the cause of 
decolonialization would make independence appear an exclusively Kikuyu 
accomplishment, and as such glorify one tribal group over others (Berman 1991: 
201). So rather than keeping the Mau Mau’s memory alive, Kenyatta 
downplayed the movement’s contribution to self-government and literally called 
upon Kenyans to ‘forgive and forget’ the past (Atieno-Odhiambo 1991: 303). He 
initiated a policy of amnesia (Clough 2003: 256), and constantly reminded 
Kenyans that they had all fought for the country’s liberation collectively. As 
such, Kenyatta set the tone for the marginal and ambivalent role that the Mau 
Mau episode continues to play in Kenya’s official historical narrative. It was also 
within this context that Kenyatta sent Kisoi Munyao to plant the national flag on 
Mt. Kenya’s peak on the night of independence – the act meant to transform the 
mountain from a Kikuyu shrine or Mau Mau hide-out into a symbol of the 
colonial hardships that all Kenyans had fought against together. 
Jomo Kenyatta’s rejection of the Mau Mau had various material effects. In the 
run-up to independence ex-Mau Mau had hoped that Kenyatta would confiscate 
and redistribute European land among them, but Kenyatta made it clear that he 
had no such intentions (Clough 2003: 255). He moreover denied former Mau 
Mau fighters government positions, and largely selected his ministers and 
statesmen from loyalist Kikuyu and British collaborators. Some ex-Mau Mau 
protested against how Kenyatta set them apart, and again retreated into Mt. 
Kenya’s forests after 1963. Castro (1995: 83) suggests that these dissenters did 
not really threaten Kenyatta’s rule because they were poorly armed and small in 
number. Yet, their self-imposed seclusion did give expression to Kenyatta’s 
limited capacity to enforce national order upon each and every citizen (ibid.).
It soon became evident that Jomo Kenyatta’s regime not only marginalized 
former Mau Mau but also cultivated unequal access to wealth and political power 
more generally. Kenyatta left the bureaucratic structures of his colonial 
predecessors in place and largely built his regime on the principle of tribal elders 
and patron-client networks. This consolidated a connection between the 
accumulation of economic and political affluence on the one hand and tribal 
solidarity on the other (Berman et al. 2009; Branch & Cheeseman 2006), and it 
generally benefitted Kenyatta’s own political associates. These associates largely 
consisted of former loyalist Kikuyu and, during Kenyatta’s first years, of Luo 
politicians who had joined KANU in 1960 under leadership of Jaramogi Oginga 
Odinga, a Luo spokesman appointed as vice-president by Kenyatta in 1963. 
Kenyatta presented himself as the country’s Mzee, the elder of all elders that 
brought together all different communities (Berman et al. 2009: 473) and he 
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employed a rhetoric of harambee, Kiswahili for all working together (Anderson 
2005B: 547). Yet, in practice, he favoured his own political cadre at the expense 
of the rest of the country.
Kenyatta’s tribal favouritism expressed itself most dramatically through the 
Million Acre Settlement Scheme. This scheme was implemented in the Rift 
Valley and essentially meant to divide previously white-owned farms, which 
Kenyatta had been able to buy with British sponsorship, into small plots owned 
by African cooperatives. Its main intention was to re-Africanize an area that, 
during colonialism, had largely been in white hands. This is not to suggest that 
all white settlers left the Rift Valley after 1963 – many stayed on, or sold their 
farms to other Europeans who came to Kenya in the years that followed. To this 
day, the area is home to a significant white population, whose insecure tenant 
rights have had a critical effect on Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site, as I will
explain in chapters four and five. 
After independence, land was scarce yet desirable and the Rift Valley’s 
Million Acre Settlement Scheme gave way to fierce competition over who was to 
benefit from the programme (Berman & Lonsdale 1992: 1). Simplifying matters 
for clarity’s sake, roughly two camps emerged. On the one hand, there were 
landless Kikuyu for whom there was no place in the overpopulated Kikuyu 
reserves, or who squatted on the fringes of white-owned farms. They saw the 
scheme as an opportunity to regain farmland, after the colonial administration 
had dispossessed them. On the other hand, there were Kalenjin groups who 
claimed that the Rift Valley was theirs, because they had occupied it prior to 
colonization. Maasai groups made similar demands, but these are set aside for 
now as their claims pertained to one specific area that I will deal with in more 
detail in the coming two chapters.
The Million Acre Settlement Scheme’s purchase system favoured the landless 
Kikuyu over the Kalenjin groups. It prescribed that land-buying companies, 
founded especially for the purpose, could buy land at market rates – a similar 
initiative had been tried in 1961 but had failed at the time due to a lack of readily 
available farmland, which had given way to prices that no African could pay 
(Leo 1981). But the Million Acre Settlement Scheme adopted lower prices. This 
primarily enabled landless Kikuyu to buy themselves in since they were typically 
more affluent than Kalenjin groups, due to their participation in commercial 
farming under colonial rule. Moreover, Kalenjin groups refused to pay for land 
they already deemed rightfully theirs due to pre-colonial inhabitancy (see for 
instance Anderson & Lochery 2008). 
The Million Acre Settlement Scheme enabled the steady influx of Kikuyu 
communities into the Rift Valley. Kalenjin groups protested loudly against these 
developments. Their most outspoken representative was Daniel Arap Moi, who 
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was a member of the political party Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU),
which had been founded in 1960 in opposition to Jomo Kenyatta’s KANU. 
Between 1960 and 1963, KADU had promoted a politics of majimboism as an 
alternative to nationalism. Majimbo is Kiswahili for provinces or counties, and 
majimboism essentially entailed the devolution of government power to a 
regional level to prevent larger tribal groups such as the Kikuyu from dominating 
tribal minorities (Anderson 2005B). Through Majimboism, KADU had hoped to 
curtail KANU’s growing influence (Ibid.: 552), but this aspiration fell apart with 
the pre-independence elections. Subsequently, some KADU members, including 
Daniel Arap Moi, took positions in the House of Representatives. But they soon 
realized that without support and funds from central government they were 
powerless (Anderson 2005B: 562). In consideration of this, different KADU 
politicians took a pragmatic stance and joined KANU. In 1964, KANU absorbed 
KADU, which ceased to exist, and Kenya effectively became a one-party state. 
As a member of KANU, Daniel Arap Moi continued to advocate majimboism. 
Set against Kalenjin frustrations over the new political establishment as well as 
over the Million Acre Settlement Scheme, majimboism was no longer merely 
understood as a particular model of rule – rather, it became synonymous with 
Kalenjin groups’ desire to expel Kikuyu from the Rift Valley (Anderson 2005B).
In 1967, Daniel Arap Moi’s uncompromising tone changed. In March 1966,
Jaramogi Oginga Odinga had fallen out with Jomo Kenyatta, and had resigned
from his post as vice-president. Kenyatta then offered the position to Moi and 
gradually the Kikuyu-Luo alliance, against which KADU had originally been 
founded, was replaced by a coalition between Kikuyu politicians and minority 
tribes such as the Kalenjin (Lynch 2006B: 234). Moi dropped his majimboism 
advocacy, and instead began to defend the Million Acre Settlement Scheme’s 
capitalist principle that land was a saleable good and not a historical or tribal 
right (Anderson & Lochery 2008: 336-337). Moi’s former Kalenjin supporters 
reprimanded him for this, and claimed that Moi had paid for his influential 
position by giving away the Rift Valley to the Kikuyu (Ibid.).
In the meantime, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, together with a number of other 
former allies of Jomo Kenyatta who had come to refute Kenyatta’s clientelistic 
practices, founded an opposition party called the Kenya’s People Union (KPU). 
KPU members condemned Kenyatta’s neo-colonial attitude, and disapproved of 
how his rule concentrated wealth and political sway in the hands of an influential 
few. Under the leadership of Odinga, KPU sought popular support from the 
people who suffered most from Kenyatta’s tribal favouritism, and it deliberately 
reached out to ex-Mau Mau. In the process, it accused Kenyatta and his 
associates of keeping alive colonial rule, and it called upon the masses to again 
fight for liberation. In response, KANU took a firm stance against its former Luo 
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allies, whom it began to portray as an ‘uncircumcised lot’ that lacked 
administrative competence and that was culturally inferior to KANU’s new 
allies, the Kalenjin (Lynch 2006B: 237). Much to KPU’s detriment, KANU also 
sought rapprochement with former Mau Mau fighters, and even pressed for the 
erection of a Mau Mau monument in Nairobi’s Uhuru Park (Clough 2003: 257). 
When the government eventually banned the KPU in 1969 it no longer needed to 
lure Mau Mau supporters away from Odinga – it again became oblivious to the 
movement, and returned to its politics of amnesia.
The government’s negligence of the Mau Mau came to a head in 1975 when 
Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, a former Mau Mau who eventually became Jomo 
Kenyatta’s most popular critic, was found murdered in Ngong Hills in western 
Nairobi. The public believed that Kariuki had been assassinated by the regime, 
and protesting masses attended Kariuki’s funeral in large numbers. These masses 
claimed that Kenyatta’s administration was trying to rid itself from political 
opponents, just as the British colonial regime had done, and they drew analogies 
between Kariuki’s murder and the colonial government’s war against the Mau 
Mau (Clough 2003: 258). These protests undermined Kenyatta’s authority, which 
in turn encouraged others to mock him openly. Among them was the novelist 
Ngugi wa Thiong’o, who saw the Mau Mau upheavals as an archetypical 
workers and peasants revolution, and who maintained that Kenyatta’s rule was 
little more than a continuation of colonial oppression (see for instance Waller 
2001) – in late 1977 he was put in jail for his criticism. Such conditions 
characterized the last three years of Kenyatta’s regime, which ended when the 
latter died of old age in 1978. 
After Jomo Kenyatta passed away vice-president Daniel Arap Moi became 
president. By that time the mechanisms of clientelism and ethnic favouritism, 
which hitherto had benefitted Kikuyu elites, were firmly in place. Moi turned 
these mechanisms to his advantage and replaced sitting politicians with his own 
political allies, most of whom sharing his Kalenjin roots. Initially, Moi’s seizure 
of the state apparatus was precarious and he only just survived a coup attempt in 
1982 (Foeken & Dietz 2000), which implicated Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and his 
son Raila Odinga. But gradually Moi marginalized what had remained of Kikuyu 
and Luo control, and over time KANU effectively became ‘KADU reborn’ 
(Anderson 2005B: 563; see also Throup & Hornsby 1998). 
After Daniel Arap Moi assumed the presidency he initially embraced Kenya’s 
Mau Mau history, and sought an alliance with former Mau Mau leaders. It has 
been suggested that this coalition meant to serve two purposes. On the one hand,
Moi’s partnership with ex-Mau Mau was part of a broader populist strategy with 
which Moi hoped to engender nationwide support (Clough: 2003: 259) – Jomo 
Kenyatta had lost such support during his last years, and Moi had observed first 
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hand how Kenyatta’s loss of authority had hampered his ability to govern. 
Secondly, Moi’s open commemoration of Mau Mau history meant to express that 
the new president would bring the favouritism towards Kikuyu leaders who had 
been loyal to the British colonial regime to an end (Ibid.). 
Throughout the 1980s, Daniel Arap Moi’s revival of Mau Mau sentiments 
aroused scholarly debate about how much the movement had actually contributed 
to decolonialization. Historians were divided over the matter, which culminated 
in a hostile row during a 1986 meeting of the Historical Association of Kenya 
(Atieno-Odhiambo 1991). On the one hand, there was a group of revisionists, 
which included historians such as Bethwell Ogot and William Ochieng, who 
claimed that all colonial victims had fought their battles. They advocated against 
romanticizing the Mau Mau uprising as a form of exclusive Kikuyu resistance, 
for such an image only aided Kikuyu elites in legitimizing the exclusion of all 
other Kenyans from the fruits of independence (Ibid.: 301). On the other hand,
there was a group of more radical thinkers, which included the historian Maini
wa Kinyatti and Ngugi wa Thiong’o who had been released after Kenyatta’s 
death, who dramatized the Mau Mau’s Kikuyu character. They blamed Ogot, 
Ochieng and likeminded thinkers for refusing to acknowledge Kikuyu heroism, 
and claimed that Mau Mau rebellion had been the ‘highest peak of Kenyan 
nationalism’ (Ibid.: 304) and deserved a prominent place in Kenya’s collective 
memory. These radicals received far more grassroots support than revisionists, 
and figures such as Josiah Mwangi Kariuki and the Aberdares Mau Mau leader 
Dedan Kimathi became the national heroes of the 1980s (Clough 2003: 259).
Daniel Arap Moi’s initial celebration of Mau Mau ebbed away in the early 
1990s. After the 1982 coup attempt Moi had largely enforced autocratic rule, but 
in the decade that followed national protest groups increasingly lobbied for 
multi-party politics and competitive elections. Such lobbying intensified after the 
assassination of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Ouko in February 1990 
(see for instance Grignon et al. 2000) – the murder was clouded in mystery and 
the rumour spread that Moi had been involved in the killing, which initiated riots 
in Nairobi. At the same time, international development partners began to call for 
political reforms (Klopp 2001). It was a time in which different African 
governments had come to find themselves on the verge of bankruptcy, and in 
order to receive loans from bilateral financial institutions these country had to 
commit themselves to widespread democratic reorganizations (Ellis 2000: 42).
Anticipating changes in Kenya’s administrative conditions, Kikuyu groups in 
Central Province once again revived the commemoration of the Mau Mau
movement. They began to sing old Mau Mau chants to express their 
dissatisfaction with Moi’s marginalization of Kikuyu politicians, and they called 
upon all Kikuyu to unite and challenge Moi’s rule. In the course of these events 
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the government ordered a ban on Jomo Kenyatta’s portrait in May 1990, after 
which it removed his photo from all government offices and public buildings. 
The Kikuyu in Central Province reacted angrily, and the measure only added to 
their discontent (Sabar-Friedman 1995: 113).
National and international pressure groups managed to command political 
transformations and in 1991, more than twenty-five years after KANU and 
KADU had merged and Kenya had become a one-party state, multi-party politics 
was restored. Elections followed in the year after. In the run-up to these 
elections, Daniel Arap Moi reinvigorated the ideology of majimbo, which he had 
defended before he had become Jomo Kenyatta’s vice-president. Moi and his 
associates capitalized upon decades-old Kalenjin frustrations over the exclusion 
from the Rift Valley, and made land distribution a high point on the electoral 
agenda in an attempt to garner Kalenjin voter support (Anderson & Lochery 
2008; Hughes 2005). One of Moi’s closest followers, William ole Ntimama, 
deliberately agitated Kalenjin and Maasai groups, and told them they would lose 
further access to the Rift Valley if a Kikuyu politician won the elections. He 
intimidated Kikuyu residents of the area and infamously warned them to ‘lie low 
as envelopes or face grave consequences’ (Onoma 2010: 87; see also Klopp 
2001), insinuating that they would have to keep calm and vote for Moi or 
otherwise face Maasai and Kalenjin spears. Eventually, Daniel Arap Moi won the 
1992 elections by more than one third of all votes. His victory articulated his 
control over Kenya’s entire political apparatus (Throup & Hornsby 1998: 533) 
and it further fuelled tensions between Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Maasai groups. This 
came to a dramatic height in Enoosupukia, a place in Narok county, where 
William ole Ntimama’s incitements resulted in a massive clash between Kikuyu 
and Maasai residents in 1993. Some people were murdered, and many others fled 
in fear for their safety (see for instance Klopp 2001).
The reintroduction of multi-party politics changed Kenya’s political arena in 
significant ways. Most importantly, it set the stage for the exaggerated enactment 
of tribal identities, and it fostered tribal polarization as political parties typically 
formed in keeping with tribal boundaries. This was partially the result of 
deliberate techniques employed by politicians such as William ole Ntimama but, 
as Klopp (2001) suggests, it was also an unplanned and unforeseen side effect of 
politicians trying to stay in control or trying to regain the power they had had 
under Jomo Kenyatta. The profound tribalization of Kenya’s political domain 
offered the Moi government opportunities that it exploited, but at the same time 
it contained a big worry: if KANU could summon popular support by playing up 
tribal grievances, then so could the Kikuyu opposition (Throup & Hornsby 1998: 
533).
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This Kikuyu opposition had one trump card with which to engender tribal 
solidarity, namely Mau Mau. But from the late 1980s onwards, open support for 
Mau Mau became more complicated due to a nationwide upsurge in sect-like 
movements. One of these movements was Mungiki, the precise origins of which
are disputed: some have depicted it as an originally religious movement (see for 
instance Wamue 2001), while others have claimed that it was founded as a 
vigilante brigade in the context of Nairobi’s high levels of crime (see for instance 
Anderson 2002). During the first decade of its existence Mungiki accentuated its 
Kikuyu character. It promoted traditional Kikuyu customs and habits, and it 
rejected all forms of Westernization. Mungiki leaders even claimed that the 
organization descended from Mau Mau, and stated: ‘we have Mau Mau blood in 
us and our objectives are similar’ (Kagwanja 2003: 30). But it did not take long 
before Mungiki revealed itself as a hostile gang with criminal intentions. Among 
other things, it aggressively monopolized Nairobi’s minivan sector and began to 
extort taxes from people in shanty towns (Anderson 2002). At least until roughly 
the 2000s, when Mungiki became less pronounced on its Kikuyu roots and began 
to adopt an Islamic identity (Anderson 2002; Kagwanja 2003), one’s support for 
Mau Mau could easily be misunderstood as sympathy for Mungiki. 
In 1997, Kenya witnessed its second round of elections since independence. 
This time, international watchdog organizations monitored the events closely, 
given the distrust surrounding Daniel Arap Moi’s triumph in 1992. The Kikuyu 
politician Mwai Kibaki was Moi’s strongest opponent – initially, Kibaki had 
been vice-president under Moi, but they had fallen out in 1988. Kibaki had left 
KANU in December 1991 and had founded his own party, called the Democratic 
Party (DP). After the votes were counted KANU again pronounced itself winner. 
In response, riots broke out in the Rift Valley, where Kikuyu groups claimed that 
Moi and his Kalenjin supporters had sabotaged the electoral process for the 
second time in a row, and both Kenyans and international observers took the 
position that Kenyan elections did not foster democracy but merely confirmed 
Moi’s totalitarian rule. This, in turn, encouraged scholars to point out that 
Kenya’s electoral system was as corrupt as the government it served, and 
attention was drawn to vote buying, selective distribution of identity cards, and 
the strategic division of constituencies (see for instance Foeken & Dietz 2000). 
In subsequent years, KANU realized that, in order to survive another round of 
elections, it needed a significant proportion of the Kikuyu vote. It found a clever 
solution to this: in the run-up to the 2002 elections, from which Daniel Arap Moi 
was constitutionally barred because he had already been elected twice, KANU 
introduced Jomo Kenyatta’s son Uhuru Kenyatta as Moi’s successor. Some 
observers have suggested that this was not only a strategy to appeal to the 
Kikuyu constituency, but that it also meant to take the sting out of the Rift Valley 
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conflict, where violence was less likely to occur if Kalenjin and Kikuyu 
communities voted for the same president (see for instance Kanyinga 2009: 336). 
It seemed that this Kikuyu-Kalenjin alliance had already been planned in the 
aftermath of the 1997 elections, when KANU had awarded Kikuyu politicians 
such as Joseph Kamoto and George Saitoti influential governmental positions. 
Critical observers came to call the appointment of these Kikuyu politicians 
kabisa (absolutely or completely): the move divided the Kikuyu vote, which 
reinforced KANU’s grips on the country’s political apparatus (see for instance 
Grignon et al. 2001: 14).
During the 2002 elections, the National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC) was 
KANU’s most important competitor. NaRC was a broad alliance of different 
parties, which had formed a bloc against Uhuru Kenyatta. Amongst others,
NaRC included Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga – the latter had been a member of 
KANU but had left the party the moment that Daniel Arap Moi had pushed 
forward Uhuru Kenyatta. Through the involvement of Kibaki, NaRC tried to 
appeal to the Kikuyu vote, and in an attempt to gain broad support in Central 
Province NaRC took part in the revival of Mau Mau commemoration that had 
characterized the region ever since the early 1990s. NaRC succeeded, and it won 
the 2002 elections. Mwai Kibaki became Kenya’s third president. 
Initially, Kenya celebrated NaRC’s victory en masse, optimistic that it would 
bring an end to decades of political corruption, violent repression and 
disproportionate enrichment of politicians. But national euphoria was short-lived. 
NaRC had run on an agenda of legislative reform and during its campaign tours it 
had promised to draft a new constitution. Civil society groups had demanded 
legislative changes since the early 1990s, when it became evident that multi-
party politics failed to foster democratic leadership (see for instance Lynch 
2006B). From the late 1990s onwards, KANU claimed that it was working on 
such reforms, but it failed to deliver results and NaRC took strategic advantage 
of this in its election campaign. 
Like his predecessor, Mwai Kibaki largely lost interest in changing the 
country’s constitution after he became president. The ‘business as usual of 
corruption and patronage’ continued (Berman et al. 2009: 464), and Kibaki filled 
Kenya’s cabinet with his own henchmen. In practice this meant that, on the 
whole, the statesmen who had served under Kenyatta simply resumed their 
former influential position (Ibid.). Kibaki’s government made attempts to review 
the country’s legislation but the process soon stalled, and constitution debates 
became merely another podium on which to express tribal differences and 
competition (Berman et al. 2009: Hughes 2005) – these developments were 
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partly due to internal NaRC divisions, 7 but they were also bolstered by an 
increasingly vocal global lobby that called for the protection of tribal minority 
rights. The public soon lost its initial enthusiasm for NaRC, and began to take the 
acronym for ‘Nothing actually Really Changed’. 
In 2003, Mwai Kibaki lifted the ban on Mau Mau membership. When the 
British administration had called off the state of emergency in 1956 it had not 
abolished the legal prohibition on Mau Mau participation, and both Jomo 
Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi had kept the ban in place. Kibaki’s repeal had no 
practical consequences but was highly symbolic: it communicated that his 
government at last meant to bring an end to the suppression of the country’s Mau 
Mau history (Coombes 2011: 204). In the years that followed, different official 
Mau Mau commemoration events took place, and throughout 2006 and 2007 the 
government erected a number of Mau Mau statues and mausolea (Coombes 
2011). But Kenya’s past remained disputed, and the celebration of Mau Mau 
continued to be a highly controlled state affair. In February 2006, for instance, 
the police intervened when a group of people tried to organize a memorial 
service for Dedan Kimathi in the latters’ hometown. The police suspected they 
were Mungiki, and hence arrested them (Ibid.: 213-214). The general public is 
not unaware of how the commemoration of Mau Mau primarily became a 
playground for politicians, and the question is whether today there is still much 
popular enthusiasm for Mau Mau’s celebration: when Kibaki revealed a statue of 
Dedan Kimathi in front of the Hilton Hotel in Nairobi just prior to the 2007 
elections, Kenyans largely rejected the act as yet another round of Mau Mau’s 
appropriation in the scramble for votes (Ibid.: 217) and paid little attention to it.
So far, I have discussed the ways in which the celebration of Mau Mau waxed 
and waned since the 1960s in line with a number of power struggles, and I have 
called attention to politicians’ ongoing endeavours to summon tribal solidarity. 
Before I move on to discuss how this ties in with Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage
designation, I want to make explicit that tribal coalitions are not the sole 
imperatives in Kenya’s political arena – just recall how Daniel Arap Moi formed 
an opportunistic partnership first with Jomo Kenyatta, and later with Uhuru 
Kenyatta.8 But the point is that Kenya’s successive political elites have framed 
the country’s administrative difficulties in a discourse that focuses exclusively on 
                                                        
7 Soon after NaRC’s election victory Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga fell out with one another. It has 
been suggested that this was largely caused by dissatisfaction on Odinga’s side. In the run-up to the 
elections Odinga had stayed in the background and had publicly endorsed Kibaki’s presidential 
candidateship, on the agreement that afterwards he would have his share in the division of ministerial 
posts and other influential positions. When Kibaki began to shape his government Odinga felt he was 
not rewarded sufficiently – tensions worsened further when Kibaki invited some former KANU 
politicians into cabinet (Lynch 2006B: 242).
8 Coombes & Hughes (2014) have also warned against understanding the alliances of Kenyan 
politicians only in terms of tribal background.
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tribal division and competition (Anderson & Lochery 2008: 339), which 
obscures other complicating factors including gender differences, class 
distinctions or racial segregation (see also Lonsdale 2008). The academic 
challenge is to problematize rather than to reproduce this discourse, and to be 
careful not to observe Kenya’s political developments purely through an ‘ethnic 
lens’ (Lynch 2006A: 61). 
The ways in which Kenyan politicians exaggerate cultural origins in relation 
to the country’s administration are not unique to Kenya. In fact, different 
scholars have pointed out how notions of indigeneity and autochthony have 
become more poignant and pronounced in recent decades, not only in relatively 
young African nations (see for instance Igoe 2006) but also in Europe, where 
classifications of cultural insiders and outsiders or distinctions between natives 
and immigrants have become reiterated themes on the agenda of many a political 
party (Geschiere 2009; Stolcke 1999). What is particularly troublesome in the 
case of Kenya, however, is the way in which the rhetoric of tribal affinity 
inspires a powerful narrative on land ownership that equates cultural background 
with rights to land (see also Kuper 2003). This narrative periodically induces 
violent clashes, especially in times of elections when politicians overdramatize 
tribal identities in an attempt to rally voter support (Berman 1998). The 2008 
elections produced the most disruptive outbreak of tribal conflict over land so 
far: it lasted for nearly two months, took roughly one thousand lives and created 
hundreds of thousands international refugees. 
In closing, I want to emphasize that I distance myself from primordial 
understandings of culture and tribe. Rather, I take my cue from scholars who 
have problematized contemporary processes of belonging, and who have pointed 
to the inherent tension between the changeable, flexible and contextual nature of 
cultural identities, on the one hand, and the rigid cultural histories and precepts 
that such identities can elicit on the other (see for instance Ceuppens & Geschiere 
2005; Igoe 2006; Gupta & Ferguson 1992; Geschiere 2009).9 In Kenya, such
tension is obviously at the core of land disputes, but it is also discernable in other 
developments. For instance, it revealed itself when a famous lawyer called 
Silvano Meleo Otieno, better known as SM, died unexpectedly in 1986. His 
widow announced that she wanted to bury him on their farm in Nairobi, but 
SM’s relatives and his Luo age-mates objected. They demanded that SM was 
buried on family land in Nyamila, Nyanza Province, close to his ancestors. 
Kenyan media followed the tussles between the widow and SM’s relatives 
closely, and debates over whether SM’s cultural background should take 
                                                        
9 Scholars working on the recent revival of occultism in various parts of Africa have offered valuable
insights into notions of belonging in relation to culture and tradition, and they have drawn attention to 
how particular modern conditions provide for the blossoming of occult reasoning (see for instance
Bähre 2002; Comaroff & Comaroff 1999; Geschiere 1997; Meyer 1999).
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precedence over his modern lifestyle or vice versa captivated the public for 
months. Eventually, the matter was decided upon in court, where a judge ruled 
that the arguments of SM’s Luo relatives outweighed those of his widow. The 
body was transferred to Nyamila, and laid to rest during a traditional burying 
ceremony (see Cohen & Atieno-Odhiambo 1992). 
The events around SM’s death offer another example of how indigeneity can 
underpin the assertion of rights, in this particular case over a body, and it 
underscores the political potential of ‘strategic essentialism’ (Igoe 2006: 417) –
in today’s geo-political conditions one’s ethnic distinctiveness and the 
mobilization of tradition (see also Meyer 2010) can be effective political tools for 
giving voice to one’s grievances, whether these consist of one’s limited access to 
natural resources, one’s marginalized role in decision-making processes, or 
restrictions in performing one’s mode of living openly. But ‘cultural distinction’ 
is a process and a mode of positioning rather than an essence (Gupta & Ferguson 
1992; Hall 1986), and this demands that we pay close attention to how cultural 
boundaries are continuously reshaped and re-interpreted. This is not to suggest 
that temporal cultural identities are devoid of historical depth: Hamilton (1998),
for instance, shows that historical events pose limits on cultural invention (see 
also Hall 1986; Li 2000). As such, she offers a critique on the body of literature 
that appeared in the wake of Hobsbawm and Ranger’s influential Invention of 
Tradition (1983), which, according to Hamilton, overestimated colonialism’s 
influence on the formation of African tribal identities (see also Spear 2003). 
Taking note of this, I regard Kenya’s ‘tribes’, ‘ethnicities’ or ‘cultures’ as a 
form of social practice that, among other things, has recourse to socio-economic 
conditions, political advocacy, historical reference, and adaption to changing 
circumstances. In the next two chapters, I continue to point out how this practice 
complicates the country’s volatile land issue. 
Nature dominating cultural and political pasts
Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage nomination came into being at a time when the 
1997 elections were pending. KANU politicians and the Central Province 
Kikuyu opposition competed for power, and in the process both tried to evoke 
tribal solidarity in order to summon popular support. In this rally for votes, Mt. 
Kenya offered the Kikuyu opposition a valuable source of symbolic capital for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, and owing to Jomo Kenyatta’s attempt to forge a 
collective Kikuyu identity in Facing Mount Kenya and in his political advocacy 
more generally, the mountain came to epitomize Kikuyu culture and religion. 
Secondly, Mt. Kenya was one of the two battlegrounds where the Mau Mau war 
was fought most fanatically, and as such it became associated with Kikuyu 
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brotherhood and camaraderie. Thirdly, the Kikuyu statesmen that Jomo Kenyatta 
put in place after he became president largely obtained their wealth in the vicinity 
of Mt. Kenya, primarily through the Million Acre Settlement Scheme. Thus, the 
mountain came to denote post-independent Kikuyu entrepreneurship and political 
sway. In addition, Kenyatta’s political associates largely originated from Mt. 
Kenya, primarily from a town called Nyeri that is located on the mountain’s 
southwestern slope. It is widely believed that not Kenyatta himself but these 
Kikuyu associates called the shots during Kenyatta’s presidency, and they 
became known as the ‘Mt. Kenya Mafia’. When Kibaki obtained power in 2002,
many former Mt. Kenya Mafia politicians regained their influential position and 
thus were able to control the country’s administration once more (see for instance 
Lynch 2006B; Murungu & Nasong’o 2006). 
In short, for the 1997 Kikuyu opposition Mt. Kenya was a powerful token of 
tribal liaison, and it tried to capitalize on the mountain’s symbolic value in order 
to encourage the different communities living around Mt. Kenya to vote as one 
united block (see also Kariuki 2006: 4). In light of this, one might expect that the 
KANU government would have tried to inhibit Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage
nomination, as surely World Heritage status could add to the mountain’s 
glorification. But neither President Daniel Arap Moi himself, nor other KANU 
politicians, prevented Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage listing. They easily could 
have done so, and there are examples of World Heritage nominations that 
resulted in an impasse after sitting politicians refused to endorse it (see for 
instance Scholze 2008).
I maintain that KANU politicians did not object to Mt. Kenya’s World 
Heritage listing because the application that Bongo Woodley drafted focused 
exclusively on the mountain’s natural features. It confined Mt. Kenya to a natural 
tableau, and it only dealt with geological and ecological characteristics. Bongo 
Woodley neither spoke of the mountain’s Kikuyu connotation, nor of its role in 
relation to the Mau Mau episode. Instead, he portrayed Mt. Kenya as a 
wilderness area and merely discussed tree species, animal records and so forth –
Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage nomination ‘naturalized’ the area, and effectively 
downplayed Kikuyu and Mau Mau histories. Meskell (2012A) makes a similar 
argument for South Africa and points out that, in post-apartheid South Africa, the 
celebration of cultural heritage is an extremely politicized undertaking because it 
inevitably evokes a history of racism. In this particular historical context, 
biodiversity conservation and the celebration of natural heritage could emerge as 
racially neutral and impartial. Meskell draws attention to different archaeological 
sites in Kruger National Park that represent apartheid’s former racist and 
repressive regime, and shows that Kruger’s depiction as a site of natural marvels 
placed the park in a discursive realm where this history need not be discussed or 
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even acknowledged. From this she draws the wider conclusion that, in light of 
the African National Congress’s ambition to let South Africa recover from 
apartheid, the nationwide celebration of nature became a strategy to tone down 
political pasts (Ibid.: 212). Before moving on, I should say that Bongo Woodley
did make one short reference to the strong connection between Mt. Kenya and 
the country’s Kikuyu population. He wrote:
Mt. Kenya is regarded as a holy mountain by all the communities (Kikuyu and Meru) living 
adjacent to it. They believe that their traditional God Ngai and his wife Mumbi live on the 
peak of the mountain. They use it for their traditional rituals. 
The Government of the Republic of Kenya (1996: 5)
Woodley’s description displays a static and deterministic understanding of 
culture and religion but, more importantly, it also shows a complete lack of 
interest for it is fundamentally flawed: in Kikuyu founding stories, Ngai and 
Mumbi do not relate to one another as husband and wife, but as deity and 
progenitor (Kenyatta 1938: 5-6). I once discussed this careless statement with a 
young woman who considered herself half Kikuyu, half Maasai. She took 
Woodley’s description as a great insult, not least because it was stored in 
UNESCO’s online archive where today it continues to mislead readers. ‘How can 
a deity marry?’ she asked me, and added that a white man would never accept an 
African telling him that his God was married. As such, she brought up a pressing 
concern that ties in with the issue of white control over African World Heritage
Sites more generally, which I addressed in the previous chapter: a white man had 
assumed he knew what Kikuyu culture and religion entailed, while the people he 
talked about were not consulted or invited to join in the nomination. And 
UNESCO experts had credulously taken over his perspective.
Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage nomination showed the KANU government that 
Mt. Kenya had the potential to be an icon of nature, untroubled by the country’s 
tribal competition over power and prosperity – it portrayed Mt. Kenya as a place 
of national pride, instead of as a place that only one particular tribal faction could 
legitimately lay claim to. A former statesman10 once told me confidentially that 
non-Kikuyu politicians regard Mt. Kenya too big an asset to leave to the Kikuyu. 
He alluded to the mountain’s natural resources and its commercial timber 
industry, but also to its potential to provoke tribal concord. This explains why the 
KANU government readily accepted the World Heritage application that Bongo 
Woodley drafted: it offered a welcome alternative to other, overtly politicized 
narratives on Mt. Kenya, and it challenged the historically strong link between 
the mountain and the country’s Kikuyu elite. This dynamic is reminiscent of
how, shortly after independence, Jomo Kenyatta tried to downplay the link 
between the Mau Mau uprisings and the country’s liberation, and insisted that 
                                                        
10 Conversation on 5 July 2012.
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not only Kikuyu but all Kenyan’s had made their contribution to 
decolonialization. 
Interestingly, all but one of the World Heritage experts whom I asked why Mt. 
Kenya’s cultural and political histories were not acknowledged in its World 
Heritage status said that these were simply not extraordinary enough to merit 
World Heritage inscription. For instance, a monuments expert located at the 
National Museums of Kenya said that although Mt. Kenya is considered a 
Kikuyu sacred mountain this is not enough to build an entire World Heritage
nomination on. He added that Mt. Kenya simply does not have outstanding 
cultural value. A conservationist working for IUCN in Nairobi gave me a similar 
explanation, and underscored that the mountain’s cultural values are too 
insignificant to live up to UNESCO standards. Only George Abungu, a World 
Heritage advisor that I introduce in more detail in chapter five, admitted that Mt. 
Kenya should have been designated as a cultural landscape rather than only as a 
natural heritage site. 
To spell out just how remarkable this near-total rejection of Mt. Kenya’s 
cultural heritage values is I briefly draw attention to another Kenyan World
Heritage Site, the Sacred Mijikenda Kaya Forests. This site consists of a strip of 
forest land two hundred kilometres long, located on the coastline in Kenya’s 
Coast Province, in which one finds the remains of abandoned fortified villages 
(kayas) that were used by the Mijikenda community around the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The Mijikenda Kaya Forests resemble Mt. Kenya’s forests in 
important ways, but contrary to Mt. Kenya they were added to the World
Heritage List specifically for their cultural relevance: UNESCO claims that the 
Kaya forests have a ‘metonymic significance to Mijikenda and are a fundamental 
source of Mijikenda’s sense of ‘being-in-the-world’ and of place within the 
cultural landscape of contemporary Kenya’ (UNESCO 2008A: 191), and the 
organization suggests that the area is defining for Mijikenda identity (Ibid.).
The Mijikenda Kaya Forests became a World Heritage Site in 2007. At the 
time, Mwai Kibaki’s government faced elections, and it tried to summon popular 
support from tribal groups other than its relatively stable Kikuyu constituency. In 
the run-up to the 2007 elections Kibaki therefore visited Mijikenda kayas and 
received blessings from Mijikenda elders (McIntosh 2009). These events were 
explained as a win-win arrangement: Kibaki anticipated that respect for 
Mijikenda elders would win him Mijikenda votes, and for Mijikenda elders a 
partnership with Kibaki was a boost to their local reputation and social standing 
(Ibid.: 42). The timing of the Mijikenda Kaya Forests World Heritage
designation suggests that the official national ratification of Mijikenda culture 
meant to further consolidate the coalition between Kibaki’s government and 
Mijikenda groups. As such, I suggest that the World Heritage designation of the 
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Mijikenda Kaya Forests was closely entwined with the election politics that have 
characterized the country since 1992, just like Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage
designation had been. I want to stress that the two sites are surprisingly similar in 
terms of both natural landscape and cultural-religious significance, but that only 
the cultural relevance of the Mijikenda Kaya Forests was acknowledged and 
celebrated. I believe that this underscores the importance of considering the exact 
timing of World Heritage listings, in order to see how the selection of a site’s 
heritage qualities ties in with a country’s prevailing political circumstances.
Before closing this chapter, I want to emphasize that even though I maintain 
that the KANU government only allowed for Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage
designation because it diverted attention away from uncomfortable cultural and 
political histories, I do not intend to give the impression that Kenya’s political 
elite deliberately engineered Mt. Kenya’s naturalization. I do not understand Mt. 
Kenya’s natural World Heritage designation as a well-planned and preconceived 
political campaign, directed at supressing Kikuyu cultural and political history –
such an explanation would take too little notice of Bongo Woodley’s role and his 
personal struggles, and it would sketch too rigid relations of cause and effect. 
Rather, Mt. Kenya’s 1996 World Heritage nomination could materialize because 
the circumstances provided for it: Bongo Woodley and the wider KWS saw 
potential in Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage application for reasons related to their 
rivalry with the Forest Department, and Kenya’s incumbent political elite did not 
stop the application because it just happened to fit its electoral agenda. Mt. 
Kenya World Heritage Site was simply the outcome of a combination of events
that, in fact, had little to do with one another. 
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White perils: Racial struggles 
over land in Mt. Kenya’s shadow
In the course of the 2000s a group of stakeholders began to call upon UNESCO 
to revise Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage status, and in 2013 the boundaries of the 
site changed. Before I discuss this in detail in the next chapter I first deal with an 
issue that was paramount in these developments, namely Laikipia’s racialized 
land debate. 
Laikipia is a highland plateau located east and northeast of Mt. Kenya. Under 
colonial rule it became the exclusive territory of white settlers, whose status and 
authority were protected by colonialism’s institutionalized racism and the colour 
bar. I argue that the colour bar is still prevalent in Laikipia, but that its 
significance has reversed: whereas in the past it served to protect white 
privileges, today it calls into question and challenges the ongoing presence of 
white communities. I will demonstrate that this manifests itself, among other
things, in criticism on Laikipia’s wildlife conservation industry, in incidental 
property invasions, and in recent legislative changes. 
Laikipia’s colour bar is not the sole driving force in Laikipia’s land debate,
and tribal competition over land rights between different African groups is at 
least as important. Nevertheless, colour bar politics do have important 
repercussions for the position of white landowners because the colour bar gives
way to heated debates over legal tenant rights, legitimate proprietorship, and 
adequate land use, and as such it fuels white anxieties over land loss and 
expulsion. As the next chapter reveals, it was these anxieties that brought about 
the modification of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site.
Below, I examine Laikipia’s particular colonial history, I trace how this 
history installed a narrative that continues to pit the area’s white inhabitants 
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against its black inhabitants, and I problematize the ways in which contemporary 
colour bar politics obscure the complicatedness of Kenya’s land question. In 
doing so, I largely draw on conversations with roughly a dozen white landowners 
and white conservationists who, due to the sensitivity of the topic, typically 
demanded anonymity. This means that it often remains unclear how, when and 
where I obtained my data. In light of the issues at stake I have tried to be discreet 
– I hope that even critical readers will respect this.
White Highlands
In the early 1860s, the German explorer Baron Karl Klau von der Drecken made 
a first attempt to travel into the interior of what would become the East African 
Protectorate. His expedition led him to an area called Masai Land where his 
journey ended, allegedly because it had run into several thousands of Masaai 
warriors (Thomson 1968 [1887]: 4). A handful of adventurers followed Von der 
Drecken, including a missionary called New and a German explorer-cum-
collector called Johannes Hildebrandt (Ibid.). But not long after Von der 
Drecken’s misfortunes the imperial interest in the area died down. Expeditions 
into Masai Land were considered too dangerous and too expensive, and between 
the late 1860s and early 1880s only native traders dared to visit the region (Ibid.:
4-5).
The situation changed in 1883 when, in anticipation of the 1884-1885 Berlin 
Conference, the area again attracted attention. In particular, the British Royal 
Geographical Society (RGS) wanted to examine whether it was feasible to 
establish a direct route from Kenya’s coast to Lake Victoria through Masai Land, 
and meant to ascertain whether Masai Land could be prepared for white 
settlement (Thomson 1968 [1887]: 6). In light of these considerations, the RGS’s 
African Committee invited the Scottish geologist Joseph Thomson to organize 
another expedition into Masai Land. Thomson accepted the job. According to his 
own journals, he primarily did so because he was fascinated with the possible 
existence of Mt. Kenya: the missionary Johan Ludwig Krapf claimed he had 
spotted the mountain in 1849 when he travelled from a district east of Nairobi 
called Kitui to Mombasa, but ever since no one had been able to confirm his 
claim. In fact, geologists widely ridiculed Krapf’s so-called discovery because 
they had no scientific explanation for the presence of a snow-capped mountain in 
the tropics. Contrary to earlier expeditions, Thomson’s journey succeeded – he
reached Lake Victoria and, much to his delight, caught a glimpse of Mt. Kenya 
on his way up (Ibid. chapter ix).1
                                                        
1 After Joseph Thomson spotted Mt. Kenya in December 1883 different adventurers followed in his 
footsteps and attempted to explore the mountain. Among them were Sámuel Teleki, who visited in 
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After returning from Masai Land, Joseph Thomson subscribed to Von der 
Drecken’s image of Maasai warriors as a bloodthirsty and ferocious people. This 
had serious implications for how the British colonial administration set about 
disciplining the tribe (Kantai 2007: 108), and shortly after Thomson’s expedition 
it began to subject the Maasai to internal relocation policies. These policies hit 
the Maasai at a time when they were already vulnerable for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, from the 1880s, African peasants had begun to take possession of Masai 
Land’s border areas. Secondly, some Maasai communities had disintegrated and 
fought amongst themselves (Waller 1976: 533-535). Thirdly, different outbreaks 
of bovine pleuro-pneumonia had reduced Maasai herds, which in turn fuelled 
aggressive cattle raids. And in 1891 the plight of the Maasai deteriorated further 
when rinderpest broke out: the disease practically wiped out all herds, and 
according to oral tradition Maasai only survived because they ate donkeys and 
cattle hides (Ibid.: 530). 
The unfortunate condition of Maasai communities in the late 1880s and early 
1890s made different Maasai leaders susceptible to British calls for an alliance. 
Among these leaders was a laibon (a ritual expert) who was called Olonana. 
Olonana had fallen out with his brother Senteu, who was based in German 
territory in present-day Tanzania, and Olonana hoped that with British support he 
stood a better chance of defeating his sibling. Olonana moreover realized that his 
position as a laibon was vulnerable, and he employed all the resources at his 
disposal to secure his standing among his peers. By 1896, the British colonial 
administration largely had Olonana under command (Waller 1976: 540), yet it 
still feared the potential outbreak of Maasai revolt against colonial rule. 
Consequently, it let the battles between Olonana and Senteu take their course in 
anticipation that the fights would weaken Olonana’s troops, and would keep 
Olonana concentrated on other things (Ibid.: 540-543).
Roughly from 1900 onwards, the nature of the alliance between the colonial 
administration and Olonana changed. By that time, Olonana had beaten his 
brother and had lost interest in a British partnership, not least because his 
covenant with colonial administrators had damaged his reputation amongst his 
own people. The British, in turn, had also lost interest in cooperation with 
Olonana. Since the late 1880s, the colonial administration had strengthened its 
                                                        
 
1887 (Mackinder 1900: 453); John Walter Gregory, who visited in 1893 (see The Geographical 
Journal of 1893 p. 326-327, author unknown); Captain F.G. Dundas, who visited in 1892 (Gedge 
1892); Georg Kolb, who visited some time between 1894 and 1896 (see The Geographical Journal of 
1899 p. 672, author unknown); Halford John Mackinder, who visited in 1899 (see Barbour 1991); and 
John W. Arthur, who visited no less than six times between 1909 and 1923 (see Arthur 1923). Of all 
these men only Mackinder managed to scale Mt. Kenya’s highest peak. Yet for more than ninety years 
little was known about this particular expedition, and Mackinder’s logbooks were only published 
posthumously in the early 1990s (Barbour 1991).
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grip on the protectorate and it was no longer dependent on the goodwill of 
Maasai leaders (Waller 1976: 548-549).
In the early twentieth century, the plight of Maasai communities changed 
drastically. The British administration had invested a great deal of money in the 
construction of the Mombasa-Uganda railroad, which had turned out to be 
extremely expensive and, in an attempt to earn back some of its investments, it
began to encourage European settlement in Masai Land (Morgan 1963: 144, see 
also chapter two). Yet, to enable such settlement, the Maasai first had to leave the 
area. The colonial administration therefore concluded a treaty with Olonana in 
1904 that compelled the Maasai to leave the Central Rift Valley, as the British 
had come to call the larger part of Masai Land, and forced them to take up 
residency in two Maasai reserves. One was located north of the Mombasa-
Uganda railroad in an area called Laikipia, and one was located in the south. This 
agreement was unique to British East Africa for it granted the Maasai control 
over both reserves ‘for so long as the Masai as race shall exist’ (Hughes 2000: 
224).
The 1904 treaty brought about a major exodus: some 11,200 Maasai and more 
than two million heads of cattle left the Central Rift Valley. Only forty-eight 
Europeans replaced them (Klopp 2001: 487). These Europeans shunned the areas 
that were already densely populated by African farmers, and instead ventured 
into regions that were not yet cultivated due to low fertility. Aided by 
innovations such as the ox-drawn plough and boreholes, pioneer settlers 
nevertheless managed to till these barren lands (Morgan 1963: 146) – especially 
Hugh Cholmondeley, 3rd Baron Delamere, who had come to the area in 1905,
spent vast amounts of money trying to work out how to farm efficiently (Ibid.:
150).
The successes of Lord Delamere and other farmers attracted more Europeans, 
and the protectorate’s white settler community grew steadily. In response, the 
colonial administration revoked the 1904 Maasai treaty. It needed more land to 
accommodate the increasing number of white settlers, and in 1911 it instructed 
the Maasai communities that had migrated to Laikipia to move to yet another 
reserve further south (Kantai 2007; Hughes 2005). The grazing grounds here 
were inferior to those in Laikipia and the Rift Valley, and the Maasai were bitter 
about this second forced relocation. In 1913, they sued the colonial 
administration, but the case was dismissed on technical grounds and the British 
government refused to offer compensation for pastoralist grievances (Hughes 
2006). In the meantime, European settlers established farms all over Laikipia. 
They soon found that Laikipia’s soil was even less fertile than in other parts of 
the Rift Valley, and they turned en masse to livestock farming.
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By the late 1910s, European settlement in the Rift Valley and Laikipia had 
expanded significantly. Especially after the First World War many Europeans 
came to Laikipia, and to the area around the town of Nanyuki more specifically 
(Ochieng’ & Maxon 1992: 139). This was a result of the Ex-Soldier Settlement 
Scheme, which granted demobilized British army officers land in exchange for 
the services they had delivered between 1914 and 1918. The British government 
had come up with the scheme to solve two problems at once. First, it meant to 
strengthen Kenya’s white minority in the face of upcoming African unrest, which 
had resulted from the battles between German and allied armies on African 
territory. Second, Britain suddenly had to shelter large numbers of demilitarized 
men for whom it had little room, and it gladly sent a proportion of them to the 
protectorate (Duder 1993: 70). From the perspective of ex-soldiers, the 
settlement scheme also offered benefits: it provided them an opportunity to farm, 
which had become increasingly difficult in Britain (Hodge 2010: 29); it offered 
them a possibility to escape Britain’s high inflation and unemployment rates 
(Duder 1993); and it gave them a chance to retain at least a middle-class standard 
of living, which their superior racial status guaranteed them on colonial territory 
(Ibid.: 86). In the end, many participants in the Ex-Soldier Settlement Scheme 
lingered in Nairobi and they never claimed their plots. Many sold out, thus 
enabling better-off farmers in Laikipia to build ever-larger estates.
By the 1920s, former Masai Land had become one large European reserve, 
popularly referred to as the White Highlands, which roughly stretched from 
Machakos and Athi Plains in the south to Trans-Nzoia in the north (Morgan 
1963). For decades, only people of European origin were allowed to settle in the
White Highlands, 2 and the region attracted various aristocrats who quickly 
gained the reputation of doing little else but hunting, partying and playing polo. 
These aristocrats largely settled on the slopes of the Aberdares mountain range 
and they became known as the Happy Valley jet set, which included prominent 
figures such as Lord Delamere, Denys Finch Hatton and Josslyn Hay, also 
known as Lord Erroll. Happy Valley was associated with promiscuity, adultery, 
and widespread drug abuse – this reputation further consolidated when, in 1941, 
the noted lady-killer Lord Erroll was murdered by a single shot in the head and 
rumours on who had killed him captivated the public for quite some time.3
                                                        
2 Indians, who had been brought to the protectorate as railroad workers, also tried to obtain land but the 
colonial administration prohibited this until it opened up the highlands for African and Indian 
settlement in 1960 (Morgan 1963; Carey Jones 1965).
3 The Happy Valley lifestyle inspired a number of publications including White Mischief (1982) by 
James Fox, The Life and Death of Lord Erroll: The Truth Behind the Happy Valley Murder (2000) by 
Errol Trzebinksi and Emma Pery, and recently The Temptress: The Scandalous Life and Death of 
Alice de Janzé and the Mysterious Death of Lord Erroll (2010) by Paul Spicer.
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The conditions of the average highland farmer or rancher were far less
glamorous than those of the Happy Valley jet set, and many found themselves 
caught in the ambivalences of the imperial project. For one thing, farming was 
only profitable if it exploited African labour and White Highland farmers 
therefore offered African wage labourers tenant contracts. At the same time, they 
feared that such tenant contracts would foster class awareness, and as such 
inspire otherwise fragmented and isolated African tribes to challenge colonial 
rule together. For that reason, White Highland farmers imposed strict control 
over their African work forces, and supervised them closely (Berman & Lonsdale 
1992). This estranged them from the colonial administration, which publicly 
defended African labour interests and claimed that White Highland farmers 
mistreated their staff (Ibid.).
The colonial administration’s critique on White Highland farmers intensified 
in the 1950s, when African nationalist sentiments were on the rise. These 
sentiments created unrest among the African tenants in the White Highlands, but 
rather than waiting for colonial officers to intervene, farmers typically penalized 
disobedient employees themselves. Already from the beginning of the twentieth 
century farmers had been discontent with colonial legislation: they claimed it was 
ill-suited to tackling their situation, amongst other things because it failed to 
discipline Africans effectively and as such played into increased African 
criminality (Shadle 2010: 516). By the 1950s, such discontent had made way for 
defiance, and most White Highland farmers had simply begun to take the law 
into their own hands. Berman & Lonsdale (1992) suggest that this was more of 
an immediate threat to white hegemony than African nationalist movements, as
the friction between farmers and administrators demonstrated that white rulers 
were not a strong, united block but rather divided on issues of authority and 
control.
After 1963, thousands of European settlers left the White Highlands on 
‘willing buyer, willing seller’ principle (McIntosh 2015: 256). The lands that 
thus became vacant soon fell prey to the struggles between Kikuyu and Kalenjin 
communities and politicians that I described in the previous chapter. The 
situation was somewhat different for Laikipia though, which mainly consisted of 
ranches that required far less manpower than farms. As such, Laikipia had not 
attracted as many African labourers as the Rift Valley had (see Duder & Youé 
1994: 265), and because the region was relatively infertile it largely failed to 
attract the interest of Africans seeking land. But there was one group that did lay 
claim to Laikipia: the Maasai. Shortly before independence, Maasai leaders 
gathered in Thomson Falls and called upon the forthcoming government to give 
them back Laikipia, Nanyuki and an area further north called Samburu. These 
leaders stressed that the 1904 treaty had promised them the reserve for as long as 
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they lived, and they threatened to take the land by force if the new government 
ignored their demands (Anderson 2005B: 559).
Despite these warnings, Jomo Kenyatta’s government did not redress Maasai 
grievances. Rather, it subjected Laikipia’s vacant lands to a variety of other 
purposes. The least infertile properties were included in the Million Acre 
Settlement Scheme and were largely bought by Kikuyu land-buying companies 
(see for instance Carey Jones 1965). Land not suited for agriculture was 
sometimes divided into small African ranches, which soon failed to be 
productive and later typically turned into informal grazing grounds (Graham 
2012: 5). On other occasions, such lands were sold again to Europeans, who 
moved to Kenya in the course of the late 1960s and the early 1970s (Sundaresan 
& Riginos 2010: 18). 
After independence, then, Laikipia turned into a patchwork hosting small-
scale African farming and pastoral communities on the one hand, and massive 
privately owned ranches on the other. These ranches are mostly white-owned but 
not exclusively, for different members of Kenya’s post-independent political elite 
confiscated parts of the former White Highlands – until recently, for instance,
Daniel Arap Moi owned a ranch in the heart of Laikipia, and Mwai Kibaki 
continues to possess a large track of land just outside the town of Naro Moru. 
Nevertheless, Laikipia’s colonial history installed an image of the area as the 
land of ‘Kenyan cowboys’, the colonial nickname for white rangers. This image 
sustains a narrative that pits Laikipia’s white residents against Laikipia’s black 
residents, which obscures the fact that after independence the bigger part of 
Laikipia turned into African smallholder ranches, group ranches or government 
land (Graham 2012: 15). In short, the history of the White Highlands put in place 
colour bar politics that continue to this day. Amongst others, these politics find
expression in white landowners’ recent conversion to wildlife conservation.
From ranches to wildlife sanctuaries
In the course of the 1990s, Laikipia’s white ranchers massively cut back on their 
cattle ranching activities, and some of them left ranching all together. This was a
result of the collapse of Kenya’s livestock industry in the late 1980s, which was 
due to a number of developments. Among others, the input costs for cattle 
farming increased; Kenya lost access to important export markets because of 
revised import regulations and hygiene requirements; and in the mid-1980s the 
Kenya Meat Commission dissolved, which was the country’s main outlet to 
export markets and the most important customer of many ranchers (Heath 2001; 
Sundaresan & Riginos 2010). Consequently, by the 1990s, Laikipia’s white 
landowners began to look for alternative ways to make their land profitable. 
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The options of these landowners were limited because much of Laikipia’s land 
was infertile. But wildlife offered them a prospect. For decades, landowners had 
fought Kenya’s large mammals because they interfered with their businesses, and 
in chapter two I already indicated that the colonial Game Department, later the 
WCMD, considered it one of its prime tasks to protect white settler properties 
against destructive and dangerous wild animals. But when the ranching industry 
collapsed some pioneers, one of which I discuss in full detail in the next chapter, 
began to realize that Laikipia’s wildlife was one of the few resources that the 
area had to offer and that it could be turned into an asset: it could attract 
international conservation funds and it could sustain a game viewing wildlife 
industry. Slowly, some landowners began to welcome wildlife into their 
properties, and turned former ranches into wildlife sanctuaries.
The KWS was not particularly fond of these developments, different wardens 
and rangers told me. From its foundation in 1990, the KWS had sole authority 
over Kenya’s wildlife. When more and more private conservancies popped up in 
Laikipia, roughly from the late 1990s and early 2000s onwards, the KWS 
retained its position of sole lawful supervisor but in practice the organization
increasingly experienced difficulties in enforcing its rule: some private 
conservancies attracted large sums of donor money, and as such became more 
powerful than the underfinanced and understaffed KWS. Among other things,
this resulted in the KWS becoming extra strict about its mandate – the 
organization continuously stressed that, since the Kenyan state was the sole 
lawful owner of all of Kenya’s wildlife, only the KWS was licensed to manage it, 
and it typically accused white landowners of illegally dealing with a state 
resource over which they had no rights. Both rangers and landowners told me 
that this caused serious friction with those who had founded wildlife 
conservancies. Conservancy owners, in turn, maintained that the KWS was an 
amateurish organization that lacked the skills and funds to manage Kenya’s 
wildlife effectively. There was one issue that bothered them specifically: the 
KWS’s imposition of a hunting ban. 
In 1977, Jomo Kenyatta initiated a nationwide ban on hunting. According to 
Gibson (1999: 74), Kenyatta had been under pressure from the World Bank, 
which at the time tried to implement a programme to develop Kenya’s tourist 
sector. Indeed, various observers believe that Kenyatta never had any intention to 
banish hunting for a prolonged period of time. But shortly after the introduction 
of the restriction Kenyatta passed away – his successor Daniel Arap Moi left the 
ban intact, and even expanded it with a ban on the sale of wildlife products 
(Ibid.). The 1989 Wildlife Act, which was drafted under the supervision of 
Richard Leakey after he had become WCMD’s director, adopted both 
prohibitions and further consolidated restrictions regarding the use of wildlife. 
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Laikipia’s white landowners, who were still ranching in the late 1970s, 
opposed the hunting ban from the beginning. Prior to 1977, different forms of 
wildlife killing had been permitted, including sports hunting, bird shooting, 
cropping and culling. After 1977, all of this was prohibited and, for instance,
ranchers were no longer allowed to shoot the lions that killed their cattle or the 
elephants that fed on their crops. To Kenya’s black population such limitations 
were nothing new, it should be noted: their hunting activities had been 
criminalized ever since colonial game laws had come into force in the early 
twentieth century, and their crops and animals had never received any form of 
legal protection (see for instance Steinhart 2006).
When Laikipia’s white landowners eventually left ranching and turned to 
wildlife conservation the ban proved problematic for yet another reason, different 
conservationists told me: it stripped wildlife of economic value because it could 
not be used or sold, and this, in turn, deprived conservation of a commercial 
incentive. In other African countries, such as Namibia, Zambia, Mozambique and 
South Africa, hunting and the sale of hides and tusks finances conservation 
programmes (see for instance Snijders 2014), or pays for community projects in 
the hope that this will make people more agreeable to conservation efforts. The 
latter is based on the presumption that when people benefit from wildlife 
economically, they will have a greater stake in safeguarding it (but see Van der 
Ploeg 2013 chapter 3; Zia et al. 2011) – Büscher (2011) sees this as one of the 
effects of what he has labelled ‘the neoliberalization of nature’. Yet, in Kenya,
the ban on hunting and selling wildlife products largely prevents wildlife from 
bringing in money. The only income it can generate here is through game-
viewing tourism, and in recent years numerous luxury game lodges have 
appeared on Laikipia’s former ranches. But tourism is a shaky industry,
Laikipia’s white landowners emphasized to me, for it depends in large measure 
on the country’s economic and political conditions. 
In 1992, the Kenyan government briefly experimented with the reintroduction 
of legal hunting and it launched a cropping programme in a few selected regions 
(Sundaresan & Riginos 2010), of which Laikipia was one. Jonathan Moss,4 an
ecologist and conservationist living in the area, had been involved in the Laikipia 
cropping programme, and had allocated cropping quota among farmers and 
ranchers. He told me that he believed that the programme was quite effective. At
the same time, however, it suffered from hunting’s association with rich white 
men, which undermined its acceptance as a sound conservation method. 
Eventually, the cropping programme was called off again in 2003, due to, among 
other things, serious criticism from the international animal rights lobby. 
                                                        
4 Conversations on 28 October 2011, Kisima Farm; 22 November 2011, Kisima Farm; 18 April 2012, 
Kisima Farm.
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The animal rights lobby, which finds its origins in the United States, has long 
been present in Kenya and became a powerful actor in the country’s conservation 
scene. It vehemently opposes all forms of killing wildlife and it maintains that 
each and every individual animal has a right to live. It thus extends human ethics 
to animals, and draws the latter into a moral community where all members have 
equal rights to life and liberty (Neumann 2004: 820) – in doing so, it discredits 
nature-culture dichotomies (Haraway 1991). Desmond Morris has traced the rise 
of the animal rights movement to a prominent Kenyan couple called George and 
Joy Adamson (Martin 2012: 24). George Adamson worked for the Kenya Game 
Department as a senior warden, and together with his wife raised three orphaned 
lion cubs. The couple took the cubs into their home, and Joy Adamson wrote a 
book on their escapades called Born Free: A Lioness of Two Worlds (1960) that 
was made into a movie in 1966. Both the book and the film were a huge success, 
and fundamentally changed the way in which an entire generation looked at 
wildlife: before the Adamsons, wildlife conservation was an issue for the mind, 
but with Born Free it became an issue of the heart. (Martin 2012: 24). The work 
of George and Joy Adamson resonated with ethologists and zoologists such as 
Jane Goodall, Dian Fossey and Iain Douglas-Hamilton, who further 
anthropomorphized animal habits and used their research results to underscore 
the sentient capacities of, in this case, chimpanzees, gorillas and elephants. To 
this day, the animal rights movement uses the outcomes of this and similar 
research to underscore the cruelty and immorality of hunting (Ibid.: 91).
Different conservationists and white landowners told me that over the years 
the animal rights movements largely came to control the KWS, as the little 
international funding the organization received came from animal rights 
organizations. The International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), perhaps the 
most vocal animal rights movement in Kenya, for instance, sponsored a number 
of KWS patrol cars and formed a partnership with the organization to jointly 
manage two National Parks (IFAW n.d.). White landowners indicated to me that 
the animal rights lobby’s grip on, among others, the KWS manifested itself in 
how the organization dealt with problem animals that had destroyed properties, 
or that had injured or killed people. In the past, such animals were simply shot,
but the hunting ban made the KWS turn to relocation projects instead. 
Landowners and conservationists stressed that such operations are very costly 
and largely ineffective, for problem animals usually continue to create problems 
after they are moved elsewhere. Also, the bureaucratic hoops that landowners 
need to leap through to get such relocations organized are time-consuming, and 
to some seem never-ending (see also Martin 2012: 185). In exceptional cases, for 
instance when wildlife causes havoc to entire villages, the KWS does shoot 
animals. But according to a young white landowner who has a property close to 
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
116 
 
Mt. Kenya such shoots are appalling, for untrained KWS rangers do not know 
how to do the job and cause unnecessary harm and suffering to animals. His 
statement echoed an old colonial sportsmen’s attitude (see Steinhart 2006: 69),
but also resembled the animal rights movement in the sense that it likewise
applied ethic standards to the handling of wildlife. 
In sum, the various ranchers-turned-conservationists whom I spoke to all 
considered the 1989 Wildlife Act to be outdated and inappropriate for the various 
conservation dilemmas that the country faced – their dissatisfaction with Kenya’s 
legislation is slightly reminiscent of how White Highland settlers had opposed 
the colonial administration’s legislation in the 1950s that I discussed earlier. On 
many occasions, Laikipia’s white landowners and conservationists told me that 
the government should reintroduce hunting, for Kenya could then adopt 
conservation models that also worked in South Africa and Namibia. Again and 
again they juxtaposed Kenya’s rampant poaching with the prosperity of wildlife 
in these countries, and they argued that Kenya’s steady decline in wildlife 
numbers could only he halted if the 1989 Wildlife Act was revised. Yet, the 
animal rights movement’s hold on the KWS hindered this. 
In the mid-2000s, the 1989 Wildlife Act was subjected to a review process. 
Norton-Griffiths (2007) suggests that Kenya’s politicians were not necessarily 
opposed to legal changes that would allow for certain forms of hunting, but that 
they were continuously restrained by NGOs like IFAW, Born Free, Action Aid 
and Humane Society, which funded the larger part of Kenya’s conservation 
programmes. In 2004, an amendment to the 1989 Wildlife Act passed, but the 
president refused to sign it – according to Norton-Griffiths this was again due to 
NGOs threatening to withdraw their funds. In September 2006, the review 
process continued, but by that time animal rights organizations had had ample 
opportunity to think up a strategy and IFAW launched a nationwide anti-hunting 
campaign that proved quite effective. Norton-Griffiths further suggests that large 
animal rights organizations paid local activists to disturb seminars and meetings 
(2010: 30), and established undercover branches that pretended to be grassroots 
NGOs (Ibid.). One of these NGOs was particularly aggressive, and its members 
threatened to shoot hunters if the government dropped the ban (Ibid.). 
In 2007, the government finally announced it would vote on a bill that meant 
to revise the 1989 Wildlife Act. Yet, the bill was almost entirely drafted by one 
IFAW consultant (Norton-Griffiths 2010: 30) and it left the hunting ban 
untouched. It did not pass parliament and, although other bills were drafted in 
subsequent years, nothing effectively changed: the hunting ban continued to pit 
pro-hunting conservationists and landowners against animal rights organizations 
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and the KWS. Anthony King,5 the former director of a conservation platform 
called the Laikipia Wildlife Forum that intends to bring together Laikipia’s 
various inhabitants on the theme of wildlife conservation, to whom I have spoken 
on several occasions, was once quoted by Martin (2012) as saying that IFAW’s 
presence in Kenya is highly problematic because it experiences little resistance 
from counter groups. ‘Though it is small potatoes in Washington or London, 
IFAW is very big in Nairobi’ he said (Martin 2012: 83), and stressed that 
organizations like IFAW managed to secure their position in Kenya through 
buying the support of politicians. Another conservationist told me that there are 
organizations in the country that do not support the agenda of the animal rights 
movement, but that they keep a low profile out of fear that incumbent politicians 
or animal rights defenders might otherwise sabotage their work. He added that he 
knew quite a number of frontmen of such organizations – in private, these 
frontmen agreed with his own pro-hunting attitude, but in public they defended 
the ban on hunting. 
Due to a number of developments, which I will discuss in the next chapter, the 
alliance between animal rights organizations and the KWS weakened after 2010. 
One effect was that the KWS sought closer cooperation with private conservancy 
owners, and the former hostility between them was partially replaced by an 
increasing number of private-public partnerships. At the same time, the unease 
between the KWS and Laikipian conservancy owners continued. The latter, for 
instance, typically quote sources that suggest that about 60 to 70 percent of 
Kenya’s wildlife is currently found on privately owned lands (see for instance 
Martin 2012: 32; or Norton-Griffiths n.d.) – according to the KWS officials I 
spoke to, such statics are flawed, and exaggerate the proportion of wildlife that 
exists outside national parks and reserves. They added that private landowners 
deliberately dramatize numbers to make themselves look more important and to 
attract more funding from international donor organizations. Whoever is right in 
this discussion, at present all but two of Laikipia’s former ranches have 
converted to wildlife conservation. Today, most white landowners host game 
viewing lodges, organize safari tours, or provide for conservation and research 
programmes. Some, such as Ol Pejeta Conservancy and Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy, have even managed to establish high-profile wildlife reserves that 
operate on a budget of a few million dollars (see for instance Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy’s 2011 annual report).
Today, wildlife conservation enables Laikipia’s white landowners to make 
their lands productive in the wake of the collapse of the ranching industry. But 
                                                        
5 Conversations on 16 August 2011, LWF office Nanyuki; 16 September 2011, Nanyuki Town; 23 
November 2011, Nanyuki Town; 23 August 2012, TNC & KWS Stakeholder Meeting Nairobi. 
Anthony King tragically died after a plane crash on Mt. Kenya in February 2013.
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from a government perspective it is not clear what all these private conservancies 
bring to the table, Anthony King once explained to me. He stressed that in the 
main private conservancies do not offer much jobs, and also fail to generate 
much revenue – on the contrary, many struggle to survive. He added moreover 
that a few conservancies are located on land that is just fertile enough to 
cultivate, which gives way to the question whether one should aspire to keep 
wildlife when one could also grow crops and contribute to the national food 
supply. Jonathan Moss further stressed how controversial this matter is and 
explained that, in a country that experiences recurrent droughts and famine, a 
landowner can hardly justify giving up arable land for tourist recreation. Such an 
argument was not only made for farming but also for ranching and Jackie 
Kenyon, one of the two landowners who thus far refuses to participate in 
Laikipia’s wildlife conservation industry, applied exactly the same rhetoric in an 
interview with an environmental reporter:
Wildlife is not the issue of primary concern. What is primary concern? Food. People are 
growing hungry in Kenya. A thousand sacks of grain were distributed for famine relief in 
Nanyuki alone last week, and conditions are much worse in the north. […] We can’t afford 
to turn all the rangelands into conservancies. Even with multiple-use management – cattle 
production as well as wildlife preservation […] – you simply can’t produce enough meat to 
satisfy domestic needs. Feeding the nation has to be paramount. 
Martin (2012: 182-183)
Such a moral rejection of Laikipia’s near-total conversion to wildlife 
conservation resonated with the fact that, for a long time, private conservancies 
had no legal foundation.6 ‘Private conservation’ was an informal type of land use 
not acknowledged in any law. In the late 1990s, the government adopted an act 
that could endow private land with an environmental easement,7 which stated:
The object of an environmental easement is to further the principals of environmental 
management set out in this Act by facilitating the conservation and enhancement of the 
environment, in this Act referred to as the benefited environment, through the imposition of 
one or more obligations in respect of the use of land, in this Act referred to as the burdened 
land, being the land in the vicinity of the benefited environment.
Environmental Management and Coordination Act Kenya (1999: section 1112)
But the landowners I talked to had been especially wary of the ‘imposition of one 
or more obligations in respect of the use of land’, and no one had dared to apply 
for an environmental easement for it was not at all obvious how such an 
easement could inhibit future land use changes if, at a certain point, wildlife 
conservation proved no longer feasible or possible. As such, Laikipia’s 
                                                        
6 This changed in 2013 when a new Wildlife Act was adopted. In the next chapter, I devote more 
attention to this.
7 Cambridge Dictionary defines an easement as ‘the use of someone else’s property or land for a stated 
reason’.
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
119
 
conservancy owners found themselves in an ambivalent position: on the one 
hand, different international conservation organizations supported and funded 
their work; on the other hand, there was always a risk that the government would 
intervene since their activities were technically illegal.
In addition to such legal uncertainties, Laikipia’s wildlife conservancies were 
also criticized by neighbouring African communities that had never opted to be 
surrounded by more wildlife, but which nevertheless had to deal with it. Most 
importantly, once ranchers en bloc turned to wildlife conservation many nearby 
community settlements were increasingly affected by human-wildlife conflicts –
from the perspective of a subsistence farmer whose crops got smashed by 
elephants, or from the perspective of a pastoralist whose cows were killed by 
large predators, Laikipia’s transformation into one big wildlife plain was hardly 
an improvement. Small-scale African farmers in particular expressed their 
dissatisfaction to me numerous times, and the typical complaint was that white 
landowners cared more for wildlife than for the well-being of their African 
neighbours. Besides, people soon realized that Laikipia’s conservation industry 
benefited lodge owners and conservancy owners, but left the majority of the 
region’s residents empty-handed. All this reinforced the colonial stereotype of 
wildlife protection being only a white men’s affair.
Some conservancy owners tried to ameliorate such a reputation, and over the 
years different initiatives were implemented designed to enthuse Laikipia’s 
African communities for wildlife conservation. Amongst these initiatives was the 
construction of a fence, called the Laikipia West Fence, which stretched over 
more than 160 kilometres and which was meant to keep wildlife away from 
villages. There were also projects that tried to encourage pastoralists to build 
bomas, predator-proof livestock enclosures, in order to keep cattle safe at night. 
But sooner or later these initiatives ran into trouble for a variety of reasons,
including lack of funding, technical difficulties, or an overall lack of community 
support. In recent years, conservancy owners have taken a different approach and 
began to implement corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes. In 2011 
and 2012, when I lived in Nanyuki, CSR and the variant ‘community work’ had 
become the buzzwords of Laikipia’s conservation scene.
Because Kenya’s wildlife is a state-owned asset and due to the hunting ban, 
different conservancy owners and conservationists stressed the importance of 
CSR programmes to me: it offers one of the few opportunities to let local 
communities experience the benefits of conservation and, as such, it can motivate 
them not to fight against but sympathize with Laikipia’s conservation industry. 
Charlie Wheeler,8 chairman of a trust that looks after a patch of forest located 
close to Mt. Kenya, explained to me that conservancy owners who sit back and 
                                                        
8 Conversation on 16 July 2012, Ngare Ndare Forest Platform.
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watch people around them grow discontent will inevitably run into trouble. ‘A
poor neighbour is a bad neighbour,’ he indicated, and he called for a proactive 
attitude towards building community credit. This could be done, for instance,
through opening clinics and schools, or proving for micro-credit, which all had 
the potential to cultivate goodwill and hence improve the relation between 
Laikipia’s black and white inhabitants. Yet, only the most successful 
conservancies, such as Ol Pejeta Conservancy and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, 
had the budgets to make any significant contributions to community work –
others typically already struggled to cover operational costs alone, and as such 
CSR further reinforced the separation of flourishing and affluent conservancies 
on the one hand and the less fortunate on the other. 
Laikipia’s CSR programmes turned several of Laikipia’s conservancies into 
powerful development agents and some, such as Ol Pejeta Conservancy, came to 
invest millions of dollars in community development programmes (Ol Pejeta 
Conservancy n.d.). But contrary to what the websites of this and other 
conservancies suggest, Laikipia’s CSR programmes do not have a 
straightforward positive effect and they certainly do not make communities more 
appreciative of nature conservation per se. Ben Wandago 9 from the African 
Wildlife Foundation (AWF), an organization that sponsored Ol Pejeta’s 
transition from ranching to conservation, told me that communities often realize 
very well that CSR programmes reinforce power inequalities – the ‘gifts’ that 
communities receive come with strings attached (see also Rajak 2011, especially 
chapter one) and aim to manipulate recipients into becoming environmentally-
friendly subjects (see also Agrawal 2005 on environmentality). AWF’s employee 
added that there is a paradox in Laikipia’s CSR projects. Communities do need 
funding to establish schools, clinics and so forth, he maintained, but they would 
arguably be better off if they received such funding directly, rather than through 
wildlife conservancies that, ironically, are themselves dependent on donor money 
– when wildlife conservancies carry out community work, they add an 
unnecessary level of administration to an already complicated affair.
Different people offered me examples of situations in which CSR programmes 
had backfired. Someone who himself participated in community work for 
instance claimed that the huge amounts of money that some conservancies spend 
on CSR raise expectations among communities. He said that some of these 
communities had become quite demanding, and sometimes even bullied 
conservancy owners until they were promised further financial support. He 
underscored that this was particularly troublesome for conservancies that 
operated on a small budget and struggled to survive economically – large and 
successful conservancies like Lewa Wildlife Conservancy or Ol Pejeta 
                                                        
9 Conversation on 23 July 2012, AWF office Nanyuki.
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Conservancy had the funds to meet community demands, but many others had 
not.
In sum, CSR is an ambivalent yet indispensible tool for conservancy owners 
who intend to remain on good terms with their neighbours. Yet, there are a few 
white landowners with such a bad reputation that community work cannot 
redeem them. Among them is Kuki Gallmann, an Italian-born who came to 
Laikipia in 1972. She wrote different novels on her emigration to Kenya10 that
became instant bestsellers, one of which was turned into a movie. Gallmann is
the owner of a property called Ol Ari Nyiro, which used to be a cattle ranch, but 
was converted into a wildlife reserve known today as the Laikipia Nature 
Conservancy. By 2012, many Laikipian landowners and conservationists had 
come to conceive of Gallmann as the epitome of conservation gone wrong. 
Apparently, Gallmann lacked the tact and diplomatic skills necessary to win over 
communities and politicians, and she crossed swords with one particular Member 
of Parliament called Mwangi Kiunjuri. The recounting of Gallmann’s precarious 
situation that follows below is a compilation of the various pieces of the story 
told to me by a dozen landowners, conservancy managers and conservationists 
working in the area.
In 2012, elections were again pending. After these elections, Kenya’s 
government system would decentralize and the country would be divided into 
forty-seven counties, all headed by a governor who would be given a certain 
degree of decision-making power. Mwangi Kiunjuri aspired to become the 
governor of Laikipia County, and already in early 2012 he began campaigning 
for votes. He knew that most votes could be won from Laikipia’s African 
communities, as they far outnumbered white landowners, and so he tried to 
appeal to these communities by openly sympathizing with their grievances about
human-wildlife conflict. Conservancy owners had expected Kiunjuri to do this,
because he had long been known as a fierce opponent of wildlife conservation: in 
2007, for instance, he allegedly instigated communities to invade Ol Jogi, a 
conservancy in the heart of Laikipia owned by a billionaire family from New 
York.
To buttress his governorship campaign, Mwangi Kiunjuri singled out Kuki 
Gallmann and used her as a ‘punch bag’, as one of my informants put it. It was 
no secret that Gallmann had a particularly troublesome relationship with her 
neighbours. On different occasions, animals coming from the Laikipia Nature 
Conservancy had attacked villagers, and some victims had died of their injuries. 
The villagers living in the vicinity of Laikipia Nature Conservancy accused 
Gallmann of not taking responsibility for her animals, and demanded that she put 
up a fence. For a long time Gallmann refused to do so – when a fence was 
                                                        
10 Such as I dreamed of Africa (1991), African Nights (1994) and Night of the Lions (1999). 
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eventually constructed Gallmann failed to maintain it properly and the wildlife 
on Laikipia Nature Conservancy continued to stray outside the property. A 
geographer from Cambridge, who did research on Laikipia’s fence network, told 
me that this had encouraged villagers to collect funding themselves and build a 
second fence. Yet, this fence was also not maintained and similarly failed to 
solve the problem. 
Kiunjuri capitalized on the existing tensions between Kuki Gallmann and her 
neighbours, and used Laikipia Nature Conservancy to illustrate the harm that 
wildlife conservation did to Africans. At a certain point, Kiunjuri even threatened 
to sue Gallmann for failing to address the issue and for causing human suffering, 
and he told her and other former ranchers to keep their wildlife on their
properties. Meanwhile, newspapers regularly published articles with headlines
such as ‘Kiunjuri Strengthens Case Against Ranchers’ (The Star, 22 February 
2012) and ‘Elephant Raid Victim Buried in Laikipia’ (The Star, 2 January 2012), 
pouring further oil on the fire. 
Mwangi Kiunjuri’s hostility towards Laikipian conservancies in general and 
towards Kuki Gallmann in particular paid off, and it gave him widespread 
popular support. Mordecai Ogada,11 who directed the Laikipia Wildlife Forum 
after Anthony King, explained that Kiunjuri realized very well that the vast 
majority of Kenya is rather poor and looks for someone to blame its poverty on. 
‘He decided to offer them a scapegoat’, Ogada pointed out. Gallmann, in the 
meantime, used the events to demonstrate to her fans and her donors the 
hardships of her condition, and promoted an image of herself as a tenacious
fighter who would not succumb to bullying and intimidation. Contrary to private 
conservancy owners who try to cultivate relations of dependency through CSR 
projects, Gallmann explicitly took a position against her African neighbours. 
Ogada summarized her plight as follows:
Her fame, her acclaim, is like the movie about her. It’s all about a single white woman, 
surrounded by enemies. The problems she faces serve her image well, it suits her narrative. 
[…] People [abroad] admire her. They admire that she doesn’t go back to Italy. This all feeds 
into the hype, and the story about her is now bigger than herself.
In the course of 2012, Mwangi Kiunjuri’s initially harsh tone softened. He 
continued to demonize Kuki Gallmann, but he also became more amiable to 
other white conservancy owners. Max Graham,12 a British environmentalist and 
founder of a local conservation organization, interpreted this change as an 
indication that Kiunjuri had realized that Laikipia’s conservancies could be of 
service to him after all, for instance because he could impose high taxes and 
                                                        
11 Conversations on 25 May 2012, LWF office Nanyuki; 9 July 2012, LWF office Nanyuki.
12 Conversations on 7 June 2012, Space for Giants office Nanyuki; 26 July 2012, Space for Giants office 
Nanyuki.
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expensive permit systems on them once he was Laikipia county governor. 
Besides, the manager of Ol Pejeta Conservancy told me, Kiunjuri was made to 
understand that if white landowners were forced to leave Laikipia then their 
manifold CSR programmes would also come to an end. Ol Pejeta Conservancy 
had explained this carefully to the neighbouring communities that it supported, 
and had told villagers that a vote for Kiunjuri could mean the end of their schools 
and hospitals. As soon as Kiunjuri got wind of this he sought an alliance with Ol 
Pejeta Conservancy, and the manager concluded: ‘Kiunjuri will not attack us, for 
if he would he would lose the votes of all the communities that we have invested 
in’.
In the end, Mwangi Kiunjuri did not win the elections. Nevertheless, the 
events around his campaign tour had once again exposed the vulnerable and 
uncertain position of conservancies, related to, among other things, the lack of an 
adequate legal framework, the difficulty of encouraging communities for wildlife 
preservation, and the image of the conservation industry as a white man’s 
concern. Different conservationists and landowners underscored to me that the 
political capital and goodwill that Laikipia’s conservancy owners will be able to 
cultivate in the near future is going to be decisive for their individual prospects: 
Max Graham indicated that although Kuki Gallmann’s conservancy is one of the 
most interesting properties from an ecological perspective, it is also the least 
likely to survive. If political opposition against Laikipia’s conservationists 
revives she will be amongst the first to leave, he said, for ‘those that don’t 
engage will definitely be immediate targets’.
Mwangi Kiunjuri’s rhetoric, which portrayed Laikipia’s conservation industry 
as an area of conflict that pits white beneficiaries against African victims, was 
not exceptional. I encountered it in the offices of conservation NGOs, during 
community meetings, and in KWS quarters – even conservancy owners 
themselves employed a similar logic in their promotion of CSR projects. This 
illustrates how Laikipia’s relatively recent transformation from cattle ranching to 
wildlife conservation reinforced and consolidated old frictions between the 
region’s black and white residents. At the same time, the racial politics that came 
to characterize Laikipia’s conservation industry were not confined to the topic of 
wildlife and, as the next section discusses, there have been other events that 
illustrate how the colour bar continues to complicate the coexistence of 
Laikipia’s diverse residents.
Maasai grievances and legislative changes
In mid-August 2004, precisely one hundred years after the British government 
and Olonana had agreed that the Maasai would leave Masai Land and settle in 
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two Maasai reserves, there was a Maasai protest in Nairobi. Participants had 
dressed up in the red and blue mashuka (loincloths) that are considered typical 
Maasai dress, and marched on the streets of the capital towards the Ministry of 
Justice and the Ministry of Land. They carried with them a petition, in which 
they stated that Olonana had signed an agreement that lasted ninety-nine years 
and that, anno 2004, the land rights of Laikipia’s white residents had expired. 
The demand of the demonstrators was simple: they wanted the Kibaki 
government to expel Laikipia’s white landowners, and give the Maasai back the 
plains that once had been promised to them (Kantai 2007). 
It was suggested that the protest was the brainchild of a group of prominent 
Maasai lawyers, journalists and NGO activists who pragmatically capitalized on 
the upcoming worldwide attention for the rights of indigenous peoples (Hughes 
2005: 216). Among them were Elijah Marima ole Sempeta, a human rights 
attorney who had hit the headlines the year before when he had sued a mining 
firm called Magadi Soda Company demanding compensation for the people 
whose land it had destroyed, and Johnson ole Kaunga,13 founding father of the 
Indigenous Movement for Peace Advancement and Conflict Transformation 
(IMPACT) (Kantai 2007: 113). The latter also had a track record in indigenous 
rights affairs, and became known for his provocative methods, his extremist 
ideology, and his primordialist understanding of Maasai culture (see for instance 
ole Kaunga 2001). The figureheads behind the protest carefully and deliberately 
staged contemporary Maasai grievances as being a direct result of colonial land 
dispossession, and newspapers that reported on the event showed pictures of 
Maasai protesters carrying placards with texts such as ‘we demand our land back 
from the British!’ and ‘100 years is enough!’ (Kantai 2007: 110). 
A week after the Nairobi protest, a group of Maasai herdsmen cut the fence of 
a white-owned Laikipian estate called Lolldaiga to let their cattle graze. The past 
few months had been extremely dry and grazing land was scarce – as such, 
pastoralists from Kenya’s northern most regions had come down to Laikipia to 
prevent their animals from starving, just like they usually did during dry spells 
(see Heath 2001). In the event of such extreme weather conditions, landowners 
generally condoned pastoralists’ trespassing. But on this particular occasion 
Lolldaiga’s staff reacted aggressively and opened fire once they spotted the 
intruders, perhaps because the Nairobi protest had made them wary of further 
Maasai rebellion. They killed one herdsman on the spot, and left three others 
severely injured (Kantai 2007: 115-116).
After the incident, tensions between pastoralists, Laikipia’s white landowners, 
and the Kenyan government escalated. More invasions occurred, after which the 
government raised the level of security: it organized ground patrols, initiated 
                                                        
13 I briefly met Johnson ole Kaunga on 5 October 2011, Nanyuki Town.
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helicopter surveillances, and arrested more than a hundred pastoralists for 
violating white landowners’ private property rights (Kantai 2007: 116). 
Politicians such as William ole Ntimama, in turn, defended the pastoralists and 
scolded the police (Hughes 2005: 219). In the meantime, international media 
picked up on the situation. These media put anti-white sentiments at the centre of 
attention and drew parallels with Zimbabwe, where, in 2000, land reforms had 
largely resulted in the end of white landownership. They produced headlines 
such as ‘Tribe, Claiming Whites’ Land, Confronts Kenya’s Government’ (The 
New York Times, 25 August 2004) and ‘Masai Invaders Target Last White 
Farmers’ (The Daily Telegraph, 13 September 2004).
In light of these developments, the group of prominent Maasai figures that had 
been behind the mid-August Maasai march organized another demonstration at 
the end of the month. During this second protest demonstrators again set out for 
the Ministry of Land, to get hold of minister Amos Kimunya who had been out 
of office the first time they had tried to deliver the petition. The protesters never 
reached their destination as soon after they took off police forces intervened and 
arrested them in a brutal manner. Camera crews were again present and the 
police’s violent actions were broadcast all over the country. That same evening,
minister Amos Kimunya held a press conference, during which he discarded the 
demands that the protesters made. He stated that the 1904 treaty had not been 
signed for a period of ninety-nine years but for a period of nine-hundred-ninety-
nine years, and he stressed that the Maasai encroachment of white lands was 
illegal and criminal. In hindsight, some observers added that the entire affair had 
rested on yet another misunderstanding: in 1904 Laikipia was given to the 
Maasai not taken from them, and protesters had confused the 1904 treaty with the 
events of 1911 (see for instance Hughes 2005). But in the heat of the moment the 
parties involved in the conflict had little attention for the historical accuracy of 
the Maasai activists’ claims, and instead had concentrated on defending their 
interests (Ibid.: 221). 
After Amos Kimunya’s television appearance the farm invasions stopped, and 
the agitation that plagued Laikipia for several weeks died down. Nevertheless,
the damage had been done: the incidents had reinforced Laikipia’s image as neo-
colonial territory where black fights white and vice versa. Such an image 
oversimplifies the complexity of the Maasai land debate, and it has been 
suggested that contemporary Maasai resentments are not only the effect of 
colonial land displacement policies, but also relate to how successive post-
colonial governments have shown little interest in redressing the colonial 
injustices done to Maasai groups (Hughes 2005; Kantai 2007). After all, the 1962 
meeting at Thomson Falls had not convinced Jomo Kenyatta of the need to 
attend to Maasai hardships, and since then Maasai groups have largely been 
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denied the political space to make their grievances heard (Kantai 2007: 109). But 
the colour bar politics that came to characterize the 2004 Maasai campaign 
effectively obscured this.
Although Kibaki’s government managed to abate the Maasai uprisings in 
2004, there continued to be rumours about Africans organizing themselves to 
reclaim white-owned lands in 2011 and 2012. One afternoon, for instance, I
chatted with a Kikuyu friend in front of the house that I rented, who told me she
had just overheard people talking about confiscating white properties during the 
matatu (minivan) ride home. Such talk was arguably boosted by a set of 
legislative changes that hung over white landowners’ property rights at the time, 
and which followed the adoption of a new constitution in 2010.
As mentioned earlier, during its 2002 electoral campaign, NaRC had promised 
to review the existing constitution. Yet almost immediately after he was 
appointed, Mwai Kibaki largely lost interest in changing legislation. 
Nevertheless, in 2005 there was a national referendum on a draft constitution that
had been drawn up by the Attorney-General Amos Wako, and which became 
known as the Wako Bill (see also Berman et al. 2009; Lynch 2006B). Although it 
was expected that the Wako Bill would decentralize the central government’s 
authority, it continued to vest decision-making power largely in the presidential 
seat. Different NaRC politicians who had fallen out with Kibaki, among whom 
Raila Odinga, therefore claimed that the bill had no intention of changing
anything at all, and that it only further consolidated Kikuyu power. These 
politicians organized a provocative and powerful campaign against the Wako Bill 
(Lynch 2006B), and during the referendum the majority of Kenyans indeed voted 
against. After that, the constitutional reform process again came to a standstill.
The situation changed in the aftermath of the 2007 elections. At the time,
Mwai Kibaki had formed an alliance with several parties that supported his re-
election, called the Party of National Unity (PNU). PNU’s main opponent was 
Raila Odinga, who after the 2005 constitutional referendum had founded his own 
party called the Orange Democratic Party (ODM).14 Immediately after the votes 
had been counted Kibaki announced that PNU had won, and he immediately took 
the presidential oath. ODM found Kibaki’s hurried inauguration suspicious and 
accused PNU of election fraud. Violent riots broke out, primarily in certain 
neighbourhoods of Nairobi and the Rift Valley, during which PNU’s Kikuyu 
followers and ODM’s Kalenjin and Luo followers came to blows. These riots 
were not so much a reaction to the election outcome itself, it has been suggested, 
but to how PNU and ODM election campaigns had again appealed to tribal unity 
                                                        
14 The name of Raila Odinga’s party was inspired by the constitutional referendum, during which 
bananas symbolized a yes-vote and oranges a no-vote.
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and solidarity, and had again revived decades-old Kalenjin frustrations over the 
Million Acre Settlement Scheme (Anderson & Lochery 2008). 
The riots between PNU and ODM followers continued for weeks. Eventually,
former United Nations’ Secretary-General Kofi Annan intervened and mediated 
between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga. At the end of February 2008, when 
more than a thousand citizens had been killed and hundreds of thousands of 
people were fleeing the violence, Kibaki and Odinga finally signed an agreement 
to form a coalition government. Within this coalition Kibaki continued to be 
president, but Odinga was given the post of prime minister that did not yet exist 
in Kenya but was created for the purpose. The UN demanded that this coalition 
government would at last carry through the legislative changes that politicians 
had promised the Kenyan public, ever since the late 1990s. This eventually 
resulted in a number of reforms, including the adoption of a new constitution in 
2010 and the revision of the Land Act in 2012. 
Both the 2010 Constitution and the 2012 Land Act engender a set of problems 
for Laikipia’s white landowners. Firstly, the constitution prescribes that one can 
purchase land and obtain title deeds over it, but that the government is at all 
times entitled to cancel property rights. It reads:
The state may regulate the use of any land, or any interest in or right over land, in the interest 
of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, or land use planning.
The Constitution of Kenya (2010, article 66)
This is not a new arrangement, and regulations similar to this one have existed 
ever since British colonial occupation. Kenyatta’s government left them intact, 
and state control over land rights has complicated white proprietorship from 
1963 onwards. One second-generation landowner offered me a telling example in 
this regard, and recounted the following story to me.
In 1966, his parents had come to Kenya and had bought a cattle farm located 
west of Mt. Kenya and east of the Aberdares mountain range. They intended to 
ranch but there was too much wildlife on the property, which restricted the 
possibilities of livestock farming. After some deliberation his parents had 
decided to cut the ranch in two: all the wildlife would be brought to one part, 
which would be turned into a game park, so that the other part could be used for 
cattle farming. He stressed that his parents had not been conservation idealists, 
but had merely acted out of a business interest – without finding a solution for 
the abundance of wildlife, the ranch could simply not become operational. A few 
years later, at the height of Kenya’s 1970s poaching crisis, the Kenyatta 
government approached his parents and told them it wanted to bring rhinos to 
their game park. His parents initially refused for they feared that these rhinos 
would attract criminal poaching syndicates, and they anticipated that their game 
park-cum-ranch would turn into a combat zone. But the government’s response 
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to their objections was simple: either his parents accepted the decision and 
receive the animals, or the title deeds of their property would be repealed and 
they would be told to leave the country. They chose the first option, and later 
their game park developed into one of Laikipia’s largest rhino breeding grounds. 
Although white landowners’ property rights have long since been subjected to 
the vagaries of incumbent politicians, the 2010 Constitution and the 2012 Land 
Act made white anxieties over the possible loss of title deeds more urgent for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, like the former constitution the new constitution 
defines two types of properties rights: freehold tenure and leasehold tenure. The 
first entails an ‘unlimited right to use and dispose of land in perpetuity subject to 
the rights of others and the regulatory powers of national government, country 
government and other relevant state organs’ (Land Act 2012, article 2), while the 
second entails ‘the grant, with or without consideration, by the proprietor of land 
of the right to the exclusive possession of his or her land, and includes the right 
so granted and the instrument granting it, and also includes a sublease but does 
not include an agreement for lease’ (Ibid.). Put simply, freehold tenure is an 
infinite right to land that includes use and sale, while leasehold tenure grants one 
the right of access and use but does not give one legal ownership entitlements. 
In the past, Kenya’s white landowners were eligible for both freehold and 
leasehold tenure but the 2010 Constitution changed this. It restricts freehold to 
Kenyan citizens, which some white landowners are but others are not, and it 
states:
A person who is not a citizen may hold land on the basis of leasehold tenure only, and any 
such lease, however granted, shall not exceed ninety-nine years.
The Constitution of Kenya, article 65
For landowners who do not have a Kenyan passport this provision is highly 
problematic, because it may imply a conversion of former freehold title deeds 
into leasehold title deeds with an end date. One of the consequences would be 
that their properties would become unsaleable, and therefore without economic 
value (see also Norton-Griffiths 2010: 31). But also, white landowners who do 
have a Kenyan passport have explained this as an intimidating development, for 
it could be indicative of a changing political landscape – taking into account that 
today Kenya hosts a population that exceeds forty-five million, and in the context 
of an ever-growing hunger for land throughout country, these legislative changes 
could be the first steps towards intensified control over white land use, or even 
the abolishment of large white estates.
To this day, the Kenyan government has not challenged white landownership 
rights on the basis of these two pieces of legislation, but different landowners 
have told me that they have been holding their breath ever since 2010. One 
afternoon, for instance, I discussed the situation with a second-generation 
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landowner who inherited his father’s ranch. He tried to explain to me just how 
uncomfortable he felt, and discussed his options with me. One of the things he 
could do is become a full Kenyan citizen, but he anticipated problems in relation 
to obtaining a travel visa for Europe or the United States. He could also acquire 
dual citizenship and appeal to either his parents’ nationality or his Kenyan 
nationality depending on the circumstances, yet he foresaw that this would also 
be problematic: he owned business ventures registered abroad and expected that, 
in case of dual citizenship, two countries would make tax demands. His last 
option was to lie low, follow the developments closely, and endure the
consequences when they presented themselves. This is what he had done thus far, 
but especially the maximum lease term of ninety-nine years continued to bother 
him. He explained to me that the constitution mentions a maximum lease period 
but not a minimum lease period and he feared that, in the end, white leases would 
only cover a few years. Besides, he doubted whether leases would begin on their 
date of issue, or whether they would be given out with retrospective effect – in
case of the latter, one’s title deed could already have expired before one actually 
obtained it.
On another occasion I drove out to one of Laikipia’s few large-scale 
agricultural farms,15 located on Mt. Kenya’s northern slopes in an area called 
Timau. The owner, a young man in his thirties, had inherited the land from his 
grandparents, who had come to Kenya in the early 1920s. He drove me around 
his property in his pickup truck while pointing out all the different activities he 
engaged in, which included cattle ranching, the cultivation of canola and the 
pressing of canola oil, and the cultivation of peas and wheat. He continuously 
stressed how efficient he was, and how well he managed to make the most out of 
every acre he possessed. At the time, one of Kenya’s infamous maize diseases 
had just broken out and African farmers subsequently suffered great food losses 
– this added a sense of urgency to his statements. In the eyes of this landowner, 
efficient management offered the best protection against land seizure and he said:
‘If someone [from the government] comes they can compare my productivity 
with other landowners. If I am producing less I will go, but if I am producing 
more than let me stay and do my work’. He knew that the colonial roots of his 
presence compromised the moral credibility of his land rights (McIntosh 2015: 
252), but by underscoring his attempts to feed the nation in the context of 
recurrent food shortages his proprietorship turned from an ethical dilemma of the 
past into an ethical dilemma of the present. Just before I left, I asked him whether 
he thought he would still be in Kenya in ten years time. ‘I don’t know’ he 
responded, and after a short silence added: ‘actually, it depends on how I get up 
in the morning’.
                                                        
15 Conversation on 5 June 2012.
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One may, or may not, empathize with the plight of either of these two 
landowners. But what is important for my argument is that their fears, 
uncertainties, and ways of dealing with these uncertainties illustrate a mode of 
living that is ingrained in a sense of unpredictability, and that revolves around 
colour bar politics. This sense of unpredictability affects landowners in Laikipia 
as well as elsewhere in the country, and it underscores their ambivalent and 
dubious position. This position is partly the result of particular legislative 
arrangements; at the same time, it also pertains to a black majority that continues 
to denounce their presence – even though this same majority blames the 
impoverishment of a large part of society at least as much on the greed and 
corruption of post-colonial politicians as on the history of white domination. The 
public reception of the ‘Malcolm Bell case’ is exemplary in this regard. In 2012,
Malcolm Bell, a white farmer from Nakuru in the Rift Valley, won a court case 
against former president Daniel Arap Moi over land rights. Moi was never 
popular and he was widely associated with the repression, torture and murder of 
political opponents as well as with the accumulation of excessive wealth that 
impeded national progress. But in spite of this, McIntosh (2015: 261-262) 
suggests, the general public displayed more dismay over a white man winning 
land from a black man than over Moi’s former crimes and offences.
Ever since independence, white landowners have employed a variety of 
strategies to minimize the risk of expulsion: some bowed to government 
authority and kept in step with national regulations; some counted on the support 
and political capital of donor organizations or private investors; and some 
deliberately sought alliances with high-ranking politicians. All these strategies 
have one thing in common: they highlight that owning land in Kenya is primarily 
a political matter. Often, I have heard landowners or other observers drawing 
parallels between white landowners in Kenya and white landowners in 
Zimbabwe, just as journalists did when they had reported on the 2004 Maasai 
campaign. On the one hand, the land reforms that the Zimbabwean government 
implemented in 2000, which caused a rampant storming of white farms (see for 
instance Wolmer 2007), did not precisely reassure Laikipia’s white landowners. 
On the other hand, a certain degree of resignation seemed prevalent, stemming 
from the fact that, although white land rights have been at stake for over five 
decades, a large-scale eviction thus far has not taken place. In the end, many 
deemed it unlikely that a ‘Zimbabwe-thing’ would happen in Kenya, especially 
because the expulsion of white farmers and ranchers would scare off foreign
investments. The depth of these comments only sank in after I had returned from 
my fieldwork. In September 2013, the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi 
became the target of a terrorist attack that eventually lasted several days –
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immediately after news on the raid spread, the president held a press conference 
in which he reassured the safety of all tourists and investors.
Still, in the face of looming uncertainties some white landowners have 
indicated to me that they are prepared to take drastic measures if need be. ‘I don’t 
think that a Zimbabwe-thing will happen here’ a third-generation landowner for 
instance told me, ‘but if it would I will fight it with my life’. Contained in this 
statement is the idea that land is a non-transferable family asset that merits the 
utmost protection, and this landowner’s strong reaction suggests that his property 
is crucial for his identity and his place in Kenyan society.16 While Boer groups in 
South Africa already in the 1990s claimed that, after so many generations of 
settlement, they are as indigenous to South Africa as the country’s black 
population (Kuper 2003: 389), the historical presence of the descendants of 
White Highland settlers still seems too frail to make a convincing case for 
autochthony. Nevertheless, some, like the landowner above, are drawing on 
arguments that link rights to soil to historical occupation and kinship relations 
(see also McIntosh 2015). As such, the contemporary opponents of continued 
white presence are beginning to be fought with their own weapons.
A spectrum of white
So far I have concentrated on how Laikipia’s colonial history engendered colour 
bar politics, and I have discussed a variety of ways in which the colour bar 
continues to divide black and white. Here and there I have argued that the colour 
bar oversimplifies the complexity of Kenya’s political arena – among other 
things I have drawn attention to Mwangi Kiunjuri’s alliance with Ol Pejeta, and I 
have pointed out that contemporary Maasai grievances are partially but not 
exclusively the result of colonial relocation policies. In this section, I continue to 
focus on something that colour bar politics obscure: namely, that Laikipia’s 
white landowners are not a homogeneous, undifferentiated group. Rather, they 
are divided on a range of topics, and individual endeavours to be accepted as 
legitimate residents have come to alienate some landowners from others. 
Firstly, Laikipia’s recent transformation to wildlife conservation gave way to 
upcoming tourism, and the number of Laikipian lodges and camps grew steadily 
over the years – according to Mordecai Ogada, by 2012, approximately 90% of 
Laikipia’s former ranches offered some sort of tourist shelter. But tourism is an 
unpredictable and fickle source of income. After the political violence of 2007 
and 2008, for instance, the country’s entire tourist industry collapsed and took 
years to recover. Besides, in comparison with other Kenyan safari destinations, 
                                                        
16 This is reminiscent of Wiener’s (1992) category of inalienable artefacts, where possession assigns 
social identity as well as political rank and authority.
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such as Masai Mara or Amboseli, tourism in Laikipia is still in its infancy. The 
region is not, or at least not yet, the type of visitor hotspot that these two areas 
came to be. Due to these circumstances, there is competition over clients, and in 
mid-2012 Ogada offered me an example of how this affected relations between 
white neighbours. He told me of a landowner who had pitched a camp that could 
be seen from the lodge on the property of an adjacent landowner. The latter, 
whom had been in business first, felt disadvantaged because the camp had 
spoiled the view from his lodge, which he could no longer advertise as located in 
a ‘wild’ and ‘pristine’ area. I was told he was determined to recover the estimated 
financial losses from his neighbour. 
Because tourism does not offer a reliable income, most white-owned lands are 
also subjected to other activities. For instance, a small number of landowners 
continues to ranch. Critical observers ridicule this and maintain that cattle 
breeding and wildlife conservation are two irreconcilable activities, due to, 
among other things, the transmission of diseases and competition over grazing 
lands (see also Martin 2012: 182). But those who do combine the two, such as Ol 
Pejeta Conservancy, maintain that the activities can go hand in hand – the
manager of Ol Pejeta Conservancy even indicated that more and more 
landowners are considering a reintroduction of cattle, primarily because the 
presence of livestock seems to decrease thick infections amongst certain wildlife 
species. In areas that receive relatively much rainfall, typically those located 
close to Mt. Kenya, landowners have converted to flower farming or have 
handed out flower farming leases to third parties – especially the northwestern 
and southwestern side of the mountain witnessed an influx of flower farming 
businesses in recent years. Today, there are many disputes over whether or not 
these flower farms should be allowed to make use of the region’s constrained 
water sources and each dry season, when the water surface of rivers falls 
dramatically and some rivers dry up entirely, flower farmers are castigated by 
both black and white water-deprived residents. In response, flower farmers now 
play up the results of water offtake studies17 that suggest that it is not they, but 
small-scale African farmers who use inefficient and irresponsible irrigation 
methods that deplete Laikipia’s water sources. 
The presence of British Army training troops is another issue that complicates 
the relationship between white landowners. The British Army Training Unit 
Kenya (BATUK) has long had a base camp in Nanyuki, as well as several 
training camps located further north where it prepares soldiers for war zones such 
as Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, the area permanently hosts a large number 
                                                        
17 These studies were carried out by Rural Focus Ltd., a Nanyuki-based consultancy firm founded by 
two American engineers. I talked to founder Tom Traexler on 5 October 2011, Rural Focus Ltd. office 
Nanyuki; 9 November 2011, Rural Focus Ltd. office Nanyuki.
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of British soldiers: according to the wife of a former BATUK officer, groups of 
approximately one thousand trainees rotate every six weeks; in addition, there is 
a training crew that stays for six months as well as a small permanent staff on 
two-year contracts that usually come with families. 
Traditionally, BATUK trained its soldiers in a camp in the vicinity of Archer’s 
Post in Samburu region, and in a camp close to Dol Dol in northern Laikipia. But 
between 2001 and 2011 these camps got caught up in two controversial court 
cases. In the first, Maasai communities living in the area claimed that BATUK 
had been reckless with its ammunition and had left unused explosives in the 
field. Pastoralists maintained that this had caused severe injuries to more than 
two hundred people over the past decades, and that it had killed another fifty. In 
the second, Maasai women claimed that BATUK soldiers had raped them for 
years, and they pointed to their half-blood children as evidence. 
In both court cases Johnson ole Kaunga, who also played a pivotal role in the 
2004 Maasai campaign, took a leading role and he presented himself as the 
spokesman of all Maasai victims. He formed a partnership with a London-based 
solicitor called Martyn Day, who came from a law firm with a track record in 
handling international scandals: his company, for instance, sued Anglo American 
South Africa Ltd. for the bad working conditions of South African miners, and it 
represented Guantanamo Bay prisoners. Martyn Day pressed charges against the 
British government for the misbehavior of its soldiers, but the latter denied 
responsibility. In the end, the case on the injuries was settled in 2002, and about 
thirteen hundred pastoralists received compensation that amounted to £4.500.000 
(LeighDay n.d.). The case on the sexual abuses lasted much longer, and was 
eventually dropped due to lack of evidence in 2011. 
In Nanyuki, people seemed uncertain about how to judge the situation. Many 
felt ambivalent about the fact that only Maasai groups had complained about 
BATUK’s ill practices, and there was considerable talk about how the 
compensation money that the British government had paid in 2002 had primarily 
been spent on alcohol. Some indicated that army discipline ensures that 
ammunition stocks are recorded with the greatest precision, and these people did 
not believe that BATUK had been sloppy. A wife of an ex-army officer told me 
that it is no secret that BATUK busses in prostitutes from Nairobi and Mombasa, 
in order to prevent its men from harassing women. She did not believe the rape 
claims and attributed the half-blood children to a nearby catholic mission, where 
it was alleged that the pastors were perhaps not as celibate as they claimed to be.
Whether or not the court cases against BATUK were justified, they at least 
gave the two training camps bad reputations and the continued presence of 
British soldiers in Dol Dol and Archer’s Post became a sensitive issue. Both 
camps are still in use today, but after the Martyn Day affair BATUK also began 
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looking for other training grounds. Different landowners offered them leases, and 
BATUK soldiers subsequently moved to various parts of Laikipia. But a side 
effect emerged: the noise of explosives and shootings scared wildlife that 
typically bolted to neighbouring properties, trampling the surroundings in the 
process. This for instance happened to Enasoit, a property not too far from Dol 
Dol, which was crushed by wildlife after a neighbouring property called 
Lolldaiga had invited BATUK. Enasoit was not pleased and sued the owners of 
Lolldaiga. Ole Naishu, a ranch that today is owned by the CEO of a large Kenyan 
coffee roaster and exporter, had also made a deal with BATUK in the past. 
‘When they were training there’, one of Ole Naishu’s neighbours said, ‘it seemed 
as if the Third World War was being fought next door’. BATUK, in turn, 
responded by implementing its own CSR programme, in the hope of ameliorating
its presence and improving its reputation after the court cases.
When the combined efforts of ranching, conservation, tourism, and handing 
out leases to entrepreneurs or to the British Army did not work, a landowner still 
had one last resort: sell land. Yet, it seemed that when a descendant of a colonial 
or early-postcolonial settler family did so, he or she would be ostracized by the 
rest of Laikipia’s settler community – in general, it seemed that in such cases 
land sales were not taken as an indication of Laikipia’s economic and political 
plight, but as demonstrating a lack of character and perseverance. The owner of 
Solio18 ranch, for instance, bore the brunt of such emotions, and he recounted to 
me how he became Laikipia’s black sheep after he had decided to sell a 
considerable part of his ranch to the Kenyan government. 
In the mid-2000s, Mwai Kibaki’s government had made the owner of Solio 
ranch an offer to buy three thousand acres of land. The government’s official 
reason for this request was that it finally wanted to relocate the people who had 
been evicted from Mt. Kenya’s forests in 1989, as I discussed in chapter two, and 
who had been living on the roadside between the village of Naro Moru and Mt. 
Kenya ever since. Allegedly, the poor conditions of these forest evictees had 
distressed some members of the Kibaki family, who came to the area now and 
then because the president owned a large estate there. The story goes that these 
family members lobbied for a resettlement programme. 
Solio’s owner had agreed to the proposal, but the selling process was tedious 
and took about eighteen months – politicians who also owned land in Laikipia
learned of the deal, and they tried to frustrate the agreement with Solio to sell
their own plots instead. But these politicians could not provide as vast a territory 
as Solio’s owner could, and eventually the latter won the bid. He clarified to me 
that he had had different motivations for the transaction. On the one hand, the 
government’s offer had come at a time when he was just turning his ranch from a 
                                                        
18 Conversations on 8 October 2011, Solio Ranch; 19 July 2012, Solio Ranch.
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beef cattle operation into a milk cattle operation. The latter brought in more 
money, which meant he needed less livestock, which in turn meant he needed 
less terrain. Secondly, he indicated that he had realized all too well just how 
difficult it is to dispose of large ranchlands, for they offer little potential and are 
politically vulnerable. He had understood the government’s offer as an 
opportunity that only comes once. And thirdly, he pointed out that the piece of 
land he had sold was of the most vulnerable category: it was fertile enough to 
farm yet he used it for cattle, and he anticipated that one day someone would 
have imposed land use restrictions upon it. Like other former ranchers, Solio’s 
owner believed that large landownership in Laikipia is on its last legs and he 
aimed to make the most out of it before it finally collapsed.
The rest of Laikipia’s white landowners were not particularly enthusiastic 
about Solio’s move, its owner told me. Some had painted him as a money
grabber, but there was another side to the story as well. The three thousand acres 
that Solio had sold had been teeming with wildlife, which needed to be moved 
elsewhere in order to enable the government’s relocation programme. Initially,
the KWS had tried to move all the animals to what remained of the Solio Ranch, 
but Solio’s owner had fiercely objected to this because he needed the land for his 
milk cattle. Like other former ranchers he did not seem to think much of the 
KWS, and he told me that he been clear to the organization that the wildlife was 
their problem, not his – the argument took place at a time when the KWS still 
claimed the exclusive mandate over Kenya’s state-owned wildlife and 
criminalized private conservancies. Against the background of these conditions, 
Solio’s owner had said to KWS officers something along the lines of ‘this is a 
good exercise for you, now show us that you can manage your assets effectively’.
It was not the first time that Solio’s owner and the KWS had had a different 
perspective on things, and their antagonism already had a history. The 1989 
Wildlife Act indicated that the Kenyan state owned all Kenya’s indigenous 
wildlife species, yet it said nothing about exotic species. Solio’s owner had taken 
advantage of this: he had begun to farm white rhinos, which unlike the black 
rhino is not endemic,19 and sold these animals to ranches in countries such as 
South Africa. He compared it with old French families taking down a painting 
from the wall when short of funds – when he needed money because his cattle 
ranch did not bring in enough, he simply sold a rhino. For a while all went well. 
But then the Kenyan government changed its export regulations, after which he 
could no longer move the animals out of the country. By 2012, Solio’s owner 
was still stuck with approximately 180 white rhinos. They had no economic 
value in Kenya, and he had no purpose for them. 
                                                        
19 White rhinos used to exist in Uganda, Chad, Sudan, Congo and South Africa. Today they are only 
found in the latter two countries (see The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species).
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While the KWS and Solio’s owner argued over who was responsible for the 
wildlife on the three thousand acres of sold land, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy and 
Ol Pejeta Conservancy eventually meddled in the dispute. Both agreed to take 
some animals, and partially funded the relocation of wildlife to other 
conservancies that the KWS had no budget for. Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had 
been especially keen on adopting a particular kind of antelope, but after the 
animals had been moved lions and leopards killed them almost instantly: the 
antelopes had come from a relatively predator-free environment, and as such 
were unaccustomed to Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s circumstances. All in all the 
relocations had been expensive, and both Ol Pejeta Conservancy and Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy were somewhat angry with Solio’s owner for refusing to 
pay. According to Solio’s owner the entire affair caused bad blood – by 2012 he
still largely avoided Nanyuki town, and often kept away from social gatherings.
Who exactly came to inhabit the resettlement programme that Solio’s land sale 
enabled remains a matter of discussion: some say that current inhabitants came 
from Nyeri and acquired plots from politicians in exchange for votes, and others 
say that the programme turned into an Internally Displaced People (IDP) camp 
for the victims of the 2007 and 2008 election riots. Either way, many plots within 
the settlement have been bought and sold since 2009, and at present even 
residents themselves seem uncertain about to whom the land was initially given. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the programme not only benefitted the landless 
and the poor, and when I visited the place in mid-2012 under guidance of 
Anthony Ochino,20 a forester from the Laikipia Wildlife Forum, I observed how 
simple huts alternated with flamboyant houses. During that visit I heard various 
complaints about the hardships of the settlement, and people described, among 
other things, how permanent wind covers everything in dust; how the entire area 
turns into a gigantic mud pool in the rainy season; how there are only a few 
access roads that are all in bad condition; how farming plots are of low quality, 
which makes people largely dependent on relief food; and how in some places 
pastoralists have moved in to graze their cattle, which in itself became a source 
of conflict. 
Although Solio’s land sale received much criticism from other white 
landowners, it seemed that by the early 2010s such sales had become more 
common. These were usually not as drastic as Solio’s, yet different owners had 
sold plots, or were in the process of doing so, to wealthy foreigners looking for 
an idyllic holiday getaway or a family retreat – Ol Pejeta Conservancy even 
announced opening an entire holiday park with about one hundred houses (see 
Mount Kenya Wildlife Estate at Ol Pejeta Conservancy n.d.). This development 
                                                        
20 Conversations on 30 May 2012, LWF office Nanyuki; 6 June 2012, Community Meeting Naro Moru; 
10 July 2012, Solio Settlement visit.
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concerns conservationists who foresee extra pressure on Laikipia’s already-
scarce resources. Mordecai Ogada, for instance, explained that many such luxury 
homes will have swimming pools and lush green gardens, and he feared how that 
would affect the availability of water to African farmers and pastoralists further 
downstream. ‘The demand on natural resources goes up, and up, and up’ he said. 
He added that Laikipia is becoming the victim of the success of its wildlife and 
safari industry, which attracts more and more people to the area. ‘We will be 
strangling ourselves’ he concluded. 
Is Laikipia’s colour bar inescapable?
Today, forty-eight large estates cover about forty percent of Laikipia’s surface. 
The rest consists of African settlements and government land (Graham 2012: 15). 
The owners of these large estates differ greatly in origin, success and financial 
means. For example, there are those who have been born and raised in Laikipia 
and who belong to settler families such as the Craig family, the Dyer family or 
the Murray family. There are also owners from families that came to Laikipia not 
long after independence. Kuki Gallmann is an example in this regard, or Edward 
Parfet, son of mining magnate Courtland Parfet who bought Solio Ranch in 1966. 
One could also count former presidents Daniel Arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki 
among them who, like a number of other politicians, took possession of large 
tracks of lands on Mt. Kenya’s slopes and in Laikipia after 1963. 
Those landowners who have been in Laikipia for a prolonged period typically 
experienced different setbacks, such as the collapse of the ranching industry. 
How they recovered from such setbacks varies: today, some are well off, while
others struggle to survive financially, and there are yet others who have had to 
sell, such as Daniel Arap Moi. In addition to these long-time occupants, Laikipia 
is also home to a handful of successful and wealthy entrepreneurs who have 
bought their estate recently, and who, in general, have little financial incentive to 
make their lands productive. Among them is, for instance, the Kenyan Jeremy 
Block, hotelier and chairman of the coffee chain Dorman Ltd, who bought Ole 
Naishu in the early 2000s (see Rees 2002: 145), or Jochen Zeitz, former chief 
executive of the brand Puma and currently director of the Kering group, who 
bought a property called Segera in 2006 (see for instance Financial Times, 10 
May 2013). One could also count Alec Wildenstein among them, although he 
obtained his estate through his family, which made a fortune in art dealing and 
bought a Laikipian property called Ol Jogi Ranch in 1977 (see for instance How 
To Spend It n.d.). Landowners such as these tend to keep their estates private, or 
occasionally rent out their sumptuous homes for exorbitant prices.
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The properties that offer high-end and extremely luxurious safaris, such as Ol 
Jogi Ranch (see for instance Forbes, 8 September 2014), reinforce the image that 
Laikipia continues to be the playground of the rich and the famous. ‘Many 
people still regard Laikipia as some sort of Happy Valley with Kenyan Cowboys’
Max Graham said to me, after we discussed the area’s land division and its land 
use patterns extensively. But Laikipia is not a Happy Valley: the region’s 
colonial history and the ongoing presence of a few wealthy and influential 
individuals consolidates the idea that Laikipia is exclusively white and rich, yet 
in practice the area is highly diverse and heterogeneous. Nevertheless, the 
narrative of white domination and white opulence has come to demand from all 
white landowners that they should continuously point out what they are worth or 
how they are contributing to the well-being of the nation at large – in short, it 
asks them to substantiate why they should not be expelled.
One result of these dynamics is that many white landowners are cautious. 
Mordecai Ogada once explained to me that most former ranchers and farmers are 
exceptionally careful about complying with all government rules and regulations, 
for they understand very well that people who would rather see them leave will 
use even the smallest mistake as a ‘stick to hit them with’. At the same time,
colour bar politics have made white landowners outspoken on a range of topics: 
especially the country’s inability to feed its own citizens and the state’s failure to 
bring about social improvement have become two strong arguments in debates 
over the legitimacy of white estates, for it enables white landowners to raise 
themselves as food producers and/or CSR development agents. The 
transformation of former ranches into conservation sanctuaries also became a 
powerful rhetorical device – though in light of Kenya’s colonial history, during 
which nature protection served as one oppressive regulatory mechanism amongst 
many, such reasoning seems primarily directed at international audiences and 
funding organizations and is used less in domestic land discussions. Yet there are 
exceptions, such as the Laikipia Wildlife Conservation Strategy.
In January 2013, the Laikipia Wildlife Forum, in cooperation with a local 
conservation organization called Space for Giants, launched a document entitled 
Wildlife Conservation Strategy for Laikipia County 2012-2030 (Graham 2012). It 
was a management plan that had been developed with an eye to the 2013 
elections, and that aimed to buffer the anti-conservation rhetoric of politicians 
such as Mwangi Kiunjuri. The document primarily targeted what many 
conservationists and former ranchers consider to be one of the main obstacles to 
Laikipian wildlife conservation, namely the widespread presence of wastelands. 
Max Graham, who drafted the document, explained the situation to me as 
follows.
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
139
 
At present, approximately half of Laikipia’s land is not claimed or used by its 
legal owner. There are various reasons for this. For one, after independence, the 
Million Acres Settlement Scheme and various group ranch initiatives lured 
African farmers and pastoralists to the area. Yet many of these farmers and 
pastoralists soon found Laikipia too dry and infertile, and left again. There are 
also the properties owned by Kenya’s political elite, or the properties acquired by 
wealthy foreigners who only visit occasionally, which are typically not managed 
and left vacant. As a result, large parts of Laikipia have become deserted. 
These deserted lands bring about a number of problems. Most importantly, 
under changed circumstances of an ever-growing population, Laikipia’s empty 
lands came to attract the attention of pastoralist groups in search of grazing lands. 
These groups took advantage of the ownership vacuum, and took possession of 
the areas that no one else wants or uses. But as there are more deprived 
pastoralists than empty lands, different pastoral groups have come into conflict 
over access rights. Such conflicts are generally fought with arms, which made 
certain parts of Laikipia unsafe and dangerous, and today some areas are in a 
state of anarchy. In addition to such hazards, pastoralists’ usage of empty lands is 
also problematic from a conservation point of view, Max Graham stressed: since 
pastoral groups do not have legal title deeds they lack the incentive to use 
Laikipia’s land in a sustainable manner, he insisted, echoing Garrett Hardin’s 
principle of the tragedy of the commons.21
Max Graham and other conservationists anticipate that the depletion of 
Laikipia’s vacant lands will eventually have various negative consequences. 
Firstly, by the time that these areas are stripped of resources, pastoralists might 
decide to move into properties with more resources and invade white-owned 
conservancies. Secondly, the depletion of about half of Laikipia will pose serious 
limits to the habitat available to wildlife. Conservationists and landowners have 
indicated that, if current trends continue, Laikipia’s private conservancies are 
likely to become isolated conservation islands located in an otherwise barren 
environment. In short, those involved in Laikipia’s wildlife conservation industry 
have at least two strong motives to prevent pastoralists from exhausting 
Laikipia’s wastelands, and in an attempt to alter current circumstances a handful 
of landowners and conservationists teamed up to devise a conservation strategy.
Although all the initiators behind the Wildlife Conservation Strategy for
Laikipia Country 2012-2030 deemed pastoralist invasions an urgent matter, it 
was not easy to draft the document in a way that all parties involved approved of 
                                                        
21 Hardin (1968) argued that all public natural resources will deplete sooner or later for individuals will 
pursue maximum gain, which will result in deterioration. Ecologists and environmentalists continue to 
use Hardin’s work, but his strong focus on the need to limit population growth in order to prevent
tragedies of the commons make the article controversial – in fact, one could read it as a manifesto for 
state control over family planning.
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it. In fact, different draft versions were rejected, primarily because they posed the 
problem in ‘us/them’ language, an insider told me. Commentators feared that if 
the strategy discussed the situation in terms of conservationists versus
pastoralists, it would further reinforce Laikipia’s black/white polarization. 
Alternatively, they wanted to present Laikipia as a region where all inhabitants, 
black and white, work together to achieve the best conservation results. By
focusing on unity, Laikipia’s Wildlife Conservation strategy tried to deconstruct 
and undo colour bar politics: it aimed to initiate a discussion of Laikipia’s plight 
in which race is not the main point of departure, and in which white landowners’ 
discursive space is not limited to pointing out how present-day white 
landownership differs from the 1930s Happy Valley jet set. The document
deliberately foregrounded what would be the consequence if no one intervened in 
the current state of affairs (i.e. the environmental deterioration of large parts of 
Laikipia), rather than detail the activities that were supposed to prevent such 
consequences (i.e. conservationists curtailing and controlling pastoralists’ 
movements). Like the poverty alleviation programmes that Ferguson (1990) 
studied, the Wildlife Conservation Strategy turned Laikipia’s management into a 
technical discussion: it foregrounded ecosystem integrity and ecological 
connectivity, and as such drew attention away from racial inequalities.
Presenting Laikipia as a whole offers conservationists the dialectics for 
arguing in favour of large-scale and widespread conservation measures, but the 
sense of regional integrity and cooperation might be lost on other residents, 
especially those whose live under the harshest and least favourable conditions. I 
realized this during a chat with James Mwangi, one of the Laikipia Wildlife 
Forum’s conservation officers. He told me that, a few days before we met, his car 
had broken down when he had been on the way to one of the forum’s 
conservation projects. He was stranded on the roadside in the vicinity of a place 
called Endana, located on the way from Nanyuki to Rumuruti. As he waited for a 
repair team he got into conversation with a group of people from the area, and he 
took the opportunity to discuss Laikipia’s environmental issues with them. He 
said he soon realized that the people he talked to did not at all identify with 
Laikipia, but spoke of it as if it were Nairobi – a faraway place they had heard of, 
but never came. An older woman had even asked him if he knew Laikipia, to 
which he had responded that she herself, and all the others present, were 
themselves Laikipians. But people said he was wrong, and they maintained they 
were not from Laikipia but from Endana. ‘People from remote areas think that 
Laikipia is Nanyuki, or that Laikipia is Dol Dol’ he indicated, and he concluded:
‘they don’t understand that Laikipia is right where they are’.
Laikipia’s white landowners have employed a variety of strategies to escape 
colour bar politics, this chapter pointed out, but in the main they have been 
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unable to break away from the discursive patterns set by Laikipia’s colonial past. 
History is inevitable to them, one could say. I consciously phrase it like this, for 
it acknowledges that these landowners are at least partially the victims of a 
historical record for which they were not responsible. There are landowners who 
live up to the stereotype of neo-colonial landlords who think little of their 
African neighbours, but there are also plenty of landowners who try to be 
responsible citizens of a country that is highly ambivalent about their presence. 
Third-generation farmers, or third-generation rancher-turned-conservationists, 
simply cannot help being the descendants of colonial settlers, yet they 
continuously carry the burden of their forefathers’ actions.
Thus far, anthropology as a discipline has largely failed to address this issue, 
and it mostly continues depicting white Africans as neo-colonial relics of a 
troublesome past. I believe that this is partly the result of an ethnographic void: 
anthropologists have studied the role of colonial administrators, settlers, and 
missionaries at great length, but after the continent de-colonized, whites in Africa 
have largely been excluded from the ethnographic gaze (with the exception of 
Crapanzano 1985; McIntosh 2006 & 2015; Teppo 2009; Uusihakala 1999; Van 
der Waal & Robins 2011). This reinforces stereotypes on white presence in 
Africa, simply because we lack accounts that prove otherwise. Terence Ranger 
once commented on this:
My desire is to see both whites and blacks in Africa as human beings, each with a fully 
human capacity for heroism and villainy and mediocrity. And one cannot see either whites or 
blacks as fully human in the framework of conventional colonial historiography, where 
white humanity is distorted by the burden of power, and black humanity is distorted by the 
image of submission.
Ranger (1998: 256)
Like Ranger, I call for social analyses that do not merely reiterate colonial 
idioms, but that make a sincere effort to come to grips with the ambiguities of 
post-colonial African societies. To achieve this, we should award honest 
ethnographic attention to all parties involved and welcome white residents, white 
development workers, and white conservationists, to mention just a few, into our 
studies as ethnographic subjects. I have tried to do this in this chapter and 
continue to do so in the next, where I discuss how Mt. Kenya was implicated in 
Laikipia’s white landowners’ perils and struggles. 
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Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site 
revisited: A conservancy’s quest 
for perpetual safekeeping
Nearly sixteen years after designation, the original boundaries of Mt. Kenya 
World Heritage Site changed. This event was the outcome of a longer process 
that had started in 2007. At the time, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, a property 
located on the eastern-most outskirts of the former White Highlands and 
bordering Mt. Kenya in the north, began lobbying for World Heritage
recognition. The managers of the property soon realized that Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy only stood a chance of obtaining World Heritage status if it 
managed to join the existing Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site. Subsequently, they
started to file different applications for a site extension to the World Heritage
Centre. Eventually, the World Heritage Committee agreed to Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy’s request, and in July 2013 it was included in Mt. Kenya’s World 
Heritage designation. 
Those behind the petition for Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site’s extension 
assumed that World Heritage status would improve Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy’s position within Laikipia’s precarious land question. Like other 
private conservancies, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy is affected by the 
contemporary political implications of the area’s colonial history, and like other 
landowners the conservancy’s executives aim to ward off risks of land alienation. 
They believed that World Heritage could contribute to this end as it could 
mobilize a global community calling for Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s continued 
existence, in case the Kenyan government decided to cancel title deeds or 
demand different land use. 
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In what follows, I discuss how Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site comments 
upon the constitution of Kenya’s political arena in the late 2000s and early 
2010s. I undertook a similar effort for 1996 and 1997 in chapter three, where I 
argued that Mt. Kenya’s original World Heritage designation served the interests 
of incumbent politicians. Below I take an opposite stand, and draw attention to 
how World Heritage might play a role in challenging a country’s state 
administration. It follows that World Heritage’s relationship to state power is not 
absolute: on the one hand, it can give expression to state sovereignty; on the 
other hand, it may also defy it. In both cases, World Heritage is likely to 
reproduce a country’s power hierarchies, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s World 
Heritage mission suggests, and I will argue that the conservancy could only 
capitalize on Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage status because it was already an 
influential and authoritative player in Kenya’s conservation industry.
The making of a conservation titan
In 1922, Alexander Douglas, born in South Africa to a Scottish father, settled on 
the northern foothills of Mt. Kenya. He established a ranch that he called Lewa 
Downs (Breed 2011). In 1952, Lewa Downs passed to one of Douglas’s 
daughters, Delia Douglas, who together with her husband David Craig continued 
ranching. In 1972, the couple established a tourist camp on Lewa Downs –
according to their own records, this was the first tourist camp located on a private 
conservancy in the entire country (see Lewa Wilderness n.d.B). A few years later,
Lewa Downs passed to one of Delia and David Craig’s sons, called Ian Craig. He 
was the main architect of what is today Lewa Wildlife Conservancy.
When Ian Craig took over Lewa Downs in 1977 it was still operating as a 
cattle ranch. This changed from 1983, when Lewa Downs gave up a far corner of 
its land to establish a rhino sanctuary. This sanctuary was the brainchild of Anna 
Merz, a British-born philanthropist who had primarily worked as a racehorse 
trainer and chimpanzee conservationist in Ghana. Merz moved to Kenya in 1976 
to retire but, the story goes, after she arrived in the country she was appalled by 
the large number of rhinos that were poached. She decided to spend her 
retirement protecting these animals and began looking for a place to start a rhino 
sanctuary. Different landowners turned a deaf ear to her pleas she later 
recounted, but Merz persisted (see for instance The New York Times, 21 April 
2013). Her unrelenting advocacy established her reputation as Kenya’s rhino 
patron, and Desmond Morris once described her as: ‘what Joy Adams was to 
lions, Dian Fossey was to gorillas, and Jane Goodall is to chimpanzees, Anna 
Merz is to rhino’ (Morris in Merz 1991: 9).
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Eventually, Anna Merz convinced David and Ian Craig to cooperate, and they 
allowed her to build a small rhino park on Lewa Downs. The reserve covered a 
fenced-off area of approximately five thousand acres: it became operative in 
1986, and it was called Ngare Sergoi (Lewa Wilderness n.d.A). Merz allegedly 
paid for the establishment of Ngare Sergoi with a family inheritance, and she 
recruited game-trackers and veterinarians to bring rhinos to her reserve (see for 
instance The Daily Telegraph, 27 May 2013). But since Kenya was in the midst 
of one of its severest poaching crises it proved difficult to find any animals left to 
protect, and during Ngare Sergoi’s first years its main task was survey what was 
left (see also American Association of Zoo Keepers n.d.A). Michael Dyer,1 owner
of a family property located next to that of the Craig’s, remembered the period 
well. He told me that his brother and Anna Merz had collected the last two rhinos 
in the Matthews,2 the last two in Isiolo, and so on. ‘It was fun in those days’, he 
stressed, and those who had been involved in the project had felt like pioneers, he
said.
Rhinos from all over the region were brought to Ngare Sergoi and over the 
years the reserve grew steadily. By 1988, the initial five thousand acres no longer 
sufficed, and Ngare Sergoi doubled in size (Lewa Wildlife Conservancy n.d.E) –
at the time, cattle ranching was in retreat, and Lewa Downs had plenty of land 
available. In the meantime, Anna Merz began looking for donors and private 
investors to help funding the operation, and entered into a partnership with,
among others, the American Association of Zoo Keepers (American Association 
of Zoo Keepers n.d.B). This marked the beginning of the Craig family’s close
relations with American nature conservation lobbies, which I discuss in more 
detail later.
Ngare Sergoi’s rhino population kept growing, and in the mid-1990s the
number of animals again exceeded the reserve’s carrying capacity. In response, 
the Craig family took a drastic decision. It turned the whole of Lewa Downs into 
a nature park, which it called Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. It was a 
groundbreaking move, for hardly any privately owned conservancies existed in 
Kenya at the time. In later years, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy advertised itself as 
the founder of an entirely new conservation model, but critical observers stressed 
to me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had never been established for that aim: 
rather, it was said that the Craig family simply faced bankruptcy after the 
collapse of the cattle industry and had made the radical transition to prevent an 
execution sale of the land.
When Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was officially established in 1995 it 
replaced Ngare Sergoi, which ceased to exist. Apart from the former territory of 
                                                        
1 Conversation on 17 July 2012, Borana Ranch.
2 Short for the Matthews Range, a strip of mountains north of Lewa that covers about 150 kilometres. 
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Lewa Downs, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy also came to include a government 
forest reserve called Ngare Ndare. The Craig family already became involved in 
the management of Ngare Ndare in the early 1990s, when the forest’s adjacent 
large landowners had raised money to fence off the government reserve (see 
Ngare Ndare Forest Trust n.d., although the website does not mention the 
sponsors by name). I was told that these landowners had meant to curtail the 
access to Ngare Ndare, because they were of the opinion that both the Forest 
Department and the African communities living around it depleted its resources. 
The fence was erected in stages throughout the 1990s, but the northern border, 
where Ngare Ndare touches the property of the Craig family, was left open. 
Thus, Ngare Ndare effectively became a part of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, and 
the latter assumed management control over the area. 
Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s start-up phase resembled that of Ngare Sergoi, 
and at first it was largely without wildlife. It then began retrieving animals from 
elsewhere. A senior KWS official, who did not want to be mentioned by name,
told me that this had irritated the KWS, because Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s 
managers had not asked permission from the institute – in fact, they had failed to 
consult them at all, and had not informed the KWS about the operations. Instead,
Lewa Wildlife Conservancy people had captured animals under the false 
pretence that they were ill and needed treatment, he said. They ‘just darted 
wildlife’ and moved them to the conservancy, he told me. I once had the 
opportunity to ask Ian Craig3 himself about this affair but he largely avoided the 
matter. Instead he said that, in general, wildlife does not need much more than 
the right environment, plenty of nutrition and protection against poaching – if 
one offered that, it would come on its own. A few moments later he commented 
‘if wildlife is not hassled it will stop moving around’ and immediately added 
that, if I understood the full extent of what he was saying, I was ‘really very 
smart’.4 This left me with the impression that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had 
collected animals by actively chasing them from neighbouring properties into the 
conservancy, where it was left in peace in the hope that it would stay. I shared 
my thoughts, but Ian Craig refused to give further clarifications.
In only a few years’ time the Craig family property no longer looked like a 
livestock farm, but measured up to the image of a wild East African savanna with 
lone acacia trees, extensive grasslands and charismatic wildlife species such as 
elephant, rhino and lion as well as grazing herds of all sorts of herbivores 
including zebra, gazelle, giraffe and buffalo. In essence, the Craig family had 
created what Soper called ‘nature as appearance’ (1995: 180). This was a ‘new’ 
                                                        
3 Conversation on 27 April 2012, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy.
4 Afterwards different people told me that these kinds of comments were typical for Ian Craig, and they 
called him ‘arrogant’, ‘bold’ and ‘full of himself’.
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nature that did not derive its credibility from the historical absence of human 
interference, but from deliberate landscape engineering that created the potential 
for spontaneous biophysical processes (see Onneweer 2009: 54-55) – the 
presence of these biophysical processes made the conservancy appear natural, 
even though it was patently man-made.
As the Craig family property’s landscape changed, so did its business model. 
Unlike the former ranch, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was founded as a non-
profit organization (Lewa Wildlife Conservancy n.d.B), and soon its operation
was paid for with money from international organizations such as the American 
Association of Zoo Keepers, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, the World Bank, 
and the Worldwide Fund for Nature (Ibid.). Over time, Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy became fully donor dependent, meaning that it failed to generate 
money of its own and instead relied on the gifts of others. Many other former 
ranchers as well as conservationists considered this a regrettable development, 
they told me. On the one hand, it had made Lewa Wildlife Conservancy a sloppy 
and irresponsible spender, they maintained, for money simply came in too easily. 
One critical observer, for instance, told me that one of Lewa’s managers had told 
him that, whenever Lewa Wildlife Conservancy needed building materials, it did 
not bother to check prices – it just went where it was easiest. The person in 
question explained to me that he deemed this highly problematic, because it sent 
out the wrong message to suppliers: it suggested that whites had money and 
would pay any price, which put the rest of Laikipia’s white landowners with less 
financial means in a difficult situation.
On the other hand, critical observers indicated, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s 
total reliance on donor money stimulates dishonest and aggressive marketing 
practices. A former employee clarified to me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy 
organizes fundraising events in the United States and Britain, which rest entirely 
on the idea that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy is the sole successful private 
conservation initiative in the entire country, and that without it Kenya’s wildlife 
would be doomed. He explained to me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy needs 
huge amounts of money to cover their costs, and that in order to raise such 
amounts it continuously exaggerates its importance and influence. ‘Lewa tries its 
best to let donors believe that no one else exists but Lewa’ he said, and added 
that he condemns this as it disregards and downplays the merits of all of 
Laikipia’s other conservation initiatives. A conservationist who requested 
anonymity, as he did not want to antagonize Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, said 
that the conservancy’s main point of departure is making itself look bigger by 
making others look smaller. He described Ian Craig as a ‘Rambo 
conservationist’, i.e. someone who is only interested in sensation and spectacle. 
He said that the things that really matter for conservation, such as butterflies and 
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beetles, were of no interest to Ian Craig, who only concerned himself with fancy 
cars, private airplanes, and large charismatic mammals. Documentaries and 
television series that feature Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, such as Game Ranger 
Diaries (2006), 5 Drawing the Line (2014), 6 and Earth, a New Wild (2015) 7
largely subscribed to such an image, and further reinforced the idea that the 
conservancy is all-important and decisive for Kenyan conservation.
Over time, Laikipia’s endangered charismatic mammals became Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy’s main asset and came to generate the most donor money. 
Mordecai Ogada from the Laikipia Wildlife Forum, for instance, indicated to me 
that the endemic black rhino, a critically endangered IUCN Red List Species,8
can produce about $60,000 in funding per year. He pointed out that Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy understands the economic potential of endangered species 
quite well, and that it makes a habit out of accumulating as much IUCN Red List 
species as possible: it has the black rhino, the Grevy’s Zebra, and in mid-2012 
there was talk that it was preparing the translocation of the critically endangered 
Hirola from an area north of the Tana River. There are conservationists who 
strongly disapprove of this, because it makes it nearly impossible for other 
private conservancies to obtain international donor money – by taking full
control over the conservation of certain species, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy 
simply corners conservation money. 
In addition to being funding magnets, iconic species can also be a form of 
political capital to Laikipia’s landowners, as the following account reveals. From 
roughly 2010 onwards, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy again hosted more rhinos 
than its environment could sustain. A neighbouring property called Borana 
Ranch, which since the late 2000s had been making preparations to host rhinos 
on its property (see Save the Rhino n.d.), offered to take in a proportion of the 
animals. In July 2012, the manager of Borana9 told me that the ranch had taken 
all the necessary steps: among other things, it had upgrade its ring-fence to keep 
out poachers, it had hired extra staff, and it had trained its personnel under 
supervision of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. Yet, each time that Borana Ranch 
thought that the animals would be brought in, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy 
objected for one reason or another. 
According to one conservationist, who regularly cooperates with Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy, Borana Ranch failed to meet Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy’s high security standards. He underscored that the latter’s safety 
                                                        
5 See Tigress Productions (n.d.).
6 See The Watering Hole Foundation (n.d.).
7 See The Nature Conservancy (n.d.B).
8 IUCN introduced the Red List of Threatened Species in the mid-1990s, which became the main global 
guideline on endangered species.
9 Conversation on 17 July 2012, Borana Ranch.
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
148 
 
system is state-of-the-art and extremely expensive and that, in comparison, 
Borana Ranch’s measures were simply insufficient. Mentioning this, he touched 
upon a broader problem: rhino conservation was so risky and expensive that the 
KWS has largely walked away from it, and today gladly leaves the animals in the 
care of private landowners. But most of these landowners do not have sufficient 
resources either, and in 2012 two private conservancies pulled out of rhino 
conservation due to the costs and dangers involved. After that, Laikipia’s rhino 
population confined to three properties only, namely Solio Ranch, Ol Pejeta 
Conservancy, and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy.
One of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s former employees offered an additional 
explanation for the continuous delay in the relocation of Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy’s rhinos. He told me that the latter not only doubted the quality of 
Borana Ranch’s security standards, but that it also was unsure about how to 
organize the translocation itself. He clarified that different experts held different 
opinions: some advised putting the rhinos in a small enclosure on Borana Ranch 
so that the animals could get used to the environment, while others suggested
simply lowering the fence between the two properties and letting rhinos wander 
in by themselves. The latter strategy was obviously the easiest, the former 
employee told me, but it had a downside: in this way, Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy could not attract much media attention. He underscored just how 
keen Lewa Wildlife Conservancy is on publicity, and he said that the 
conservation preferred ‘some big deal, a big hoopla rhino introduction’.
In the meantime, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy questioned Borana Ranch’s 
motivation for the rhino relocation project. It maintained that Borana Ranch was 
not so much interested in the continued existence of the species itself, as in the 
political support of influential conservation lobbies that do everything in their 
power to protect rhino habitat. Borana Ranch was only interested in the black 
rhino because the animals would give the property a stronger position if the 
Kenyan government decided to target privately owned land, Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy’s CEO suggested to me. He stressed that if the government 
confiscated Laikipia’s large estates, then those hosting black rhinos would be 
among the last to fall, for conservation organizations would fight for them till the 
bitter end. Of course, this rationale was also applicable to Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy – however, its PR machine effectively covered such incentives up. 
In 2014, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy finally agreed to bring rhinos to Borana 
Ranch. As expected, the conservancy dramatized the event and announced on its 
website that the translocation had created the ‘biggest rhino sanctuary in the 
country’ (see Lewa Wildlife Conservancy n.d.A). Lewa Wildlife Conservancy 
also shot a sensational promotion film that showed how rhinos were darted from 
a helicopter, how they were put in big containers and transported, and how the 
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
149
 
animals were finally released amid much loud trampling and snorting (YouTube 
2014). The promotion clip constantly showed Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s 
name and logo, but information on Borana Ranch’s contributions was kept to a 
minimum.
The way in which Lewa Wildlife Conservancy branded the rhino relocation 
project almost entirely as its own was illustrative of the conservancy’s powerful 
position – Ian Craig tended to get his way, I was told on several occasions, and 
over the years both he and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy became increasingly 
authoritative. This manifested in different ways. For example, Ian Craig initiated 
another conservation initiative in 2004. This was the Northern Rangelands Trust 
(NRT), which he established in cooperation with the politician Francis ole 
Kaparo, an influential statesman who had, among other things, served as the 
speaker of the lower house of parliament between 1993 and 2008. NRT aimed to
offer conservation support to those community ranches located north of Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy that were in the hands of pastoralist groups. In essence,
NRT was an extension of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy under a different name, 
and one of NRT’s main objectives was to make the communities around Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy agreeable to conservation. This was necessary because the 
safety of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s wildlife depended on their goodwill and 
cooperation (see also Northern Rangelands Trust 2013: 6).
Initially, NRT worked with some ten or eleven pastoral communities. It 
supported them in the management of wildlife and in setting up ecotourism 
businesses. Il Ngwesi, a community ranch that borders on Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy in the northwest, became NRT’s showpiece: it established a 
luxurious lodge, and with the marketing support of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy,
Il Ngwesi managed to attract a steady stream of tourists. Yet, in later years, NRT 
and Il Ngwesi fell out. Someone from the Lewa Wildlife Conservancy 
bandwagon told me that Il Ngwesi’s community felt exploited, and that 
pastoralists claimed that NRT had profited too much from their work. In 
response, these pastoralists had demanded full control over Il Ngwesi’s lodge and 
no longer wished to work with NRT. Despite such setbacks, the number of 
community conservancies that NRT worked with expanded rapidly. At the time 
of writing the organization cooperated with more than twenty-seven community 
ranches. It had expanded into areas further north as well as into Kenya’s coast 
region, and in total controlled more than 7,600,000 acres (Northern Rangelands 
Trust n.d.). 
But Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s influence over other conservation areas did 
not stop there. In the mid-2000s, the British conservation organization Flora and 
Processed on: 9-6-2016
503514-L-bw-ASC
150 
 
Fauna International (FFI)10 bought Ol Pejeta Ranch, where it wanted to establish 
a conservancy modelled on Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. Ol Pejeta Ranch had a
turbulent history: it had been owned by, among others, Thomas Cholmondeley,
4th Baron Delamere (son of Hugh Cholmondeley, 3rd Baron Delamere, introduced 
in the previous chapter), by the father-in-law of Christina Onassis, daughter of 
Aristotle Onassis, and by infamous weapons dealer Adnan Khashoggi (Pearce 
2012). After FFI bought Ol Pejeta Ranch it contracted Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy to organize Ol Pejeta Conservancy’s management. Batian Craig, 
Ian Craig’s son, became overall supervisor and Ian Craig himself took a seat on 
Ol Pejeta Conservancy’s board of directors. Within a few years, Ol Pejeta 
Conservancy became very successful and today some even consider it more 
prosperous than Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, for Ol Pejeta Conservancy 
generates its own income through livestock farming and does not depend on 
donor money.11 In any case, together Ol Pejeta Conservancy and Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy became Laikipia’s two conservation giants – and Ian Craig stood at 
the helm of both.
Ian Craig’s influence over Laikipia’s conservation scene also showed in his 
appointment to the KWS board of trustees in 2008, where he served six 
consecutive years (KWS annual report 2008: 9). In this period, Ian Craig 
promoted cooperation between the KWS and private conservancy owners in 
general, and cultivated a stronger relation between the KWS and Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy in particular – I return to the latter development later in this 
chapter. In recent years, the KWS certainly seems to have become more 
agreeable to Laikipia’s large white landowners, and it might have realized that it 
cannot compete with influential stakeholders such as Ol Pejeta Conservancy and 
Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. In fact, the organization is dependent on such 
private conservancies, as the outsourcing of rhino conservation suggests. Former 
Mt. Kenya senior warden Robert Obrien 12 realized this all too well, and he
indicated to me that although Lewa Wildlife Conservancy does not need the 
KWS the KWS certainly needs them. He said that Mt. Kenya should consider 
itself lucky with a neighbour such as Lewa Wildlife Conservancy: the effect of 
the latter’s tight security system spilled over, and ensured that the overall region 
was safer and better protected against poaching. 
                                                        
10 Flora and Fauna International was the successor of the Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna 
of the Empire (SPWFE), which was established in 1903. Edward North Buxton, whom I briefly 
introduced in chapter two, cofounded the SPWFE.
11 Like Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, Ol Pejeta Conservancy came to feature in different documentaries
and television shows. It even got its own three-season series, called Ol Pejeta Diaries (see 
Smithsonian Channel n.d.).
12 Conversations on 19 October 2011, Naro Moru Gate Mt. Kenya National Park; 21 November 2011, 
Naro Moru Gate Mt. Kenya National Park; 25 April 2012, Naro Moru Gate Mt. Kenya National Park.
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Ian Craig’s position on the KWS board of trustees and his partnership with 
politicians such as Francis ole Kaparo granted Lewa Wildlife Conservancy a 
favourable lobby position. Mike Watson,13 Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s CEO 
since April 2011 (see Lewa Wildlife Conservancy n.d.D), told me that the 
conservancy’s staff and board had invested in reinforcing state relations for a 
long time. This had rendered Lewa Wildlife Conservancy considerable political 
leverage, which revealed itself, for example, during the design phase of a 
KETRACO power line. In 2006, the governments of Kenya and Ethiopia had 
signed a memorandum of understanding on the construction of a transmission 
line that would run from the Ethiopia-Kenya border to the plains east of Mt. 
Longonot. On its way it would traverse the regions Marsabit, Samburu, Isiolo, 
Laikipia, Nyandarua and Nakuru (see KETRACO Kenya Electricity 
Transmission Co. Ltd. n.d.). The initial design for the power line suggested that it 
would scrape Laikipia in the east. As such, it would go over Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy. Watson told me that once the conservancy had realized this it had 
begun lobbying to have the design changed, as a power line over its property 
would affect its pristine-looking landscape. Lewa Wildlife Conservancy managed 
to persuade the politicians involved to adjust the KETRACO line’s course, and 
eventually it moved further north (to the detriment of private conservancies 
located in that region).
All together, Ian Craig had turned the former Lewa Downs into a conservation 
titan. Many conservationists and landowners saw him as a visionary who had 
understood the potential of private conservation long before others. Yet they did 
not necessarily like working with him, as he was known as a man who did not 
tolerate contradiction and who let no one stand in his way. One conservationist 
told me in private that he truly disliked Ian Craig, but that he had to make do 
with his presence and influence. ‘I have to live here and work here, and so I have 
to make the best of it’, he said. In line with this, another conservationist later told 
me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy does not hire people to think for themselves, 
but to promote Ian Craig’s vision. The greatest source of frustration seemed to be 
that Ian Craig’s and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s behaviour as the grand dame
of Kenyan conservation undermined endeavours to strengthen Laikipia’s 
conservation industry as a whole, and belittled the efforts of other private 
conservancies. At the same time, those involved in Laikipian conservation were 
well aware of Ian Craig’s range of influence, and especially conservationists and 
landowners who relied on Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s goodwill or financial 
support were careful not to state their criticism in public (which is why many of 
the informants in this section have been anonymized).
                                                        
13 Conversations on 28 November 2011, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy office; 22 May 2012, Nanyuki 
Airport.
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But although Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had a powerful position it was not 
invincible, and critical observers pointed out, in particular, the risks of its 
business model. A former employee who once worked at the top of the 
conservancy’s administration told me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s 
managers were always worried about reaching income targets. This made the 
conservancy incredibly donor pleasing, he said, and the organizations that fund 
the conservancy largely came to direct its conservation agenda. As a result, Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy got caught between what American and British donor 
organizations want on the one hand, and what its Kenyan staff deems appropriate 
and suitable on the other. Brockington & Scholfield (2010C) have identified such 
dynamics for Sub-Saharan conservation efforts more generally, and stress that 
conservation funding is a powerful tool with which the North enforces its 
conservation ambitions on the South.
In addition to how the principles of international organizations affected Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy’s daily operation, the conservancy had another 
vulnerability related to its complicated and fragmented ownership arrangements. 
After Lewa Downs became a conservancy, the non-profit organization Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy came to supervise about 62,000 acres of land. Of these,
approximately 40,000 acres were owned by Craig family members; about 8,000 
acres were in the hands of other private owners who had bought properties from 
the Craig family in the past; and the remaining 14,000 acres largely covered 
Ngare Ndare forest reserve (Lewa Milele n.d.B). During Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s 
initial years, the supervision of all this land rested solely on informal agreements. This 
changed in 1999 when Craig family members signed an easement that gave Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy full management control over the land in their possession, 
but in legal terms this easement was not very strong and it only lasted for thirty 
years (Ibid.). Moreover, the easement did not cover the 8,000 acres not owned by 
Craig family members, and on these properties informal agreements continued. 
At a certain point, these informal and fragile arrangements began to unsettle 
donors, I was told – Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s sponsors wanted a more 
secure future for their investment, and they demanded that the risks be averted. In 
response, the conservancy’s managers developed a strategy that consisted of a 
number of measures, of which two are discussed in the remainder of this chapter.
A devilish land sale?
As long as Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s land question was not settled, the 
conservancy’s future was uncertain. On the one hand, there were the informal 
and legally weak arrangements between those who owned the land and the non-
profit organization; at the same time, there was also the risk of political expulsion 
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confronting all Laikipia’s white landowners. In the run-up to the new constitution 
and Land Act it became obvious that private property rights would be curtailed, 
but little was said about corporate property rights. As such, the executives of 
Lewa Wildlife Conservancy believed that land would be less vulnerable to 
government confiscation if owned by a firm, rather than one or more white 
individuals, and thus they decided to transfer landownership to a Kenyan
shareholding company. They thought up the following plan: a shareholding 
company would be founded, called Chikwe Ltd. (see Government of Kenya 
2012: 54), which would buy 32,000 acres of the approximately 40,000 acres that 
the Craig family in total possessed (Lewa Milele n.d.B). After the sale, Chikwe 
Ltd. would allocate the management right to the non-profit organization Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy – the organization would supervise the entire area, with 
the exclusion of the residences and tourist lodges owned by individual Craig 
family members who would have the opportunity to lease such real estate back.
In order to pay for the land sale, as well as for the employment of Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy as general overseer, Chikwe Ltd. had to accumulate 
money: Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s executives estimated that the shareholding 
company needed nearly $30 million to get through the first years, of which 
roughly $17.5 million was needed for land acquisition (Lewa Milele n.d.A). It 
was decided to generate this money through donor funding, and Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy partnered with the American conservation organization The Nature 
Conservancy (TNC): TNC would partially finance the project; in addition, the 
two organizations would launch a fundraising campaign to collect the rest of the 
money. This fundraising campaign was given the name Lewa Milele, Kiswahili 
for Lewa Forever, and was primarily meant to attract private investors and 
philanthropists. 
Lewa Wildlife Conservancy began cultivating an alliance with TNC from 
2008 onwards (see Lewa Milele n.d.C). At the time, TNC was new to Kenyan 
conservation. The American organization had been founded in 1951, but for a 
long time it concentrated its activities in North and South America, with an 
occasional project in Asia. Today, TNC is considered one of the wealthiest and 
most powerful environmental conservation organizations worldwide (see Forbes 
2011). According to its own website, TNC pursues ‘non-confrontational, 
pragmatic, market-based solutions to conservation challenges’ (The Nature 
Conservancy n.d.C) – in practice, the organization buys up vast tracks of land 
with government funds and money from the private sector, and subjects these 
lands to authoritative management plans.
In the United States, TNC is primarily known for its controversial methods. 
Especially its aggressive land-acquisition strategies, and its reselling of land to 
the United States government at increased rates gave way to different scandals. 
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In 1993, for instance, TNC hit the headlines after it bought a farm from the 
elderly Frederic Gibbs, a well-known neurologist and scientist. Gibbs’s heirs, his 
two sons, then sued TNC: they maintained that their father had not been mentally 
competent when he signed the agreement, and they argued that the organization 
was fraudulent and manipulative. Gibbs’s sons won the court case, and TNC had 
to give back the property. Another often-heard critique of TNC is that its board 
includes directors of oil companies, chemical producers and mining concerns – it 
is believed that TNC prioritizes the interests of the corporate sector and has 
conservation only as secondary concern, illustrated, for instance, by the 
organization’s condoning of logging and drilling for oil.14 Holmes (2011) notes 
that, in general, the roles of NGOs, corporations, and the state have become 
increasingly indistinguishable in nature conservation (see also Spierenburg & 
Wels 2010): TNC is a perfect example of this. 
In 2006, TNC began to invest in African conservation programmes. It soon 
entered Kenya, where it immediately got caught up in another scandal that 
roughly went as follows. In 2008, former president Daniel Arap Moi announced 
the sale of his Laikipian ranch, Eland Downs, which had been in his possession 
since 1997. The announcement alarmed Eland Downs’s adjacent landowners, Ol 
Pejeta Conservancy’s CEO Richard Vigne 15 told me. It was shortly after the 
2007 and 2008 election violence, and at the time politicians were looking for 
land to settle hundreds of thousands of displaced people. Laikipia’s white
conservancy owners worried that Eland Downs would turn into a refugee camp, 
and they feared the effect that this would have on their properties.
To prevent Eland Downs from becoming an African refugee camp, an 
organization called African Wildlife Fund (AWF) offered to buy Daniel Arap 
Moi’s property. AWF did not have the money to finance the purchase but TNC, 
which at the time was trying to get a foothold in Kenya, volunteered to sponsor 
the buy. The two organizations sided, and AWF bought Eland Downs with the 
intention of turning it into another conservancy. Yet, shortly after the transaction,
a group of Samburu pastoralists began to protest. They said they lived on Eland 
Downs, and maintained that they were the property’s rightful owners. Moi had 
grabbed their land decennia earlier, they stated, and as such the sale between the 
former president and AWF was unlawful.
AWF rejected the pastoralists’ objections. The organization declared that it 
had paid Daniel Arap Moi and had thus gained legal possession of Eland Downs, 
but the pastoralists refused to leave the ranch. In 2011, Channel 4 ran a 
documentary on the situation, called ‘Conservation’s Dirty Secrets’. 16 The 
                                                        
14 There appeared a critical essay on TNC in the Washington Post in May 2003 that sums up these 
concerns (The Washington Post, 4 May 2003).
15 Conversation on 6 August 2012, Ol Pejeta Conservancy office.
16 For a clip from the documentary see Vimeo (n.d.). 
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documentary featured Samburu men who claimed that the Kenya Police had tried 
to evict them in a violent manner, and witnesses declared that police forces had 
beaten people up, had stolen money, had burned huts, had raped women, and had 
killed one man. After the documentary was broadcast, international media and 
organizations jumped on AWF. The Guardian, for instance, headlined ‘Kenya’s 
Samburu People Violently Evicted After US Charities Buy Land’ (14 December 
2011); the indigenous rights organizations Just Conservation and Cultural 
Survival publicly condemned the proceedings (see Just Conservation n.d.; 
Cultural Survival n.d.); the German travel branch organization threatened to 
discourage tourism to Kenya (see Deutscher ReiseVerband n.d.); and the 
indigenous rights organization Survival International sent a petition to the United 
Nations (see Survival International n.d.).
International rights movements portrayed AWF’s land purchase as a human 
rights violation, but their reports were sensational, confusing, and sometimes 
downright contradictory. Cultural Survival, for instance, said that the evictions 
had affected three hundred pastoral families (Cultural Survival n.d.), while 
Survival International spoke of two to three thousand households (Survival 
International n.d.). Also, the organizations seemed uncertain about how long the 
pastoralists had actually been living on Eland Downs before AWF interfered. In 
the meantime, AWF fought back, and it presented a 2008 court file in which the 
same group of Samburu pastoralists claimed to be living next to Moi’s ranch 
instead of on it. But the pastoralists received public support, and with the help of 
international organizations they took AWF and Daniel Arap Moi to court. TNC 
was spared because it had never been a party to the sale – it had merely made 
funding available.
By November 2011, AWF was tired of the witch-hunt. It donated Eland 
Downs to the Kenyan government, after which Moi’s former ranch turned into a 
National Park under supervision of the KWS (Daily Nation, 11 November 2011). 
The affair had driven a serious wedge between AWF and TNC and, shortly after 
international rights movements had begun to target AWF, TNC moved out of the 
organizations’ shared office in Karen, Nairobi. After AWF had taken its hands 
off Eland Downs, TNC also published a public statement in which it said:
The Conservancy has never approved or enabled the evictions of Indigenous Peoples from this 
property. Moreover, the Conservancy condemns the use of violence or any forcible removal of 
Indigenous Peoples from their land or territories.
[…]
We are shocked and saddened by reports of abuse to Samburu pastoralists in the Samburu district, and 
we are investigating the matter. In such a highly charged environment, emotions and rumors are 
running high, and ascertaining the facts is a challenge. However, we remain committed to 
transparency and openness, and we will communicate updates on this issue as developments occur.
The Nature Conservancy, 16 December 2011
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In August 2012, I visited Charles Oluchina, 17 TNC’s Kenyan director, in the 
organization’s new headquarters in another neighbourhood of Nairobi. He said 
that AWF had abused TNC’s trust, and that he did not believe that AWF had not 
known about the politics in advance. Maybe he was right, or maybe not – in any 
case, the partnership with AWF had put TNC’s introduction in Kenya in a bad 
light.
At the time that the Eland Downs affair unfolded, TNC’s cooperation with 
Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was already well underway. Chikwe Ltd. had been 
founded, and the land sale was in process – the two organizations had cut the 
vending process in two so that funding could be raised in steps (Lewa Milele 
n.d.B), and by the time that the Channel 4 documentary began to cause upheaval 
the first phase of the sale was nearing completion. On the one hand, the 
developments around Eland Downs certainly affected TNC’s reputation; at the 
same time, the organization had already made headway by then – it had become 
Chikwe Ltd.’s biggest shareholder, and as such it had secured major influence 
over Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. During a conversation in August 2012 Charles 
Oluchina highlighted TNC’s control over Lewa Wildlife Conservancy and said 
that, if the conservancy’s CEO failed to manage the property well, TNC would 
fire him. ‘It’s tough love,’ he stressed.
Laikipia’s landowners and conservationists seemed worried about TNC’s 
growing control. Mordecai Ogada told me, for instance, that he feared that 
TNC’s mode of working would do serious harm to the country’s conservation 
industry, because in the context of Kenya’s land scarcity the organization’s land-
buying principle was likely to fuel African resistance to white conservation 
efforts. Another conservationist, who had worked for Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy in the conservancy’s early days, also underscored the dangers of 
working with TNC. He admitted that TNC has the money that Laikipia needs, 
but at the same time the organization’s rigid and autocratic approach to 
conservation was likely to cause more harm than good. He concluded that 
working with TNC was like ‘dancing with the Devil’.
After Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s land sale to Chikwe Ltd., TNC’s power 
expanded rapidly both in Laikipia as well as in the country at large. Firstly, TNC 
followed Ian Craig’s lines of influence and became a partner to both Ol Pejeta 
Conservancy and NRT (see The Nature Conservancy n.d.A). On the one hand,
this seemed to constrain the decision-making power of these organizations’ 
former executives, and an employee from a regional NGO who had visited one of 
NRT’s management meetings said that TNC had ruled the entire session. ‘It 
came up with a conservation strategy and it simply dictated it without any room 
                                                        
17 Conversations on 13 August 2012, TNC office Nairobi; 23 August 2012, TNC & KWS Stakeholder 
Meeting Nairobi.
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for discussion’, he stated. On the other hand, TNC’s approbation seemed to boost 
confidence, and Ol Pejeta Conservancy’s Richard Vigne emphasized to me that 
TNC’s interest in Ol Pejeta Conservancy confirmed the latter’s good work –
while critical observers insisted that wildlife conservation and cattle ranching 
were incompatible, Ol Pejeta Conservancy had showed them otherwise and TNC 
had recognized the potential of their business model.
Here it may be noted that Ol Pejeta Conservancy’s success also seemed to 
have another effect: it encouraged Richard Vigne to advocate in favour of 
implementing stricter land use regulations that centred on maximum gain. He
suggested that Laikipia’s land debate should no longer focus on acreages but on 
efficiency, and he claimed that the region needed a method to enforce 
productivity upon landowners. ‘If a landowner fails to manage his or her land 
effectively’, he said, ‘then transfer the management to a better manager’. This did 
not necessarily have to infringe upon ownership rights – even without title deeds, 
Vigne stressed, Ol Pejeta Conservancy’s staff was very willing to take over the 
daily management of properties such as Kuki Gallmann’s Laikipia Nature 
Conservancy, or even that of Eland Downs.
Such calls for what may be dubbed ‘management imperialism’ seemed to echo
TNC’s ambitions and, like Ol Pejeta Conservancy, TNC did not make a secret of 
its ambitions. Charles Oluchina indicated to me that TNC did not believe in 
fragmented conservation projects and that the organization meant to gain control 
over a vast terrain, ideally over the whole of Laikipia. To this end, TNC 
continuously tried to enter into new partnerships. Sometimes its lobbying paid 
off and in April 2014 the organization Space for Giants announced that, in 
cooperation with TNC, it would take over the management of a property called 
Loisaba Conservancy (see Space for Giants n.d.).
Meanwhile, TNC also gained a hold over the KWS. The KWS had long been
under the spell of the animal rights lobby, as I indicated in the previous chapter, 
which, among other things, had prevented the revision of the 1989 Wildlife Act. 
But when TNC began to finance the KWS’s operations, the latter largely broke
its ties with animal rights organizations. When I asked Charles Oluchina what he 
expected from TNC’s partnership with the KWS, Oluchina responded that, in
future, all organizations working in Kenya should be accountable to TNC. ‘We 
will not kick out NGOs with expertise’, he said, but added that the core of 
Kenyan conservation was to be with TNC, the KWS, and private conservancies. 
It was clear that if such a partnership was to work, the 1989 Wildlife Act first 
had to be updated as it estranged the KWS and private landowners from one 
another. Changing Kenya’s regulations thus became a priority for TNC,
according to Oluchina, and like most Laikipian conservancy owners he took a 
firm stance against the hunting ban – TNC in general opposed such bans because 
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they deprived wildlife of economic value, and this was at odds with the 
organization’s principle of market-based conservation. Moreover, Oluchina 
found the legal backing of Laikipia’s private conservancies too weak and he 
advocated in favour of strengthening conservancies’ tenure rights. I learned 
during a stakeholder meeting organized jointly by TNC and the KWS in 2012 
that, in order to motivate the KWS to initiate such legislative changes, TNC had
invited KWS executives to its headquarters in Washington and had sponsored 
‘educational trips’ to Namibia where hunting was permitted and private 
conservancies flourished.18
In late December 2013, the Kenyan government finally adopted a new 
Wildlife Act. The 2013 Wildlife Act demonstrated TNC’s impact: it reintroduced 
culling and cropping licences (article 80), and it offered a legal basis for private 
conservancies (article 39). I suspect that, after more than two decades of 
advocacy and negotiation, Laikipia’s conservancy owners celebrated this as a 
victory. At the same time, I take it that some also had mixed feelings because the 
legislative changes further illustrated TNC’s climb to power. The position of 
private conservancies had finally improved, if only slightly, but it remained to be 
seen at what cost.
A first attempt to become World Heritage
The Craig family’s land sale to Chikwe Ltd. constituted one strategy to help 
secure Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s conservation prospects but, as Ian Craig 
once formulated it to me, one should not put all one’s eggs in one basket. Thus,
Lewa Wildlife Conservancy undertook additional measures to bolster its 
conservation status. Most prominent among these measures was the 
conservancy’s endeavour to obtain World Heritage status.
Jonathan Moss, 19 CEO of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy at the time that the 
conservancy filed its first World Heritage nomination to UNESCO, told me that 
Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s executives had considered World Heritage status 
an extra layer of protection against land grabbing. If the conservancy was on the 
World Heritage List, he explained, then it would arguably be more difficult for 
the Kenyan government to cancel title deeds or confiscate the land, for such an
event would then not only matter to Kenya but to the world at large. Moss
stressed that, with the help of World Heritage status, the ongoing existence of 
                                                        
18 The meeting took place in the Sarova Panafric Hotel in Nairobi on 23 August 2012, and was attended 
by approximately one hundred people. Fifteen of these were white representatives of private 
conservancies or conservation organizations, the remainder largely consisted of representatives of 
African community ranches and KWS staff.
19 Conversations on 28 October 2011, Kisima Farm; 22 November 2011, Kisima Farm; 18 April 2012, 
Kisima Farm.
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Lewa Wildlife Conservancy would be a ‘public and global concern’. As such, he
reiterated World Heritage’s official discourse that underscores that World 
Heritage Sites belong to ‘mankind as a whole’ (UNESCO 1972: 1), and he
highlighted the political potential of addressing a global community via World 
Heritage – if there was ever a day that the Kenyan government challenged Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy’s existence then this global community could be motivated 
to become an active citizenry (see also Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2006: 189), and 
defend the conservancy’s survival. World Heritage listing could thus be 
promising, but obtaining World Heritage status was not an easy task, as the 
coming two sections point out.
Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s World Heritage adventure began in 2007 when 
it hired a Kenyan consultancy firm, Okello Abungu Heritage Consultants, 
directed by archaeologist George Abungu. At the time, Abungu was the Kenyan 
representative to the World Heritage Committee and hence was closely involved 
in the World Heritage programme. Furthermore, between 1999 and 2002,
Abungu had been the director of the National Museums of Kenya in Nairobi, and 
in addition he was involved in numerous heritage initiatives such as the World 
Monument Watch, 20 the International Council of Museums 21 and the Global 
Heritage Fund.22 Abungu was obviously well informed about cultural heritage, 
but he had little experience in natural heritage conservation. Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy’s executives had been aware of this, someone who had been 
involved in the project at an early stage said to me, but they had felt that 
Abungu’s contacts and network would outweigh his lack of expertise and they 
had hoped that Abungu’s relations would help shorten the application process. 
Since George Abungu was unfamiliar with natural heritage he asked a second 
man, Maurice Nyaligu, to carry out a feasibility study on Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy’s World Heritage potential. Nyaligu had worked for the KWS and 
IUCN in the past, and he had even been stationed at IUCN’s headquarters in 
Gland, Switzerland, where he had served as a World Heritage monitoring officer. 
After carrying out the study, Nyaligu concluded that, on its own, Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy stood little chance of obtaining World Heritage status – the 
conservancy was simply not unique enough (Abungu & Nyaligu 2008: iv). 
Nevertheless, Nyaligu proposed an alternative course of action. He advised Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy to join Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage status, and to apply 
for an extension of the existing site (Ibid.: iv-v). 
                                                        
20 A biennial event that means to call attention to cultural heritage sites under threat (see World 
Monuments Fund n.d.).
21 An organization for museum professionals that is committed to the preservation of cultural goods (see
ICON n.d.).
22 An organization that means to protect cultural heritage in the developing world (see Global Heritage 
Fund n.d.).
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Based on Maurice Nyaligu’s advice, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy contacted 
the KWS to gauge their view on the matter, Jonathan Moss told me. If the 
conservancy wanted to apply for an extension it would need the backing of a 
state institution, and the project’s chances depended on the KWS’s willingness to 
cooperate. An insider told me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy made the KWS an 
offer: if the latter drafted and submitted the application, then the conservancy 
would cover the costs and pay the KWS a fee. The KWS accepted the offer, but
for a different reason, an insider later suggested to me. In 2008, the organization 
was still in conflict with the Forest Service over Mt. Kenya’s management 
mandate – if anything, as I suggested in chapter two, their antagonism had only 
increased after the adoption of the 2005 Forest Act. So when Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy sought cooperation, some people within the KWS had taken that as 
an opportunity to extend Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site not only with the 
conservancy, but also with the lower forest ring that Bongo Woodley had been 
told to remove from his application (see chapter two). In this way, Mt. Kenya’s 
KWS team hoped to reinforce its authority over the area, and to gain the upper 
hand over the Forest Service. 
Although the KWS had initially agreed to participate, it soon lost interest. 
Someone from Lewa Wildlife Conservancy told me he recalled that the KWS 
became increasingly suspicious of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s intentions. 
Also, for reasons that I never learned, the KWS’s initial plan to include Mt. 
Kenya’s lower forests in the extension disappeared. The organization put the 
application on the back burner and the process stalled. Geoffrey Chege,23 one of 
Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s conservation officers who played a central role 
throughout the entire application procedure, told me that eventually one 
individual KWS staff member had drafted the application at home, in his own 
time. The document that this staff member produced carried the logo of the 
Kenyan government and included the necessary official credentials, but in 
practice the KWS had taken its hands off the project. I had this confirmed when I 
visited the National Museums of Kenya to speak to Hoseah Wanderi, 24 the 
museums’ World Heritage contact. While waiting for Wanderi a helpful secretary 
wanted to hand me the original application file, but she struggled to locate it in 
the museum’s database. Then, Wanderi came in and told her she would not find 
it – since the application had not been written by the KWS as an institute, it had 
never been filed.
In January 2010, the application for an extension to Mt. Kenya World 
Heritage Site finally reached the World Heritage Centre in Paris. The request for 
                                                        
23 Conversations on 12 November 2011, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy; 19 April 2012, Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy; 21 August 2012, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy.
24 Conversation on 3 July 2012, National Museums of Kenya Nairobi.
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a revision to the existing site primarily rested on two arguments. First, the 
application highlighted Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s black rhino and Grevy’s 
Zebra population, and it argued that Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site’s overall 
biodiversity record would become more unique if the site came to include the 
conservancy (The Government of the Republic of Kenya 2010A: 35-36). Second, 
the application went out of its way to argue that there was an unmistakable 
symbiotic relationship between Mt. Kenya and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. To 
strengthen this argument, the application file displayed various maps. For
instance, it included a map that blotted out all the other private conservancies, 
thus giving the impression that Mt. Kenya and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy were 
two heavily-dependent conservation islands in otherwise empty surroundings 
(Ibid.: 16). There were also maps that underscored Mt. Kenya’s and Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy’s ecological connectivity by showing the movement of 
elephants between the two properties (Ibid.: 27-28). But like the first one, the 
latter maps were misleading – they were based on the journeys of a single bull 
elephant, notorious for his wanderings between the two properties, and they 
failed to show that elephants moved in other directions as well. But more 
important even than the maps, the application tried to brace the argument of 
ecological connectivity by highlighting the presence of a wildlife corridor that 
connected Mt. Kenya and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy (Ibid.: 4).
The wildlife corridor had a history of its own. In 2006, two farm owners and 
two local conservation organizations, the Bill Woodley Mount Kenya Trust 
(BWMKT) and the Ngare Ndare Forest Trust (NNFT), had agreed to build a 
fenced-off elephant passage that would connect Mt. Kenya’s northernmost 
forests with the adjacent Ngare Ndare forest reserve, and which meant to 
centralize elephant movement in the area. All four parties believed they would 
gain from the corridor: the two farms wanted to control elephant migration
because the animals invaded their lands and destroyed their crops, and BWMKT 
and NNFT wanted to control elephant migration to offer better protection against 
poaching and to reduce human-wildlife conflicts in neighbouring African 
villages. Due to its close relationship with Ngare Ndare forest, Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy was also affiliated to the project (see Bill Woodley Mount Kenya 
Trust et al. 2006).
BWMKT, NNFT and the two farmers reasoned that the elephant corridor was 
an important conservation investment because it would re-establish and protect 
traditional elephant migration routes that colonial settlement had disturbed (see 
also Avery 2006). Among other things, proponents of the project argued, the 
recovery of these traditional routes would contribute to the diversification of the 
area’s elephant gene pool (Ibid.). But a number of observing conservationists 
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questioned this. One of them, a trained zoologist,25 was especially critical of the 
idea of historical elephant routes. When we met, he told me he was working on 
an article in which he meant to show that there is little scientific evidence that 
explains how elephants pick their migration routes. As such, he emphasized, it 
would be premature to assume that ‘historical’ elephant routes exist. The 
zoologist had also worked on a number of elephant fencing projects throughout 
Laikipia, which had given him the impression that the elephant herds on Mt. 
Kenya’s highlands and the elephant herds on the lowlands north of Mt. Kenya 
were isolated from one another. From the perspective of elephant conservation,
therefore, he saw little benefit in connecting the two areas.
The zoologist was sceptical about the corridor’s utility but had observed the 
negotiation process between the stakeholders involved with slight amusement, he 
told me. All stakeholders coped with dense elephant populations, and all hoped 
that the corridor would bring relief: lowland stakeholders anticipated that the 
corridor would lead elephants into Mt. Kenya’s forests, while the stakeholders on 
Mt. Kenya anticipated that the corridor would lead elephants into the northern 
rangelands. There was clearly a conflict of interest, but that did not inhibit the 
corridor project – rather, it stimulated and shaped it (see also Tsing 2005: 10). In 
the meantime, the zoologist hoped that the corridor would indeed fail to achieve 
anything at all, for if it caused two thousand Mt. Kenyan elephants to head for 
the lowlands, or vice versa, pressure on the environment and human-wildlife 
conflicts would only further increase.
Alternatively, there were also conservationists who supported the corridor 
plan for reasons other than its conceivable capacity to direct elephant migration. 
These conservationists focused more on the project’s potential political capital 
than on its possible conservation merits, and they stressed that the corridor could 
enhance Laikipia’s conservation reputation. Anthony King, for instance,
suggested to me that the corridor would show the rest of the world that Kenya 
spoke the language of conservation, and would demonstrate Laikipia’s 
innovative outlook. He underscored that, apart from a possible ecological effect, 
the corridor could generate a psychological effect and he called it ‘a piece of 
conservation bling’.26 As such, Anthony King tapped into the current popularity
of wildlife corridors more generally. Goldman (2009) suggests that this 
popularity may be a result of corridors’ ability to satisfy different conservation 
philosophies: they connect otherwise isolated conservation enclaves, but ideally 
do so in a manner that least affects surrounding communities. Thus, she suggests,
                                                        
25 Conversation on 18 August 2012, Nanyuki town.
26 Anthony King might have borrowed that term from Norton-Griffiths, who already used it in 2009 (see 
Martin 2012: 65).
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corridors appeal to both fortress and community-based conservationists (2009: 
336).
That, on the whole, and with the exception of only a few critical observers,
there was such enthusiasm for the Mt. Kenya-Ngare Ndare corridor may need to 
be seen in light of the failure of an earlier corridor project. In the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, a man called Mike Prettejohn, the owner of a property called 
Sangare, had meant to build a corridor between Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares 
mountain range. Someone who had followed Prettejohn’s proposal closely told 
me in confidence that there had been no scientific justification for Prettejohn’s 
plan: there was only one source that suggested that there had been elephant 
movement between Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares in the past, and that was the 
diary of a colonial administrator called Richard Meinertzhagen (Meinertzhagen 
1983 [1957]: 107) – Meinertzhagen had come to the White Highlands in 1905, 
but not long after the British government had ordered him back because it 
considered his mode of administration too violent and too brutal (Garfield 2007: 
61).
The corridor between Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares mountain range differed 
from the corridor between Mt. Kenya and Ngare Ndare forest in at least one 
important respect: it had meant to cut through a densely populated area with 
African smallholdings. Thus, African farmers had had to be relocated, and the 
initiators of the corridor project had thought up a compensation scheme. Max 
Graham, who became involved because he was doing a PhD on elephant 
movement at the time, told me that these farmers had initially received the 
scheme well, although matters complicated when more and more people had 
demanded payment. But as the 2002 elections drew closer, the corridor had 
become a political target: a regional politician had managed to convince the 
farmers that the corridor was a cover-up for whites taking over African land, and 
the farmers had turned against Prettejohn. Graham stressed that these farmers 
became increasingly aggressive and violent, and that for reasons of safety the 
project was eventually abandoned.
The corridor between Mt. Kenya and Ngare Ndare was more fortunate. It only 
ran over two white-owned farms, and its biggest challenge was financial rather 
than political. Stakeholders predicted that the construction of the corridor would 
be unusually expensive, most importantly because it required an underpass to 
cross the Nanyuki-Meru highway, and the estimated costs totalled one million 
dollars. Even so, stakeholders managed to collect enough funding, among others
with the help of gifts from Richard Branson’s Virgin Atlantic and the Royal 
Netherlands Embassy. In 2008, building began (see for instance Nyaligu & 
Weeks 2013).
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When the application for Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site’s extension reached 
the World Heritage Centre in early 2010, the construction of the corridor was in 
progress. In stressing the corridor’s importance, the application summed up all 
the arguments that BWMKT, NNFT and the two farmers also used: it claimed 
that the corridor would re-open former migration routes; that it would relieve 
elephant population pressure; that it would alleviate human-wildlife conflicts; 
and that it would diversify gene pools (see for instance The Government of the 
Republic of Kenya 2010A: 12). But the application also obscured one important 
thing, namely that the corridor did not link Mt. Kenya and Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy directly – rather, Ngare Ndare forest reserve was positioned 
between them. This meant that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy could only join Mt. 
Kenya World Heritage Site if Ngare Ndare did so as well, and hence the 
application requested the designation of both (Ibid.: 51).
By October 2011, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had not yet heard back from 
the UNESCO World Heritage Centre, and the status of the application was still 
unclear. This changed as a result of my own interference: after I met Jonathan 
Moss, who was the first to inform me about Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s World 
Heritage project,27 I checked World Heritage’s online archive and I found that 
the World Heritage Centre had viewed the application as incomplete (UNESCO 
2011: 20). I sent my findings to Moss, who, in turn, forwarded them to Mike 
Watson, his successor as Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s CEO, who was
apparently unaware of the developments. Sceptics told me that this aptly
illustrated Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s irresponsible spending: first the 
conservancy invested a lot of money in a World Heritage application, and then it 
forgot to follow-up on the results. 
Since World Heritage’s online archive did not say much about why the 
application had been considered incomplete, Mike Watson began an inquiry of 
his own. He later showed me his email correspondence, which revealed that his 
investigations had brought him to IUCN’s regional director for East and 
Southern Africa Ali Kaka; to a staff member of the IUCN office in Nairobi called 
Leo Niskanen; to staff of IUCN’s headquarters in Switzerland, including director 
of the World Heritage Programme Tim Badman; and to a World Heritage
nominations manager called Alessandro Balsamo, 28 who was located at the 
World Heritage Centre in Paris. Together, these World Heritage experts raised a 
number of concerns. Firstly, they told Watson that there had been several 
administrative flaws. Among other things, the information on the surface 
acreages had been imprecise, and there was a lack of adequate maps and 
                                                        
27 The UNESCO online archive does not show the applications of World Heritage Sites still in 
preparation, and as such I had not known about Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s ambitions until 
Jonathan Moss informed me.
28 Conversation 29 May 2013, World Heritage Centre Paris.
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photographs. Also, the request for extension had not been put on Kenya’s World 
Heritage tentative list prior to submission.
In addition to these shortcomings, which could easily be rectified, there were 
more problematic issues. Firstly, the World Heritage Centre had not accepted the 
application’s argument that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s black rhinos and 
Grevy’s Zebras would add to the overall biodiversity of Mt. Kenya World 
Heritage Site. It had turned down this argument, not because of its content, but 
because it rested on World Heritage nomination criterion (x),29 which had not 
been part of the original designation of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site. Instead, 
the 1997 designation only made mention of World Heritage criteria (vii) and (ix), 
and therefore the World Heritage Centre maintained that the alterations proposed 
were too drastic to pass as a simple site extension – either Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy and Mt. Kenya needed to apply for an entirely new World Heritage
listing that did include criterion (x), or Lewa Wildlife Conservancy needed to 
adjust its argument to fit criterion (vii) or criterion (ix). This illustrates World 
Heritage’s remarkably static understanding of heritage sites, as well as its rigid 
enforcement of such an understanding. The World Heritage experts that Mike 
Watson had contacted furthermore indicated that they had reservations 
concerning the validity of the corridor argument: since the corridor had not yet 
been finished when Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s application had reached the 
World Heritage Centre, experts had considered it too early to pass judgement on 
the its ecological merits.
Needless to say, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was not happy with the outcome. 
It had spent approximately $150,000 to $200,000 on the application, only to find 
that the document had been doomed in advance because the KWS had not 
followed World Heritage’s bureaucratic procedure properly. In light of this, Mike 
Watson consulted a colleague to discuss whether he could hold the KWS 
responsible and whether it would be of any use to file another application. He 
forwarded me the emails, of which a part read:
[The KWS] were far from transparent, and failed to share the document until well after the 
fact – so I regret I have no expectation that you will get anything further without throwing 
money at it. I would suggest you get as much detail as you can from IUCN in the first 
instance. If the inscription criteria is a deal breaker then there is no point in pursuing this 
further. If it is simply a case of missing paperwork, mapping – and indeed procedure – then 
it should be fairly straight forward [sic]. Even so you will need KWS support and would 
need to fund the resubmission. I doubt there will be much appetite amongst donors unless 
prospects look good. I also fear that the KWS were not particularly interested in the Lewa 
extension – and were simply using [Lewa] to try and expand the WHS on the mountain to 
                                                        
29 Which concerns ‘the most important and significant natural habitats for in-situ conservation of 
biological diversity, including those containing threatened species of outstanding universal value from 
the point of view of science or conservation’ (UNESCO 2015, article 77).
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cover the entire reserve – and even that is seen of only limited value given the limited return 
KWS see from the WH inscription of Mt. Kenya (in financial terms). 
It appeared as if Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s World Heritage venture was 
stranded, not least because Mike Watson left me with the impression that he was 
not very motivated to go through the entire application process again – it would 
cost more time and more money, and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had already 
improved its position vis-à-vis the Kenyan government through the Chikwe Ltd. 
land sale. To Watson, World Heritage appeared as ‘just another box to tick’ when 
it came to securing the conservation status of the land. But after Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy’s ownership arrangements had changed, this box had lost most of 
its appeal. 
All this happened shortly before I left Nanyuki for a few months. I expected 
that, by the time I returned, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy would have moved on to 
other things. I got it completely wrong.
A former cattle ranch as World Heritage
In December 2011, Geoffrey Chege rewrote the application for Mt. Kenya World 
Heritage Site’s extension with Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. Apparently, the
conservancy had not trusted the KWS with the task and had taken matters into its
own hands. Chege primarily made two modifications to the initial application: he 
deleted all references to criterion (x), and put more emphasis on the ecological 
connection between Mt. Kenya and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy (see The 
Government of the Republic of Kenya 2012A) Accordingly, the corridor between 
the mountain and Ngare Ndare forest came to serve an even stronger rhetorical 
purpose. Yet, this time round, that seemed less problematic: the corridor had 
been finished, and from early 2011 there had been reports of elephants using it
(see for instance African Conservation Foundation 2011; The Huffington Post, 30 
January 2011).
While Lewa Wildlife Conservancy showed little confidence in the KWS’s 
ability to rewrite the application in such a way that the World Heritage Centre
would accept it, the KWS also seemed reluctant to assist the conservancy a 
second time. On different occasions KWS officers told me that they did not see 
the point of uniting Mt. Kenya and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy in one World 
Heritage Site: they underscored that the properties were completely different, for 
instance in terms of habitat, conservation problems or management capacities, 
and they maintained that the two were not supposed to be connected. In the 
course of the process, moreover, a number of people within the KWS had 
become increasingly suspicious of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s intentions. For 
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instance, one warden30 told me that he was certain that the conservancy had clear 
reasons for its interest in World Heritage status, yet he had no idea what these 
reasons were. He stressed that Mt. Kenya had long been a World Heritage Site,
but that this status had never delivered anything, either in terms of management 
mandate, or in terms of financial support. In fact, he was so disappointed with the 
World Heritage programme in general that he suggested removing UNESCO’s 
logo from Mt. Kenya’s gates entirely. His own scepticism about World Heritage
had made him wary of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s objectives, for he suspected 
that the conservancy knew things that he did not know. If the site extension was 
truly beneficial to all parties involved, he reasoned, then Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy would have been less secretive about it. 
Despite this warden’s mistrust, the conservancy nevertheless managed to get 
the institute’s approval for Geoffrey Chege’s rewritten application, and KWS 
director Julius Kipng’etich31 signed the document himself (The Government of 
the Republic of Kenya 2012A: 82). Still, the warden had made valid remarks 
about the application’s lack of transparency and openness. From the beginning, 
Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had largely kept the venture to itself – not only had 
it kept the KWS in the dark about it motivations, it had also failed to involve 
affected parties such as corridor stakeholders. This became evident when I 
visited NNFT’s office and spoke to the trust’s project manager, Dominic 
Maringa,32 in May 2012. By that time, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had already 
submitted the rewritten application to the World Heritage Centre, and I asked 
Maringa how he or other members of the trust had contributed to the revision 
process. In response, he raised his eyebrows, and said: ‘I was not aware of all 
this’. Apparently, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had requested World Heritage
status for Ngare Ndare forest, but without notifying the forest’s daily 
management team.
Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had also not put much energy in informing the 
two farm owners who had made available land for the corridor. Both33 told me 
that they had heard one or two things about the extension project, but had not 
known what to expect from it. Since the corridor ran over their lands they would 
inevitably be drawn into a World Heritage extension, yet neither of them knew 
how, or even if, World Heritage status would affect their land use possibilities –
one of them grew crops in the corridor and the other had real estate plans, and 
both were uncertain about UNESCO’s power to curtail such activities. They 
                                                        
30 We discussed the subject on 21 November 2011, when Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had just found out 
that the World Heritage Centre had turned down the first application for extension.
31 Conversation on 20 June 2012, KWS Headquarters Nairobi.
32 Conversation on 28 May 2012, NNFT office in Ngare Ndare Forest.
33 Conversations on 18 October 2011, Kisima Farm; 24 April 2012, Kisima Farm; 5 June 2012, Marania 
Farm.
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indicated that they would only condone Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s World 
Heritage campaign if it did not affect their individual businesses. But since the 
conservancy hardly engaged them they could not assess the situation.
In addition to the reservations of immediately affected parties, there were also 
onlookers who were not directly involved but who were nevertheless critical. 
Different observers told me they disapproved of how Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy had acted alone, and had turned the entire undertaking into a one-
man affair. At the same time, people tended to dismiss the request for Mt. Kenya 
World Heritage Site’s extension as just another event that illustrated Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy’s over-the-top marketing practices. One conservationist,
for example, told me that he considered the conservancy’s quest for World 
Heritage status a ‘typical Lewa thing’, and he repudiated it as ‘mainly bullshit’.
He clarified that he did not see why, if Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site had to be 
expanded, it should only include Lewa Wildlife Conservancy and not all the 
other private conservancies as well. He emphasized that Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy had once again acted at the cost of other people. A colleague of his, 
whom I talked to a few days later, agreed with this point of view and said that it 
was about time someone told Lewa Wildlife Conservancy to stop growing and 
disadvantaging others.
IUCN also entertained the idea that if Lewa Wildlife Conservancy could be 
added to Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site then other conservancies could be as
well. When Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had just submitted the rewritten 
application to the World Heritage Centre, one of IUCN’s technical advisors 
located in Nairobi 34 indicated to me that the conservancy could only obtain 
World Heritage status if it could demonstrate that, of all possible extensions, the
one they proposed would create the most extraordinary World Heritage Site. He 
speculated that this would be difficult, not in the last place because the 
conservancy’s application rested entirely on the argument of the corridor, while
the corridor only had limited ecological potential. It linked Mt. Kenya to Ngare 
Ndare, he clarified, but it only enabled the movement of one particular wildlife 
species, namely elephants. The technical advisor therefore stressed that, contrary 
to what the application suggested, the corridor did not ‘link’ two ecosystems –
instead it just offered elephants a safer passage. In theory, the corridor could also 
be opened to other species such as rhinos or Grevy’s Zebras, but different 
conservationists indicated to me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy would never let 
such valuable species off its property, and even the application itself explicitly 
mentioned that the conservancy had no such intentions (The Government of the 
Republic of Kenya 2012A: 18).
                                                        
34 Conversation on 10 May 2012, IUCN office Nairobi.
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In addition to the corridor’s limited ecological benefits, IUCN’s technical 
advisor pointed out, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s complex ownership issues 
further problematized the application. The proposed extension included land 
owned by Chikwe Ltd. and supervised by the non-profit organization Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy; land owned by Chikwe Ltd. but leased back by Craig
family members; land that Chikwe Ltd. had not (yet) bought and that was owned 
by different third parties; corridor land that belonged to two different private 
landowners; and Ngare Ndare forestland in possession of the Kenyan 
government. IUCN’s technical advisor stressed that, in general, IUCN is not in 
favour of such complicated arrangements, because the involvement of many 
different stakeholders typically hinders effective management. Besides, he 
stressed, if Mt. Kenya and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy were united in one World 
Heritage designation then their individual management plans also had to be fine-
tuned. He doubted whether that was feasible, because the two had completely 
different modes of operation and completely different budgets. In sum, he did not 
seem to believe that the extension would actually happen. 
Nevertheless, in late May 2012, Mike Watson notified me that he had heard 
indirectly that the World Heritage Centre had accepted Geoffrey Chege’s revised 
application, and that IUCN was making preparations for a field evaluation. This 
evaluation eventually took place in October 2012 and was carried out by a South 
African called Roger Porter. Through others I heard that Porter had spent two or 
three days on Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, and that there had been one 
stakeholder meeting to which all corridor partners had been invited. It was said 
that none of these partners had raised any serious concerns, and the report that 
Porter later produced stated:
The LWC-NNFR [Lewa Wildlife Conservancy – Ngare Ndare forest reserve] extension 
brings an additional set of ecosystem processes and biodiversity that are currently not part of 
the Mount Kenya World Heritage Site by incorporating the lower lying, scenic foothills and 
arid habitats of high biological richness and diversity. Of particular significance and value is 
that LWC-NNFR lies at the ecotone or ecological transition zone between the Afro Tropical 
Montane ecosystem and its associated biodiversity and that of the semi-arid East African 
Savannah Grasslands. It thus provides for a more ecologically intact World Heritage site 
especially in its incorporation of the complete and diverse range of outstanding ecological 
processes.
IUCN (2013: 9)
Despite all the complications, including the intricate landownership
arrangements, the weak arguments for ecological connectivity, and the failure to 
include affected stakeholder, Porter supported the extension.
Perhaps Roger Porter’s uncritical approval of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s 
proposal for extension must be understood in light of IUCN’s willingness to help 
secure the conservancy’s future. Roughly nine months after Porter’s site 
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evaluation I briefly met Tim Badman,35 the director of IUCN’s World Heritage
Programme, at the World Heritage Centre in Paris. Badman told me that, for 
IUCN, the World Heritage initiative is essentially one conservation scheme 
amongst many others. It is primarily of interest to IUCN, he explained, because it 
assists in setting aside as many areas as possible for conservation. He commented 
that, in recent years, World Heritage status had inflated, and he stressed that quite 
a few natural sites had been added to the list of which the management and state 
of conservation was insufficient – as such, IUCN officially maintained that the 
number of new World Heritage inscriptions had to be curtailed (see for instance 
IUCN 2012). But Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was a different case entirely, I 
realized after the talk – the conservancy controls the management of its property 
to the very last detail, and perhaps IUCN hoped that the Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy’s best practices would trickle down to Mt. Kenya if the two were 
joined in one World Heritage designation. In addition, at the end of July 2012 a 
former IUCN employee told me that IUCN had a longstanding interest in NRT’s 
community conservancies. Yet due to some unfortunate event in the past, the 
organization had fallen out with either the wider management of Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy, or with Ian Craig personally. Already in July the person expressed 
to me his expectation that IUCN would write a favourable report either way – he 
stressed that the organization would want to re-establish contact, strengthen the 
links, and finally gain a foothold in the northern rangelands.
Regardless of how and why Roger Porter had arrived at his positive 
assessment, the World Heritage Committee adopted IUCN’s advice and in July 
2013 it voted in favour of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site’s extension with Ngare 
Ndare forest reserve and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy (UNESCO 2013: 155). 
After more than five years of trying, the latter’s efforts had finally paid off, and a 
former white cattle ranch had been accepted as natural World Heritage.36 Some 
of Laikipia’s conservationists found this staggering, they told me: they could not 
understand that land, which less than twenty years ago had still hosted a cattle 
business, had ended up on the World Heritage List. Different World Heritage
experts, however, took a completely different perspective. IUCN’s Roger Porter 
had clearly supported the extension, but also Hoseah Wanderi from the National 
Museums of Kenya told me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy fully deserved 
World Heritage status. He did not find the conservancy’s short existence 
troubling, and he underscored that World Heritage was primarily about unique 
features and enhancing conservation – from his point of view, Lewa Wildlife 
                                                        
35 Conversation on 29 May 2013, World Heritage Centre Paris.
36 The problem of the complex ownership arrangements was solved through the identification of no less 
than seventeen ‘exclusion zones’ that were exempted from the designation (see The Government of
the Republic of Kenya 2012A: 7).
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Conservancy fulfilled both. George Abungu37 even went a step further. Not only 
did he not take Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s ranching history as an obstacle to 
becoming World Heritage, he turned the whole thing upside-down: he said to me 
that the conservancy deserved heritage status all the more, because after so many 
years of colonial occupation it had finally returned to its original landscape and it 
had welcomed back the wildlife that had always been there. To him, Lewa
Wildlife Conservancy was a showpiece example of pre-colonial land use.
Like Mt. Kenya’s original World Heritage designation in 1997, for which 
Bongo Woodley argued that the mountain was a pristine wilderness area 
unaffected by human interference (see chapter two), Mt. Kenya’s 2013 World 
Heritage Site extension was vested in visions of an ideal landscape. These 
visions outweighed Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s actual history and, notably, 
after World Heritage listing the conservancy actively began to cover up its own 
cattle ranching past. Prior to mid-2013, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s website 
openly mentioned that the conservancy had grown out of Lewa Downs livestock 
farm. If anything, the website revealed a certain pride in how the Craig family 
had managed to turn an unprofitable cattle ranch into a world-renowned nature 
reserve, and pictures of rhinos featured alongside pictures of colonial cattle 
caravans (see for instance Lewa Wildlife Conservancy n.d.B; Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy n.d.C). But after World Heritage listing, Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy redesigned its website: it deleted most references to how the 
property had been used in the past, and presented the foundation of Anna Merz’s 
rhino sanctuary as its historical moment of origin (see Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy n.d.E). After it obtained World Heritage status Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy had apparently found it necessary to reinvent itself – in the process,
it disposed of those parts of history that could impair its World Heritage
credibility.
A brand in the hands of elites
Initially, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy became interested in gaining World 
Heritage status because it aimed to strengthen the conservation status of its land. 
This ambition reverted to the colour bar politics that I discussed in the previous 
chapter, which continue to inspire a persistent nervousness on behalf of many 
white landowners over their title deeds, and which lay bare the Kenyan 
government’s ambivalent stance on the future of white property rights. During 
the 2004 Maasai campaigns, the government sided with Laikipia’s landowners 
and refused to redress Maasai grievances over colonial injustices, but the 2010 
                                                        
37 Conversation on12 July 2012, Naro Moru (Deirdre Prins-Solani, independent heritage consultant and 
former executive director of the Center for Heritage Development in Africa, was also present).
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Constitution and the 2012 Land Act suggest that tides may be turning. In any 
case, Laikipia’s white landowners are careful to minimize risks of confiscation 
and they have developed a variety of land securing strategies, such as being as 
productive as possible, or investing in community work.
Within this context, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy conceived of World Heritage
as yet another strategy to avert the threat of expropriation. Its managers hoped 
that if the conservancy was acknowledged as one of the world’s most 
extraordinary natural treasures under the World Heritage Convention, then it 
would be able to summon a sense of collective global ownership. This sense of 
ownership could subsequently translate into political capital: if the Kenyan 
government decided to interfere with the conservancy’s land use or cancel its 
title deeds, then World Heritage status could activate a global community urging 
for and defending Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s preservation. The pressure that 
such a community could exert is limited, for UNESCO has no legal sanction to 
enforce the World Heritage Convention. In fact, there are numerous examples of 
governments that take little notice of the lobbying of World Heritage advocates. 
The Australian government mining in Kakadu National Park (see Maswood 
2000) and the Tanzanian government building a highway through Serengeti 
National Park (see Death 2013) are exemplary in this regard. Even so, in light of 
Laikipia’s landowners’ limited means to improve their position, even the 
smallest opportunities are exploited. 
These dynamics are not unique to Kenya. Maurice Nyaligu38 told me that,
immediately after the release of Nelson Mandela, different South African farmers 
put forward World Heritage nominations for their private estates. Like Laikipia’s 
white landowners today, these farmers had feared losing rights of possession, and 
they had tried to stay one step ahead of possible land reform policies. Nyaligu 
recounted that such nominations had caused heated debates within the UNESCO 
World Heritage Committee, for different state representatives had taken the firm 
stance that World Heritage should not serve as a political tool in domestic 
struggles over land distribution. Of course, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy aimed to 
employ World Heritage in exactly the same way, but unlike the South African 
nominations this never revealed itself as a problem. There might be several 
possible explanations for this; perhaps Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was more 
successful in covering up the politics at play due to its heavy reliance on nature 
conservation rhetoric; perhaps state representatives were less aware of current 
developments in Laikipia and in Kenya at large; or perhaps state representatives 
were simply less critical than they had been in the early 1990s, which might be 
an effect of the overall increasing politicization of the World Heritage Committee 
                                                        
38 Conversation on 1 August 2012, Nanyuki Airport. 
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and its present-day tendency to prioritize inscription over thorough research and 
evaluation (see Brumann 2014B; Meskell 2012 & 2013). 
At the same time, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s interest in World Heritage
status cannot entirely be explained through the ambition to secure ownership 
rights. By the time that the conservancy learned of the World Heritage Centre’s 
rejection of the first application, which was in late October 2011, the Craig 
family’s land sale to Chikwe Ltd. was about to be concluded. This land sale 
generated far more legal protection against colour bar politics than World 
Heritage status ever could, Mike Watson suggested to me, and also Ian Craig 
indicated that the transfer of ownership was more of a boost to Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy’s conservation future than a UNESCO designation. Nevertheless, 
Geoffrey Chege rewrote and resubmitted the application and the conservancy 
continued pursuing World Heritage status. This was arguably partially motivated 
by the investments that had already been made, for when the World Heritage
Centre turned the application down Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had already 
spent between $150,000 and $200,000 on the project. At the same time, Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy may have been interested in World Heritage status for yet 
another reason – World Heritage offers a trademark, which the conservancy 
could employ for marketing purposes.
Over the years, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy put great effort into advertising 
itself, and to this day it continues to invest heavily in improving name awareness 
both inside and outside Kenya. To put it in the words of one informant, Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy simply ‘puts its name on everything’. The relocation of 
rhinos to the neighbouring Borana Ranch, which was accompanied by dramatic 
media announcements as well as a sensational video that almost entirely focused 
on Lewa Wildlife Conservancy and marginalized Borana Ranch’s efforts, is 
exemplary in this regard. But such branding activities also mark the
conservancy’s CSR programme; the flamboyant charity events and galas that it 
organizes or that its representatives attend (see for instance Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy 2015); the yearly Safaricom Marathon (see Safaricom Marathon 
n.d.); or the conservancy’s regular appearance in nature documentaries and films. 
In short, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy is keen on media attention and it 
presumably intended to employ World Heritage status for this purpose. In fact,
both the applications that the conservancy submitted to the World Heritage
Centre proposed to alter the name ‘Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site’ to ‘Mt. 
Kenya-Lewa Wildlife Conservancy World Heritage Site’ (see The Government 
of the Republic of Kenya 2010A & 2012A). The World Heritage Committee did 
not grant this request, and the name remained unchanged – even so, after 
designation, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy quickly redesigned its logo, and since 
then features its World Heritage status prominently. This suggests that even if the 
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conservancy no longer needed World Heritage for securing land rights, its 
managers still felt that the UNESCO brand name could contribute to summoning 
the large amounts of donor money that its operation depends on.
Although Lewa Wildlife Conservancy immediately employed World Heritage
for marketing purposes, and despite having paraded its World Heritage status 
ever since July 2013, I do not mean to reduce World Heritage listing to mere 
branding in the way that tourism or administration studies sometimes do (see for 
instance Poria et al. 2011; Ryan & Silvanto 2009). More than just a prestigious 
label, the case of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy shows that World Heritage is a 
catalyst and mobilizer in its own right (this is comparable with how Mosse 2005 
approaches development). Besides, the way in which Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy today promotes its uniqueness and extraordinariness via World
Heritage seems to exemplify more structural conditions, namely the 
conservancy’s ruling position in Laikipia’s wildlife conservation industry. This 
finds expression in, among other things, how Lewa Wildlife Conservancy 
monopolizes the donor money for certain wildlife species, or in how it changed
the design of the KETRACO power line. 
I believe that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s success in obtaining World 
Heritage status was itself an effect of the conservancy’s strong network and 
overall dominance. Already at an early stage, the conservancy managed to secure
the support of influential stakeholders such as Julius Kipng’etich and George 
Abungu. Despite the suspicion of various wardens and rangers, the
conservancy’s plea for extension received official KWS support; and despite 
arguments that called into question both the extension’s ecological value as well 
as its ownership complexity, IUCN evaluator Roger Porter backed the 
application. From the start, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had the necessary key 
figures on its side, and it seemed that its World Heritage project could hardly fail. 
It was Maurice Nyaligu who pointed this out to me most vividly. In August 2012 
he said that, without doubt, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy would end up on the 
World Heritage List – every person within Kenya who either had the knowledge,
the capabilities and the power to halt the nomination had been won over.
The joined World Heritage designation tightened the bond between Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy and the KWS, and in theory it even authorized the latter to 
meddle with the conservancy’s management (because the World Heritage
Convention allocates state parties the exclusive right to supervise World Heritage
Sites). Yet, this did not seem to worry Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, even though 
the KWS only recently softened its previously hostile attitude towards private 
conservancies in general. Mike Watson once pointed out that the KWS can be 
fairly robust with regard to rights of ownership, management and utilization, but 
he added that, in the end, the organization does not have the capacity to enforce 
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any of its rules. From his perspective, the KWS was hardly a threat to Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy’s hegemony. Besides, the revised 2013 Wildlife Act 
suggests that the conservancy’s largest shareholder, TNC, already gained 
considerable control over the KWS’s conservation agenda as well as over its 
policy-setting. Moreover, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s executives have direct 
connections to the KWS: in 2012 Julius Kipng‘etich, for instance, joined the 
conservancy’s board of directors (see Lewa Wildlife Conservancy 2012) and in 
2013 he was accompanied by Paula Kahumbu (see Lewa Wildlife Conservancy 
2013), a protégé of Richard Leakey who himself took a place on the KWS’s 
board of trustees in 2015.
The case of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy thus suggests that World Heritage
reifies existing power structures. If the conservancy had not been as influential as 
it is, it probably would have been unable to capitalize on Mt. Kenya’s World 
Heritage status. It seems to me that Laikipian landowners and conservationists 
disapproved of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s World Heritage campaign so 
strongly, precisely because the undertaking underscored something they already 
understood quite well – namely that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s political and 
economic capital surpasses theirs, and that the conservancy continues to grow at 
the expense of others. This illustrates just how much World Heritage is in the 
hands of national elites, but it also immediately reveals that such elites are not 
necessarily within the state apparatus. It also calls into question the work of 
scholars who foreground World Heritage’s top-down implementation structures 
(see for instance Byrne 1991; Smith 2006; Rowlands & Butler 2007), for here the 
World Heritage label was not imposed but seized. I agree that the World Heritage
programme does set strict and rigid parameters for heritage conservation, and
that it does rely on narrow understandings of heritage, but this should not draw 
our attention away from how stakeholders put such parameters and 
understandings to good use to get what they want. In the process, World 
Heritage’s technical idiom may enable such stakeholders to conceal what is 
actually at stake – even if that is colour bar politics and white anxieties over 
property rights.
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Conclusion: Monument of nature?
In December 1997, Mt. Kenya obtained World Heritage status on the basis of its 
natural characteristics. The designation’s apolitical appearance, vested in the 
representation of ‘nature’ and ‘state party’ as technical categories, has been the 
central theme of this dissertation. Throughout this work I endeavoured to bring 
into focus what the rhetoric of nature conservation and natural heritage 
preservation obscures, and I unpacked the Kenyan state party involved in Mt. 
Kenya’s 1997 designation as well as the Kenyan state party that directed Mt. 
Kenya’s 2013 site extension. In doing so, I drew attention to Bongo Woodley’s 
key role in the late 1990s and dealt with Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s current 
dominant position; I made explicit the issues at stake, and pointed out how the 
ongoing rivalry between the KWS and the KFS as well as the competition 
between Laikipia’s private conservancies affected Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage
status; and I situated Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site in Kikuyu and Kalenjin 
political elites’ struggles over power as well as in Laikipia’s White Highlands’ 
history and the present day implications of that history. Each chapter made its 
own contributions to this exercise.
In chapter one, I identified a number of key concerns for studying World 
Heritage Sites. Among others, I historicized heritage’s central role in nation-
building and state-making, and I emphasized the authority that the 1972 World 
Heritage Convention ascribes to national state parties. I suggested that many 
World Heritage studies echo this official discourse of state authority over World 
Heritage Sites, thus failing to address the notion of World Heritage state party 
critically. Based on the work of scholars such as Abrams (1988), Mitchell 
(1991), Taussig (1993), Trouillot (2001), and Radcliffe-Brown (1940), I took the 
position that there is no such thing as ‘the state’ – there are constantly changing 
networks of individuals who deploy power in the name of the state, yet whose 
command very much depends on the extent to which an image of the state as a 
unified and collective source of intention is upheld. Translating this to World 
Heritage, I argued that it is crucial to deconstruct specific World Heritage
nominations and designations to the level of the actual individuals involved. 
When we fail to do this we are likely to miss how World Heritage articulates and 
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reinforces struggles over power, for instance between different state 
representatives and institutions, and thus we risk misunderstanding World 
Heritage’s workings and effects. 
One consequence of the typical reluctance to problematize notions of the state 
and state actors in relation to World Heritage is that it has become generally 
accepted that World Heritage is a nationalist instrument that buttresses state 
ideologies (see for instance Askew 2010, or the case studies of Hevia 2001; Long 
& Sweet 2006; Scott 2002; Silverman 2011). However, the case of Mt. Kenya 
suggests that World Heritage’s relation to the state and nationalism is not 
straightforward: when we closely examine who contributed to a World Heritage
designation when, for what purposes, and under which circumstances, we might 
find that World Heritage serves a range of purposes, of which giving expression 
to nationalist sentiments is only one. 
Finally, I considered the tendency in many World Heritage studies to treat ‘the 
state’ as a given (rather than as a problem) in light of how World Heritage at 
large depoliticizes (Ferguson 1990) heritage identification and preservation. That 
is to say, it reduces complex social and political matters to an expert discourse 
that makes believe that heritage management is technical rather than political 
(see also Li 2007 on ‘rendering technical’). World Heritage’s technical idiom 
reduces state parties to administrative entities that merely serve a bureaucratic 
purpose, but it also, for instance, depicts ‘nature’ and ‘ecological integrity’ as 
simple scientific facts to be recovered by trained specialists. In doing so, it makes 
invisible the politicking over what is and is not accepted as natural, and it 
obscures that nature is a culturally defined category that in itself might be 
considered a form of cultural property.
In chapter two, I introduced Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) warden Bongo 
Woodley, who served on Mt. Kenya between 1989 and 2006, as the mastermind 
of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site. Throughout his term, Woodley was in 
conflict with the Forest Department over the authority to supervise the mountain. 
Due to former colonial policies, both institutes had an official mandate over the 
area, yet their intentions with Mt. Kenya differed notably: the KWS practiced 
colonial ideals of fortress conservation and meant to protect the mountain’s 
forests against human exploitation, but the Forest Department carried out large-
scale logging operations. 
In the mid-1990s, KWS director David Western asked Bongo Woodley to 
draft a document to nominate Mt. Kenya for World Heritage status. The latter 
took this as an opportunity to outwit the Forest Department and grab control over 
Mt. Kenya’s management. In the World Heritage nomination document,
Woodley deliberately depicted the mountain as a pristine wilderness area – this 
image did not correspond with Mt. Kenya’s actual condition, but it did offer a 
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canvas for demonizing the Forest Department’s ongoing logging in front of a 
global World Heritage audience. In this way, Woodley hoped to mobilize an 
international lobby that would urge Kenya to remove the Forest Department from 
office. 
Not long after Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage designation, the KWS, in 
cooperation with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and a 
conservation platform called the Kenya Forest Working Group (KFWG), carried 
out two aerial surveys on Mt. Kenya. Both surveys underscored the Forest 
Department’s mismanagement, and both called for the need to curtail the Forest 
Department’s rights over Mt. Kenya’s forests. In 2000, the Kenyan government 
finally cancelled the Forest Department’s mandate, after which the KWS became 
Mt. Kenya’s sole official overseer. However, the Forest Department denounced 
the decision: it never left Mt. Kenya’s forest stations and to this day the two 
institutes fight over the mountain’s resources. Mt. Kenya’s 1997 World Heritage
listing thus did not remedy the area’s management conundrum. Indeed, instead of 
the World Heritage designation offering a solution to Bongo Woodley’s 
problems it was itself the product of his predicament. World Heritage status did 
not change the power dynamics at play – instead it reproduced them and offered 
them a new outlet. 
In chapter three, I examined Mt. Kenya’s cultural and political histories. I 
explained that the political establishment in place when Mt. Kenya became a 
World Heritage Site did not allow for a celebration of these histories because 
they were central to the symbolic capital of its strongest opponents, the country’s 
Kikuyu population. In the late 1930s, Kikuyu spokesman Jomo Kenyatta 
published a monograph called Facing Mt. Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu.
This work, together with Mt. Kenya’s role in the Mau Mau uprisings of the 
1950s, which at the time were interpreted as a Kikuyu revolt against colonial 
domination, consolidated the mountain’s image as a Kikuyu place. Jomo 
Kenyatta’s inauguration as Kenya’s first president further reinforced this, and in 
due time Mt. Kenya came to symbolize the control that Kikuyu politicians gained 
over Kenya’s post-independent political apparatus.
When Jomo Kenyatta passed away in 1978 Daniel Arap Moi took over the 
presidency. The latter continued the clientelistic politics that Jomo Kenyatta had 
put in place, but turned them to benefit his Kalenjin constituency. Moi 
marginalized Jomo Kenyatta’s former Kikuyu affiliates, and instituted a strict 
regime that did not tolerate opposition parties. These conditions changed in 1991 
after international organizations such as the World Bank cut off aid and 
demanded political reforms. In response, President Moi re-introduced a multi-
party political system as well as quadrennial elections. These reforms fostered 
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tribal oppositions, and especially from the second half of the 1990s, ethnic 
competition over administrative power has intensified. 
When the KWS submitted Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage nomination to the 
World Heritage Committee, Kenya’s second round of multi-party elections was 
pending. In those days, President Moi was most strongly challenged by the 
country’s Kikuyu population: the Kikuyu politicians who had been replaced after 
Jomo Kenyatta’s death encouraged Kikuyu communities to vote as one united 
block, and former Mau Mau war songs were revived in the region around Mt. 
Kenya. With elections drawing nearer, the Moi regime did everything in its 
power to subvert Kikuyu solidarity. However, it did not prevent Mt. Kenya’s 
World Heritage designation. I argued that this was because the nomination that 
Bongo Woodley drafted ‘naturalized’ the mountain: it exclusively spoke of Mt. 
Kenya’s natural features, and in doing so it gave the impression that there was 
nothing else to discuss. Thus, it tied in with incumbent politicians’ larger efforts 
to downplay Kikuyu cohesion, and the Moi regime therefore had no incentive to 
arrest Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage listing. This is not to suggest that Mt. 
Kenya’s natural World Heritage status was the result of deliberate political 
engineering. Rather, Moi and his allies just let the nomination run its course 
because it fitted their political ambitions – had the nomination proposed to 
celebrate Mt. Kenya’s cultural history, the situation would certainly have been 
different.
At the end of chapter three, I warned against seeing politics everywhere, in 
everything. Mt. Kenya’s natural World Heritage designation came to serve a 
larger political purpose, but its manifestation cannot be explained in terms of this 
purpose – it was Bongo Woodley and the KWS that pushed for Mt. Kenya’s 
World Heritage listing, for reasons that had nothing to do with nation-building or 
tribal competition over decision-making power. This illustrates that World 
Heritage studies should be cautious in explaining the progression of World 
Heritage processes in terms of the outcome, for Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site 
reveals that even when a designation is of service to office-holding politicians it 
does not necessarily mean it was also plotted as such.
In chapter four, I examined how racial colonial histories continue to inform 
Laikipia’s land debate. With the Maasai movements of 1904 and 1911 the British 
colonial administration opened former Masai Land to white settlement. 
Subsequently, the area turned into a hub of colonial immigrants who founded 
farms or cattle ranches, and the region became known as the White Highlands. 
After independence, a part of these European settlers returned to their country of 
origin. The lands that became vacant were subjected to state-orchestrated 
resettlement programmes, although the areas that were too arid for agriculture 
were typically sold to other European settlers or acquired by members of 
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Kenya’s upcoming political elite. In sum, certain parts of the former White 
Highlands land subdivided in small African settlements while at the same time a 
significant number of large white-owned estates remained intact.
Apart from the few white-owned estates that were fertile enough to farm, most 
Europeans continued ranching. But in the late 1980s and early 1990s Kenya’s 
cattle farming industry collapsed. As a result, ranch owners collectively sought 
alternative ways to make their lands profitable. In Laikipia, the part of the former 
White Highlands that is closest to Mt. Kenya, most ranches converted to private 
conservancies: in the course of the past twenty-five years, nature conservation 
became Laikipia’s core business, and today there are many NGO projects as well 
as an upcoming safari industry. But the future of Laikipia’s conservancies is 
uncertain. Firstly, Maasai groups continue to challenge white landowners’ 
property rights and from time to time they call upon the Kenyan government to 
redress colonial injustices. In addition, large landownership came under further
pressure due to recent legislative changes. In August 2010, the Kenyan 
government adopted a new Constitution and in May 2012 it introduced a new 
Land Act. These statutes made land ownership rights the preserve of Kenyan 
citizens, and they restrict land leases by non-citizens to a maximum period of 
ninety-nine years. 
Under these conditions, Laikipia’s white landowners have developed a range 
of strategies to ward off the risk of expulsion, but their endeavours are 
complicated by colour bar politics. In the past, the colour bar served to protect 
the privileges of Europeans but today it has an opposite effect: in contemporary 
Kenya white descent marks the need to constantly account for and legitimize 
one’s presence. In light of this, Laikipia’s white landowners typically emphasize 
how they improve national well-being, for instance because they pay taxes or 
because they contribute to the country’s food security. But the specific history of 
the White Highlands installed a narrative of white dominance that complicates 
such justifications. Most importantly, this narrative exaggerates Laikipia’s 
present-day whiteness and it downplays the presence of African pastoralists and 
small-scale farmers since 1963 – as a result, Laikipia still has not managed to 
shake off the image of being almost exclusively white. On occasion, this image 
translates into calls for retaliation, and from time to time Laikipia’s white 
residents are faced with politicians or protest groups who demand their eviction. 
The actions against Laikipia’s white landowners illustrate just how precarious 
the position of white residents in present-day African societies can be. 
Unfortunately, this has only received scant attention from social scientists (with 
the exception of Crapanzano 1985; McIntosh 2006 & 2015; Teppo 2009; 
Uusihakala 1999; Van der Waal & Robins 2011). Post-colonial scholars have 
tended to examine whites in Africa historically rather than ethnographically: 
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colonial agents such as missionaries, administrators and explorers have been 
studied in great depth, but only rarely are white Africans welcomed into 
anthropological fieldwork as informants and subjects of investigation. As a 
result, the discipline runs the risk of reiterating colonial idioms rather than 
analysing their place in contemporary African societies, thus playing into racists 
stereotyping. To prevent this, I argued at the end of chapter four, we need more 
ethnographic work that asks what it means to be a descendent of a colonial settler 
in Africa today. 
In chapter five, I discussed how Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site was drawn 
into the ongoing reproduction of Laikipia’s colonial and racist past. In 2010,
Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, which borders Mt. Kenya in the north, requested an 
extension of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site to include them. Like the rest of 
Laikipia’s conservancies, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had grown out of a cattle 
ranch, which had been founded in the early 1900s by a settler family named 
Craig. It had been one of the first to recognize the potential of wildlife 
conservation, and already in 1983 it had begun hosting a small rhino project. 
This project expanded rapidly, and in the mid-1990s the entire ranch was turned 
into a wildlife sanctuary. This wholesale transformation was unprecedented in 
Kenya, and its success set an example for Laikipia’s wildlife industry that 
developed in its wake. Eventually, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy became a 
powerful player within this industry, primarily due to its stake in the foundation 
of other conservancies and conservation platforms, and because of its leading 
role in the preservation of iconic species.
Despite Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s relatively strong position, its executives
nevertheless worried about the unpredictability of Laikipia’s colour bar politics 
as well as about the curtailment of white landownership rights more generally. 
To prevent the conservancy’s confiscation, either by discontent African farmer 
and pastoralists of by the state administration, these executives implemented a 
number of measures. Among others, they invested in community work and 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programmes; they cultivated partnerships 
with influential politicians; and with the help of the American organization The 
Nature Conservancy (TNC) they staged a land sale to change the conservancy’s 
legal status from private to corporate. Moreover, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy 
applied for World Heritage designation. The initiators behind the conservancy’s 
World Heritage quest anticipated that World Heritage status would reinforce 
Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s political capital: if the conservancy became the 
collective property of a global heritage community, then this community could 
be mobilized to demand ongoing preservation if the Kenyan government 
announced plans to cancel title deeds or alter present land use. World Heritage
thus offered Lewa Wildlife Conservancy an international podium on which to 
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call for perpetual safekeeping, should Kenya’s landownership issue or Laikipia’s 
land debate escalate. 
Initially, the World Heritage Centre rejected Lewa Wildlife Conservancy’s 
application for the extension of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site due to a number 
of procedural inaccuracies. Most importantly, the application was stranded 
because it did not match Mt. Kenya’s original World Heritage designation – the 
way in which Bongo Woodley had described Mt. Kenya in the late 1990s served 
as a fait accompli, and the World Heritage Committee could only consider the 
application if it fitted this description. This demonstrates World Heritage’s static 
understanding of heritage, which assumes that a site’s meaning is fixed in time 
and exists in isolation of social and political developments. After Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy received the World Heritage Centre’s feedback it rewrote and 
resubmitted the application, even though the Craig family’s land sale had already 
helped to secure the property’s conservation future by then. Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy’s second World Heritage application was also troublesome for a 
number of reasons, including the land’s complicated ownership arrangements 
and the disputable ecological merits of a site extension, yet IUCN backed the 
request. The World Heritage Committee adopted the organization’s advice, and 
in July 2013 Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was finally added to Mt. Kenya World
Heritage Site. 
After designation, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy began to employ its World 
Heritage status for fundraising purposes. Among other things, the conservancy
changed its logo and launched a new website on which it now highlights its place 
on the World Heritage List and conceals its ranching history. Although Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy immediately turned its newly obtained World Heritage
status into a PR tool, I argue against viewing the event as a mere merchandizing
or branding exercise. On the one hand, the World Heritage label acted as a 
mobilizer in its own right, as it encouraged stakeholders seeking the attention of 
international spectators to take action. On the other hand, Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy’s World Heritage designation gives expression to the conservancy’s 
powerful position both regionally and nationally, for without the right contacts 
and the necessary support of key figures it would not have been able to follow 
World Heritage’s strict bureaucratic procedures (which, for instance, demand 
state approval). The case of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy then illustrates that 
World Heritage is not a mere trademark – it is a catalyst, and it is likely to 
reproduce existing power structures. 
***
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Several larger arguments ran through this dissertation. First, every chapter in one 
way or another problematized the notion of the Kenyan state, and by extension 
stressed that there is little sense in understanding World Heritage as a mere state 
tool (as for instance Askew 2010 suggests). In the late 1990s, the government 
institute KWS requested World Heritage status for Mt. Kenya because it hoped 
that this would help to curtail the management rights of another government 
institute, the Forest Department. This demonstrates that World Heritage can 
simultaneously serve, and hinder, different arms of the state. That the Moi 
government endorsed Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage designation adds a dimension 
to this: it suggests that, even in those cases where different state representatives 
support one and the same World Heritage application, they might do so for 
completely different reasons. Chapters four and five further dealt with World 
Heritage’s ambivalent relation to the state, for they revealed how a conservancy 
started a lobby for World Heritage status with the deliberate intention to oppose 
Kenya’s state administration if necessary. In addition, these chapters included a 
variety of examples that emphasized just how problematic it is to conceive of the 
Kenyan state as an exclusive and unified source of power. For instance, they
described how the politician Mwangi Kiunjuri attacked private conservancy 
owners, which sat uncomfortably with the KWS’s official policy to improve 
private-public partnerships; they showed that although Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy is not a state actor it does have close relations with state 
representatives such as Francis ole Kaparo and Julius Kipng’etich, which 
guarantees them certain privileges; and they described how the non-
governmental organization TNC took up state responsibilities and behaved like a 
state agent when it directed the revision of the 2013 Wildlife Act. All these 
examples underscore that boundaries between state and non-state actors, as well 
as boundaries between private and national agendas, are constantly reshaped and 
continuously under negotiation (see also Li 2005; Mitchell 1991; Trouillot 2001).
Another theme that introduced itself both during Mt. Kenya’s original World 
Heritage designation as well as during the 2013 site adjustment is what I call the 
‘ownership paradox’. With this I refer to how stakeholders tried to capitalize on 
World Heritage’s idea of global collective ownership, but with the explicit 
intention to impound management rights rather than share them. Both Bongo 
Woodley, who aspired to gain full control over Mt. Kenya’s forests, and the 
executives of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, who wanted to prevent a transfer of 
property to the Kenyan government or pastoralist groups, interpreted the notion 
of ‘collective heritage’ as a status that would not diminish but rather reinforce 
their private control – sharing their treasures with the world at large, they 
believed, could mobilize a lobby defending their exclusive management 
authority. I began the first chapter pointing out that World Heritage is vested in 
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inconsistent ownership principles, i.e. collective ownership and state ownership, 
and I underscored that both principles leave undecided who precisely is endowed 
with the privilege to supervise. Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site illustrates what 
such uncertainties may come to look like in practice: when a place belongs to 
everyone, and when there are no clear arrangements on administrative control, 
we may all be pulled into the competition over ownership rights. 
Finally, all chapters drew attention to the struggles and processes that the 
technical and depoliticized narrative of Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage designation 
obscures. Now that these struggles and processes have been discussed in detail, I 
take the position that Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site articulates Kenya’s colonial 
history in various ways. First, the 1997 designation was enmeshed in an 
administrative conflict between the KWS and the Forest Department, which 
found its origins in the colonial separation of forest and wildlife management. In 
addition, the way in which Mt. Kenya eventually came to feature on the World 
Heritage List subscribed to colonial conceptions of a pristine African wilderness 
and reinforced colonial ideas about what conservation should be: that is, a 
military undertaking that protects nature against human exploitation. Secondly, 
Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site was drawn into the tribal competition over power 
between Kikuyu and Kalenjin political elites. This competition is vested in how 
colonialism played up and consolidated tribal identities, as well as in how the 
British administration helped establish Kikuyu control after independence 
through Jomo Kenyatta. Third, the 2013 modifications to Mt. Kenya World 
Heritage Site articulate white landowners’ worries over potential expulsion. 
These worries characterize the controversy over the ongoing presence of colonial 
descendants in contemporary Kenya, and they revert to colonialism’s colour bar.
Here, it may be noted that my suggestion that Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site 
articulates racial boundaries is, in light of World Heritage’s institutional anchor 
in UNESCO,1 paradoxical: ever since its foundation in 1945 UNESCO has been 
preoccupied with race issues, and the organization actively fought racism in 
different ways. In the 1950s, for instance, it aimed to formulate an alternative to 
scientific racism, which had provided for the hierarchical race typologies on 
which Nazism and colonialism thrived (see Brattain 2007; Stoczkowski 2009). 
This endeavour was closely entwined with the development of anthropology as a 
discipline, due to the involvement of, among others, Franz Boas’s student Ashley 
Montagu, who rejected racial divisions as a social myth. 2 In later years,
                                                        
1 UNESCO finds its origins in the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation (ICIC) that was 
founded in 1922 and roughly operated between 1936 and 1946 (Meskell & Brumann 2015: 24). In 
1945 the ICIC became part of the United Nations institutional structure and changed into UNESCO. 
Originally UNESCO aimed to promote literacy and disseminate Western agricultural models 
(Stoczkowski 2009) – only later did it begin to concern itself with the preservation of heritage sites.
2 See Visweswaran (1998) for inconsistencies in the anti-racist rhetoric of Franz Boas himself.
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UNESCO adopted Lévi-Strauss’s relativist definitions of culture and ethnicity in 
the hope to foster intercultural respect (Erikson 2001: 128). Yet, such attempts 
notwithstanding, Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site suggests that UNESCO still has 
a task ahead. As long as the World Heritage programme does not scrutinize and 
problematize the actual architects of World Heritage Sites, and consequently fails 
to recognize the social and political dynamics that individual heritage 
designations play into, then the organization may sustain the conditions for
ongoing racial struggles, perhaps without even being aware of it.
From a natural heritage point of view, Mt. Kenya may be a monument of 
nature – it is a place of extraordinary natural beauty with particular conservation 
demands that arouses a sense of awe and veneration in conservationists and 
nature-loving observers alike. Simultaneously, Mt. Kenya is a range of other 
things. It serves, for instance, as a cultural and political icon, it has been and 
continues to be a source of administrative struggle over management authority, it 
inspires nationalist propaganda (recall the hikes of Kisoi Munyao and Teddy 
Munyao that opened this dissertation), and it is a reminder of imperial expansion 
and former British rule. At times these different understandings merge, at times 
they collide, and at times they are simply ignorant of one another. In all cases, 
they make for messy social realities. Throughout this dissertation I have 
embraced this messiness. In fact, I am of the opinion that it forms the very tissue
of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site.
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Monument of nature? an ethnography of the World Heritage of Mt. Kenya 
examines the World Heritage status of Mt. Kenya, an alpine area located 
in Central Kenya. In 1997 Mt. Kenya joined the World Heritage List due to 
its extraordinary ecological and geological features. Nearly fifteen years later, 
Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site expanded to incorporate a wildlife conservancy bordering the mountain in the north. 
Both Mt. Kenya’s original World Heritage designation and later adjustments were founded on, and exclusively 
formulated in, natural scientific language. This volume argues that this was an effect not only of the innate 
qualities of Mt. Kenya’s landscape, but also of a range of conditions that shaped the World Heritage nomination 
and modification processes. These include the World Heritage Convention’s rigid separation of natural and cultural 
heritages that reverberates in World Heritage’s bureaucratic apparatus; the ongoing competition between two 
government institutes over the management of Mt. Kenya that finds its origins in colonial forest and game laws; 
the particular composition of Kenya’s political arena in respectively the late 1990s and the early 2010s; and the 
precarious position of white inhabitants in post-colonial Kenya that translates into permanent fears for losing 
property rights. 
Marlous van den Akker (1983) obtained a Master’s degree in cultural anthropology from the Institute of Cultural 
Anthropology and Development Sociology at Leiden University in 2009. The year after, she received funding from 
the Leiden Global Interactions Research Profile to write a dissertation on Mt. Kenya’s World Heritage status. For this 
project Marlous spent approximately one year in the vicinity of Mt. Kenya in a town called Nanyuki. She is currently 
a member of staff at the Institute of Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology at Leiden University.
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